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ABSTRACT
In his essay, Don’t Mourn for Us, Jim Sinclair describes autism as a “way
of being.” He maintains there is “no normal child hidden behind the autism” and that “it
colors every experience, every sensation, perception, thought, emotion, and encounter,
every aspect of existence.” In an attempt to appreciate the depth of Sinclair’s statements,
this thesis approaches autism as a “way of being” through the psychoanalytic theory of
Jacques Lacan. By applying Lacan’s conceptual framework to first-person writing and
scientific research, I lay an interdisciplinary foundation for the case I make. Although this
project requires significant conceptual scaffolding across different epistemological
systems, I consider how Lacanian theory possesses a unique capacity to conceive of
autism as a way of being and to open new ways of approaching the source material.
Implicitly, Sinclair asks that we consider the question of what it means “to be” –
autistic, neurotypical, or otherwise. I approach this from the premise that an individual
exists as a thinking being, or a “subject.” Because psychoanalysis is concerned with the
constitutive role of the unconscious in structuring consciousness, this thesis invests
substantial space in consideration of how the Lacanian subject is oriented around a
fundamental lack. To this end, I return frequently to Lacan’s concept of objet a,
understood as a representative of the subject’s lack in the perceptual realm that is itself
lacking. Further, Lacan’s unique interpretation of Freud consists in placing language as
the ultimate mediating structure of subjectivity; it both generates lack and establishes a
system for mitigating it. One’s way of being is always a way of being in language. 1
Given the predominant roles of language and social communication impairments in the
DSM-V diagnostic criteria for autism, a main goal of this project is to consider how an
autistic way of being entails a unique structuration of lack. 2
Autism and psychoanalysis share a history that extends back to the origins of the
diagnosis. I explore this history with a focus on how different psychoanalytic theories
conceptualize the autistic subject and to what extent they honor or undermine Sinclair’s
position. Contemporary Lacanian thinkers of autism do both. Unique to Lacan’s
structural approach, the concept of the Other is inclusive of a radical alterity, yet also the
system of language, the body, and certain aspects of the maternal and paternal functions.
The subject is unthinkable apart from the Other. I suggest an autistic way of being is
discernible in the autistic subject’s relation to each aspect of the Other. I find support for
this claim in recent sensorimotor research. Referred to loosely as the movement
perspective, this research suggests that differences in how autistic individuals move and
perceive others is a “unifying characteristic” of autism. 3 Importantly, the movement
perspective is proactively inclusive of first-person knowledge. Read through Lacan’s
conceptual framework, movement differences address the underlying mechanism of the
autistic subject’s relation to the Other, and thus its way of being.
Most fundamentally, this thesis is a work of theory that attempts to articulate
something universal about being a subject, without simultaneously eliding what is unique
about being an autistic subject
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Autism is typically defined as a neurodevelopmental disorder affecting multiple
aspects of an individual’s life. Current DSM-V diagnostic criteria include impairments in
verbal and non-verbal communication, deficits in social interactions, and restricted and
repetitive behaviors or interests. 4 Frequently associated with these criteria are a
pronounced preference for sameness and an aversion to breaks in routine, as well as
hyper- or hypo-sensitivity to certain sensory stimuli. 5 Autism is conceived of as existing
along a spectrum, conjoining individuals in need of intensive daily supports at one end,
with those who go largely unnoticed among their non-autistic peers at the other end.
Although rates of occurrence have risen steadily over the last three decades, accompanied
by an increase in research, 6 societal awareness, and cultural representation, there is still
no definitive etiology of autism beyond a collection of risk factors. 7
In my view, each inconclusive attempt to determine a cause corresponds to a
speculative theory about what autism is. These range from the psychogenic and the
environmental, to the neurobiological and the genetic. Regardless of the varying degrees
of evidence to support these theories, what they often share is an etic approach to
understanding autism, grounded in clinical observation or some sort of empirical
research. In recent years, however, autistic self-advocates are producing emic accounts in
growing numbers, often as participants in the autism rights and neurodiversity
movements. For a condition surrounded by so many questions, how the simplest are
posed is perhaps as important as to how they are answered. This is a shift from asking
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how? to asking what? It is a move away from discourse focused on prevention and cure,
to one grounded in a radical acceptance that autism is.
Neurodiversity activist, Jim Sinclair, raises the stakes of such a shift in his essay,
Don’t Mourn For Us. Here he asserts: “Autism is a way of being. It is not possible to
separate the person from the autism.” 8 To conceive of autism at the level of one’s
existence, as a way of being, is to seek an alternative framework from one grounded in a
gradation of clinical severity. It highlights the importance of first-person, qualitative,
emic descriptions. Further, this shift poses the question of what it means to be in general.
In my view, these questions must traverse an epistemological antagonism located at the
intersection of etic and emic discourses as they relate to the what of autism. Put simply,
how does knowledge produced through one discourse relate to knowledge produced
through the other? How does one reconcile the truth values of etic and emic accounts of
autism without subsuming one within the other? Issuing out of these admittedly abstract
concerns are the very concrete policies and practices that guide the development of the
systems of support available to actual autistic subjects. Given that any such system is
founded on an implicit definition 9 of what constitutes individual agency, defining autism
as a “way of being” instead of as a disorder or a condition initiates a cascade of ethical,
political, and philosophical ramifications.
In order to appreciate the scope of Sinclair’s words, this thesis applies the
psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan to autism as a metapsychology of the subject.
Because psychoanalysis, as a critical method, can be applied across emic and etic
discourses, I believe it to be uniquely suited for addressing the questions raised above.
2

My application of this theory will unfold along two related but distinct paths, owing to
the influence of Lacan on clinicians and philosophers alike. In both cases, there is an
equivalence between what can be said (or known) of human being most profoundly, and
the inescapable horizon of language in enabling those claims. For Lacan, language both
enacts and mitigates a fundamentally unthinkable trauma at the root of human psychical
existence, access to which blurs the distinction between speculative inquiry and a leap of
faith. 10 Taken to its most radical conclusion, this means that considering autism as a “way
of being” requires we approach it as a “way of being” in language. 11
In Chapter 1, I elaborate on certain aspects of Lacanian theory to develop an
understanding of what it means “to be” a subject most broadly, as well as how a subject
might evince a specific “way of being” in particular. As I work to show “the subject”
stands in contrast to the self-aware, thinking-being of consciousness, which is often taken
as the individual unit of human being. Instead, the Lacanian subject is the subject of the
unconscious. It is defined by its relation to the Other and is, by nature, irreducible to the
appearance of mind (or “ego”) to itself. To approach the autistic subject, I pursue a
reading of Lacan that allows one to speculate about unconscious structures by
extrapolating from first-person accounts. This involves discerning the conditions of
possibility for consciousness as such, without simultaneously or inadvertently making
these conditions conscious. Given the interdisciplinary origins of this project, substantial
time is invested towards introducing and orienting psychoanalytic concepts; those
familiar with Freud and Lacan will consider this well-trodden terrain. Rather than attempt
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a novel reading of the primary sources, my goal in Chapter 1 is to engineer the
conceptual machinery I utilize in what follows.
In the Interlude, I review historical and contemporary psychoanalytic theories of
autism. One goal for this portion is to identify what is unique in a Lacanian approach
compared to other theories. Another is to gauge the potential for these theories to engage
with Sinclair’s statement that “autism is a way of being,” as well as other first-person
accounts more generally. As we will find, the question of a psychogenic etiology lingers
in a psychoanalytic conceptualization of autism. Similarly, we are forced to consider a
distinction between approaches that treat autism, compared to those that treat the autistic
subject. Examples of the former present as incompatible with Sinclair’s thinking.
Ultimately, I argue that a Lacanian approach offers a way to move past the limitations of
other psychoanalytic theories of autism, owing both to Lacan’s unique innovation of
Freudian theory and a persistent resistance to an orthodox reading of his work. 12
In Chapter 2, I apply Lacanian theory to scientific research and the writing of
autistic subjects. Here the overarching goal of engaging with emic and etic knowledge
through a psychoanalytic metapsychology is pursued most directly. Building from the
definition of being developed in Chapter 1, along with the Lacanian conceptualization of
autism described in the Interlude, I find support for Sinclair’s claim in multiple sources.
Scientific research that examines sensorimotor differences is reviewed with a focus on
how what these differences mean for the emergence of the autistic subject. Likewise,
first-person writing is analyzed for signs that indicate the writers’ “way of being”
according to the criteria established in Chapter 1. By and large, I support Sinclair’s claim,
4

owing to the resonance that emerges between emic and etic sources when they are
situated within a Lacanian psychoanalytic metapsychology. I conclude by considering the
implications of an autistic way of being on treatment and support approaches, suggesting
areas for additional research, and reflecting on the limitations this project.
Meet and Greet
The potential for deepening one’s understanding of autism based on
autobiographical accounts far surpasses the scope of this project. Further, as the saying
goes, “If you’ve met one person with autism, you’ve met one person with
autism…once.” 13 There is a risk inherent to making general claims based on individual
reporting. With this in mind, a fundamental wager of this thesis is that Lacan addresses a
universal dimension of the subject that does not, through its universality, preclude
conceiving of autism as a distinct “way of being.”
Finally, to set the stage before moving forward, a brief introduction to the writers
who inspired this project is warranted. It is worth noting that the majority of the firstperson sources were authored by individuals considered severely autistic. That is, while
they are accomplished writers and self-advocates in their own rights, DSM-based
diagnostic criteria views them as markedly impaired, requiring substantial support. They
are predominantly non-verbal and engage in various modes of ritualized, repetitive, “selfstimulating” behaviors. And yet:
Amanda Baggs is a writer of blogs and essays. In 2007, she created and uploaded
a video to YouTube called In My Language. 14 Baggs’ video asserts the basic value of her
unique experience of the world, shown through a series of shots of her interacting with
5

objects in her apartment: a stream of running water, a piece of string, sunlight shining
through a window, the corrugated surface of a piece of cardboard. Her movements are
rhythmic and repetitive; throughout the piece she hums a series of sustained tones. About
halfway through there is a pause and a title card reads “A Translation.” A voiceover
generated by an augmentative speech device begins, accompanied by subtitles. In her
typed monologue, Baggs challenges the social paradigm/perception that fails to see her as
a “thinking being,” in light of her inability to speak verbal language. She implores the
viewer to consider that her movements constitute their own form of language independent
of “visual symbols for people to interpret.” She laments that “failure to learn your
language is seen as a deficit but failure to learn my language is seen as so natural.” At the
time of this writing, In My Language has amassed almost 1.5 million views.
In her essays and blog posts, Baggs critiques the discourse of “ableism,” which
she views as underlying all social oppression, 15 as well as the implicit privileging of
neuro-typicality at play in certain diagnostic approaches 16 to autism. She works to expand
the definition of what constitutes a meaningful human existence, in the face of her own
profound, daily struggle to meet the basic criteria for that definition: autonomy, mobility,
expressive language. In Baggs’ descriptions of her subjective experience, she touches
upon the themes of distance from spoken language; a predilection for a-symbolic
communicative-interacting with her environment; the predominance of patterns and interobject connections in her visual field, and the eschewal of a “shell” conceptualization of
autism, in favor of one defined by there being less “filtering” of the world than
neurotypical individuals experience. 17
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Naoki Higashida, now in his mid-20s, has published poems, novels, and essays in
his native Japan. In The Reason I Jump (2007), Naoki answers a series of questions often
asked of autistic individuals. Across his responses, Naoki returns frequently to language.
He describes the need to “anchor” his words through the use of an alphabet grid, lest he
“drown in a flood of words.” 18 To communicate, he has to “speak in an unknown foreign
language, every minute of every day,” which is complicated by the “verbal junk” he
spews involuntarily. 19 Naoki considers how autistic kids “never use enough words, and
it’s these missing words that can cause all the trouble.” 20 He longs for a planet with
“autistic gravity” 21 and a return to a primordial state, where humankind is immersed in
water and “at one with the pulse of time.” 22 Naoki suggests “people with autism were
born outside the regime of civilization” 23 and never feel “our bodies are our own.” 24 He
maintains that autism is fundamentally a matter of “emotions that trigger abnormal
reactions,” as opposed to something grounded in a “malfunctioning” nervous system. 25
Tito Rajarshi Mukhopadhyay, now in his late-20s, wrote How Can I Talk If My
Lips Don’t Move (2008) as a teenager. Through a series of short chapters, Tito describes
his experiences growing up in India before moving to the US with his mother. His writing
builds a narrative structured around the progressive changes in how he relates to his
world. From seeing stories unfold in a mirror, 26 to the existential guarantee of his
shadow, 27 to a desperate need to climb staircases, 28 Tito sought refuge from his chaotic
senses in idiosyncratic ways that changed over time, due in large part to his mother’s
deep faith in his ability to learn, despite less hopeful prognoses from doctors and
specialists.
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Tito describes, in vivid detail, how his “boundary between imagining and
experiencing something was a very delicate one.” 29 His sensory perceptions veer wildly
and involuntarily. 30 In his words, “I either over-see or under-see the components of the
environment.” He struggles with “overassociation” 31 and adds “extra components to
existing components,” 32 including synesthetic bursts of color to auditory objects. When
asked by a doctor to name an object presented to him, he struggled to “untangle the
web” 33 of all the “names that were associated with that object.” Whereas looking at real
faces threaten him by demanding “the identification of a name,” 34 pictures in magazines
are innocuous, because they are “frozen,” 35 and “do not change their angles.” Further, the
repetitive nature of designs “calmed” his eyes and never commanded him to “tell me
what I am.” 36 Tito states: “My autism is the dynamic experience of my relationship to
the world, with its many aspects of place, people, climate, and their own interactions.” 37
These brief introductions highlight a range of experiences, touching upon each
writer’s relationship to language, rich sensory perceptions, and sense of embodiment.
Although in Naoki Higashida’s case, he seeks to raise awareness by writing in the firstperson plural voice, there is little indication he intends to be exhaustive in his account of
autistic subjectivity; a writer like Baggs outright denounces any attempts to generalize
about autism from her writing.
Psychoanalysis and Being
In many ways, Lacan and autism make for a strange pairing. Autism is defined in
large part by impairments in an individual’s ability to communicate, verbally and
nonverbally. 38 The spectrum is inclusive of individuals prone towards a highly literal
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usage of language, absent implicit meaning and sub-textual elements, to the complete
absence of the spoken word. “Autism” derives from autos – Greek for self – suggestive of
an inward-facing disregard for others, reflected in another hallmark characteristic of
autistic individuals: a lack of eye-contact. From this view, autistic individuals are either
uninterested in others or incapable of engaging in pro-social behaviors. Conversely,
Lacanian theory commences from the premise that the subject of the unconscious
emerges on the very condition of existing as a speaking being. Psychoanalysis is, after
all, the “talking cure,” even if it holds that speech functions only partially to
communicate conscious intentions, and wholly to promulgate unconscious desires.
As Lacan states time and again, unconscious desire is the desire of the Other. 39
The ulterior, unconscious agenda at play in speech is predicated on an encounter with the
Other, which, as a concept, is taken to include: another person, the otherness of the body,
and something inhabiting the entire system of Language as the big Other. For Lacan,
language is the very mediating substance of thought. There is no “outside” of language
and its absence might be suggestive of the absence of the subject.40 The stakes of a
Lacanian reading of autistic texts become sharper when we consider how Amanda Baggs
implores us to consider “her language” as an embodied conversation with her
environment, while Lacan maintains “the effect of language goes beyond, because it
precedes it, any subjective apprehension which may authorize itself as being a conscious
apprehension.” 41 Yet, as will be argued in Chapter 2, non-verbal autistic writers are in the
unique position to highlight — and problematize — any simple conflation of agency with
the ability to speak.
9

With this in mind, it would seem that approaching autism through Lacan is
skewed from the start. Indeed, although a psychoanalytic clinic of autism was prevalent
in the early days of the diagnosis, its decline parallels the overall decline of
psychoanalysis in the contemporary (Anglo-American) mental health field, amidst the
ascendancy of empirical, evidence-based practice. 42 This landscape has changed
dramatically since the days of psychogenic etiologies, such as the “refrigerator mother” 43
theory, which suggested that autism commenced from the influence of an emotionally
distant caregiver. Now, organizations like the Association for Science in Autism
Treatment (ASAT) seek to dispel “the ongoing parade of ‘miracle cures’ and ‘magical
breakthroughs’’’ in favor of “science-based treatments.” 44 When one considers the ill
effect of unduly blaming parents or of creating an anti-vaccination craze, the shift
towards an empirical epistemology is sound. But a different question must be asked as
well: what is science’s role when it comes to the way of being of a subject? Can “sciencebased treatments” be applied to such a condition of existence without inherently doing
violence to it?
It is of no small significance that the research bedrock for Applied Behavioral
Analysis — perhaps the gold standard evidence-based practice du jour — originated from
the same group of researchers who developed the Feminine Boy Project at UCLA in the
1970’s, a project aimed at modifying gender non-conforming behavior in young boys. 45
This shared history highlights the extent to which the discourse on autism prevalent in the
contemporary Anglo-American world is grounded in the empirical, cognitive-behavioral,
and neuroscientific. By contrast, in her documentary, The Wall (2011), Sophie Roberts
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maligns a contemporary psychoanalytic course of treatment for autism in France,
comparing it unfavorably to the aforementioned ABA modality delivered in the US. Her
footage depicts analysts explaining their interventions with an air of absurdity,
exemplified in a scene where the interviewee holds a small toy crocodile, its jaws
agape.46 The analyst instructs, “this is the mother,” and proceeds to prop the crocodile’s
jaws open with a small wooden rod. She suggests her work with autistic kids is
symbolically analogous to preventing the child from being subsumed by the desire of the
mOther. The Wall amounts to a scathing condemnation of psychoanalysis as applied to
autism, presenting the participating analysts as dogmatically unscientific and downright
regressive in their sway over the French mental health system. Roberts was subsequently
sued by three of the analysts interviewed in the documentary and it was banned for a
short time. In one sense, a task for the current project is to reconfigure the coordinates
available for understanding the crocodile metaphor along with scientific research and
first-person writing.
Another intent here is to raise questions about the epistemological stakes implicit
in the favoring of etic knowledge-production over emic sourcing, while suggesting that
Lacan offers a metapsychological forum for actively listening to both. By keeping
clinical and philosophical interpretations of Lacanian theory near to one another, I hope
to show how these initial points of divergence can be taken as opportunities for
deepening one’s regard for autistic subjects on their own terms, without jettisoning the
findings of empirical science or clinical case studies. An important step in this process is
to demonstrate how Lacanian theory can be applied to non-speaking subjects, by
11

suggesting that there is something unavoidable and universal in the underlying structure
of language, regardless of whether one is autistic or neurotypical. The task of the current
section is to introduce certain key theoretical concepts and to orient them in alignment
with my overarching goals, and the methodology I will employ to reach them. Among
these concepts are: the divided subject, metapsychology, lack, structure, and the Other.
But first, any initial encounter with Lacan cannot help but take pause at the deceptively
simple theoretical edifice he develops to map the terrain of human psychical existence.
Understanding the Lacanian subject requires that one locate it in this field.
Lacan’s Subject
Lacan’s theoretical edifice can be divided across a tripartite structure, inclusive of
the Real, the Symbolic, and the Imaginary. These domains relate to one another along a
topological model. We can conceive of this structure in terms of how a knot suggests the
existence of an enclosed inner space, a hidden chamber in its depths, where instead there
is only the folding of a continuous surface onto itself. Lacan’s three registers are equally
inseparable-from and irreducible-to one another. The imaginary is what is given to
consciousness; it is the realm of stable appearances, meanings, and phenomena.
Linguistically, the Imaginary functions to preserve a degree of predictable
correspondence between signifiers and the things they ostensibly signify. Yet crucially,
there can be no imaginary appearance without prior symbolic mediation.
Loosely, the Symbolic embodies the shifting, dynamic matrix of signifiers that
constitute Language. It is the contextual opening within which imaginary appearances
emerge, without ever appearing itself. At the level of the symbolic, language is structured
12

as a differential field through which the subject emerges as a speaking being. Because
Lacan further intends for the symbolic to denote the system of social codes, he installs the
big Other as a steward of the symbolic and the originator of signifiers. Finally, the real is
an unthinkable, yet necessary, structural impasse that cannot be ascribed to the contextual
field of the symbolic, and exceeds capture in imaginary appearances.
As psychoanalyst and philosopher Mari Ruti observes, there is a tentative
correspondence between Lacan’s real-symbolic-imaginary and Freud’s second
topography, especially to the degree the focus is on the “tensions and antagonisms”
between the elements in each structure. 47 After moving from his first topographical
model, focused as it was on the relationship between the unconscious, the preconscious,
and consciousness, Freud’s formulation of the Id, the Super Ego, and the Ego came to
redefine his thinking, and ultimately to pose the theoretical conundrums he would work
to answer until his death. In this second model, the Ego is that aspect of an individual’s
mental existence with which it most readily identifies. The Super Ego is an
internalization of parental (and cultural) authority, whose prohibitions and injunctions
provide the ego with the basic coordinates of social conduct. The Id, then, is an untamed
source of libido, constantly in transgression of the Law established by the Super Ego, and
disruptive of the Ego’s attempts to abide by it.
Turning to Lacan’s structure requires that one avoid reading Freud according to a
depth paradigm. In this interpretation, popularized within post-Freudian strands of ego
psychology, the Ego’s plight lies in how it deals with the Id’s attempts to drag it down
into the abyss of unconscious libidinal satisfaction. Instead, Lacan maintains the notion of
13

a pure surface topology. In this sense, the Imaginary corresponds to the Ego to the extent
that the Ego appears to itself as a self-image. The Symbolic and the Super Ego share the
role of establishing the coordinates within which the Imaginary Ego will adjudge itself to
be in keeping with this self-image. Finally, the disruptive effects of the Id invoke the
Real, to the degree that Symbolic Law has no jurisdiction over the Real, nor can the
Imaginary Ego identify with what is extra-legal in the Id. In this way, the tension evinced
in the individual between Super Egoic/Symbolic restriction and Real/Id-generated
pressure fundamentally conditions any act of consciousness, leaving the Imaginary Ego
little more than an illusory effect of the collision between the two.
As Lacan details in his essay on The Mirror Stage, the ego is a fundamentally
narcissistic and defensive investment. It emerges when the developing child identifies
with a “gestalt” mirror image, or perhaps more broadly, with the mimicked actions of a
mirroring parent. This reflected image of wholeness pulls together the “fragmented”
motor-functioning of the immature body and sows the seeds for the development of the
ego as a coherent and stable entity. 48 A tentative, but crucial, correspondence is thus
forged. However, Lacan’s point with The Mirror Stage essay is to highlight the
fundamental misrecognition involved in this investment. An important nuance is the
inescapable alienation that results, meaning the “initial synthesis of the ego is essentially
an alter ego.” 49 By identifying with an external image, the child’s internalized sense of
self is defined by something outside of it. For however much the child attempts to
coincide with its own image, no one-to-one correspondence can be fully obtained, nor
does the stability of the image account for the entirety of subjective experience – there is
14

always a remainder. 50 Further, as Lacan goes on to state in Seminar X, for as much
“jubilation” as the child feels at the sight the image that “renders him transparent to
himself,” 51 the child’s investment in the image is only made possible when the parent is
called on to “ratify the value of this image.” 52 A Symbolic dimension is – paradoxically,
unconsciously – required to register even the most self-evident content of consciousness.
The Other sets the initial coordinates for child’s the identity, even as the child comes to
take itself as the primary agent behind its subjective existence, “jubilant” in its Imaginary
self-knowledge. Although the Imaginary ego appears to cover over a fundamental
division, its every manifestation simultaneously conspires with the Other of the Symbolic
to maintain an irresolvable instability owing to the shifting coordinates by which it
registers itself as such.
In Lacanian theory, the Other is figured as both a parental/caregiving other who
responds to a child’s basic needs, and more broadly as Language, in the figure of the big
Other of the Symbolic. Here it is important to bear in mind the inevitable limitations and
fallibility of these still formative support structures in a human’s early life. The
impossibility of a parent ever perfectly (and permanently) addressing a child’s every need
is analogous to the incapacity of language to ever fully articulate one’s subjective
experience.53 Taken further, the child’s needs are effectively sculpted into existence by
the Other, informed by the caregiver’s attempts to quell hunger, thirst, and discomfort. At
this level, one’s internal sensations come to be distinguished by virtue of an external
response. Nonetheless, over time, the child synchronizes the words and actions of a
caregiver with its own nascent body-organization, and, according to a typical
15

developmental trajectory, to employ such words and actions to its own ends. But as
Lacan describes, something is left out in this progression from chaotic infantile need to
conscious intentionality. Owing to how both the parental Other and language fall short –
owing to what they lack – the subject of the unconscious emerges as a desiring being.
Desire is a leftover, generated by the unavoidable imperfection of the whole arrangement.
Further, this condition cuts both ways, making lack itself a pre-condition for the subject.
For as much as a well-attuned caretaking Other might adequately support a child’s
development, it cannot help but also bring the child into a confrontation with an
unknowable dimension of itself: the desire of the Other, which remains as a lacuna in the
symbolic. 54 For Lacan, unconscious desire is both “of” and “for” the Other, manifest in
the connotative range of de. 55 Desire seeks an answer to the nebulous Che vuoi? of the
Other’s desire, suggestive of the notion that what desires seeks is, in fact, desire itself.
An important caveat with all of this is to resist seeing the actions and signifiers of
the Other as orienting a pre-existing, if inchoate, subject to the ways of the world. Such a
pre-lingual dimension is imbued with meaning retroactively as an effect of the signifier,
in defiance of a commonsensical developmental chronology. Lacan builds this non-linear
temporality out of Freud’s concept of Nachträglichkeit (“deferral” or “afterwardsness”),
initially made in reference to the effect of a past trauma felt in the present. 56 In this sense,
the meaning of an event is not something internal to it that unfolds from past, to the
present, into the future. Rather, the meaning of the past is retro-determined in light of
how the event is coded in the present by the remembering agent. To speak of a pre-verbal
subject is untenable in Lacanian theory. Because there is no apprehension of an event
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without some base-level mediation of it, there can be no proto-lingual subject lying in
wait for the descriptive power of language to come along and provide the tools for
signifying its pre-historic experiences.
If the ego is an illusory misrecognition, desire is of/for the Other, and the subject
is conditioned by a non-linear temporality, what sense does psychoanalysis make of the
subject’s being? For starters, Lacan draws a sharp distinction between the being of the
subject of the unconscious and any meaning one might derive from such being. In a
rather hyperbolic example, he likens this mutual exclusivity to the choice faced by the
would-be victim of a mugging: Your money or your life! Naturally, “If I choose the
money, I lose both.” 57 In the choice between meaning and being, “meaning survives only
deprived of that part of non-meaning that is, strictly speaking, that which constitutes in
the realization of the subject, the unconscious.” 58 To this extent, the subject stands in
mutual exclusivity to its being; it is separate/divided from its being. Over the course of
his annual Seminars, Lacan sets out from the classical definition of the Cartesian cogito –
the “I” that knows itself in its thinking – to distinguish his subject as the subject of the
unconscious. Whereas the Cartesian subject finds its being the moment it says “I am,”
this proclamation is the exact opposite for the Lacanian subject. The meaning of such a
statement eclipses the unconscious being of the subject.
The key to understanding Lacan’s shift relies on the primacy of Language in his
thinking, grounded in his interpretation of the structural linguistic theories of Ferdinand
de Saussure and Roman Jakobson. Structural linguistics is concerned with an analysis of
“the sign” as it is constituted through the pairing of “the signifier” and “the signified.”
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Yet Lacan radically severs this pairing, establishing an ever-receding horizon of the
signifier that never dips into the signified. By maintaining that the subject is the subject
of the signifier, he insists the signifier “stands prior” to the subject. 59 In ‘standing prior’
the question of ‘being’ relative to the subject takes on its own retroactive layering:
The signifier, producing itself in the field of the Other, makes manifest the subject
of its signification. But it functions as a signifier only to reduce the subject in
question to being no more than a signifier, to petrify the subject in the same
movement in which it calls the subject to function, to speak, as subject.60
Lacan’s topography entails that the Symbolic facilitates the movement from one
Imaginary appearance to another, without ever “getting behind” the appearance as such.
Lacan maintains that the subject is not consciousness, but nonetheless he locates it in
speech. Where exactly? The subject is present on the underside of the manifest semantic
content of language. The truth of the unconscious emerges at the interstices of
representation. One could venture further and say that the Lacanian subject literally is this
interstitial space. 61 Whereas the Imaginary Ego speaks under the illusion of transparent
intentions and self-directed agency, the subject of the unconscious is what is more truly
spoken in language. In Seminar XI, Lacan distinguishes between the “subject of the
statement” and the “subject of enunciation.” In one example, at the level of the statement,
the phrase “I am lying,” is a logical paradox. 62 But at the level of the enunciation – the
contribution of the unconscious – the phrase serves to show the inherent double-speak at
play in any attempt to represent oneself. “I am lying” thus functions in spite of its
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paradoxical structure. The subject always says more than it intends at the level of
consciousness, through what Lacan deems a “truthful lie.” 63
In Seminar XIII, Lacan again invokes Descartes, this time recalling that “doubt”
is the definitive step towards establishing the certainty of being. The subject is thus “the
being which finds its certainty by manifesting itself as being at the heart of this
questioning, ‘I think’: thinking that I am, but I am what thinks and to think: I am, is not
the same thing as being what thinks.” 64 In plainer, more straightforward terms: the
subject is retroactively posited as the originator of the signifiers that come to stand for it,
even though psychoanalysis holds that these signifiers really come from the Other. Lacan
simplifies his phrasing somewhat when he says that “the one who is that which thinks,
thinks in a way that the one who thinks: ‘I am’, is not aware of.” 65 The first part of the
sentence, “The one who is that which thinks,” can be restated simply as “the
unconscious.” The second part can become the “I” who appears to itself as thinking. Put
back together in this way, Lacan’s formulation becomes: The unconscious thinks in a
such a way that the “I” misrecognizes itself to be the source of its thinking (“…is not
aware of”). Thus, the unconscious is the very condition of possibility for the “I” to appear
as such, even as it precludes the “I” from ever properly articulating or knowing itself. The
“way of being” for any subject is to derive no meaning from its being as such.
In conceptualizations of autism that focus on deficits in Theory of Mind (ToM),
the question of the “I” relative to the unconscious evinces an important contrast. Theory
of Mind describes the ability to ascribe internal mental states and intentions to another
human being. The autistic individual is considered, in varying degrees, to lack a proper
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Theory of Mind. That is, they fail to perceive the other human being as an agent with the
potential to act intentionally in the world out of conscious motivations. The intent here is
not to refute the broad research base underlying this approach, nor to, conversely, endorse
its descriptive potential for first-person narratives. What is at stake in psychoanalysis are
the ways the unconscious dimension of an individual renders its own intentions as opaque
to itself, let alone to others. Our line of inquiry is less concerned with whether the autistic
individual views the other human being as possessing its own beliefs and intentions, but
whether the other human being is itself a subject of the unconscious. 66 An encounter
between desiring beings is different than an encounter between conscious beings. The
former requires there to be a space for what is unknown of the Other to the other. In The
Reason I Jump, Naoki Higashida questions: “Isn’t there a belief out there that if a person
is using verbal language, it follows that the person is saying what they want to say? It’s
thanks to this belief that those of us with autism get even more locked up inside
ourselves.” 67 A psychoanalytic understanding of how desire undermines the expression
of one’s conscious intentions in language simultaneously undermines the “belief” Naoki
cites. Instead, not “saying what they want to say” is something oddly universal.

Why a Metapsychology?

To function as a metapsychology, psychoanalytic theory must attempt to account
for all that can be known by the psyche in addressing itself to something that is
unthinkable within it: the unconscious. In the way that metaphysics theorizes the
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preconditions for the existence of time and space, metapsychology seeks to describe the
[ultimately] unknowable conditions of possibility for a thinking, self-aware being to exist
in relation to the subject of the unconscious. Metapsychology is, in effect, a
psychoanalytic epistemology that locates the being of the subject beyond the limit of
knowability. What is knowable, then, is structured by this limit, even as the structure
itself cannot be observed as such. Building from Freud and Lacan, I deploy
psychoanalysis for the purpose of making universal claims about subjectivity, without
dissolving the very real differences between individual subjects, autistic or otherwise,
based on examples in the emic literature that signal the presence of this limit.
This project is not an attempt at “closing up” or “tying off” an exhaustive account
of autistic subjectivity, nor does it approach the question of universality by invoking
concepts such as human nature or biological determinism/materialism. In psychoanalysis,
the idea of a totalized system of knowledge is radically undermined at the outset.
Whereas in a positivist/scientific worldview, the goal is to fill in gaps in knowledge,
Lacan considers psychoanalysis to be “an experience that includes within it the taking
into account of lack as such.” 68 In effect, the precondition for universality held by
psychoanalysis is not “despite our differences, we’re all the same because we’re human,”
so much as it is the universalization of the decentering effect of the unconscious, marking
an internal non-identity of the human subject with itself. If anything, what humans have
the potential to share in is a mutual lack of self-sameness. 69 Put differently: what is
universal is the particular condition of one’s individual alienation.
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This starting point sets psychoanalysis on a divergent course from any theory, be
it scientific, philosophical, or spiritual, that maintains an [epistemological] teleology of
omniscience. Rather, psychoanalysis entails a radical epistemological humility at odds
with the desire to master reality, based first and foremost in Freud’s discovery of the
unconscious as what is fundamentally determinative of the psyche. Freud believed
psychoanalytic inquiry to be a “wounding blow” against “human megalomania,”
subverting the ego so that “it is not even master in its own house” (Freud Intro 353). In
this way, I view psychoanalysis as a uniquely privileged interdisciplinary tool, capable of
maintaining a space for the unconscious through a profound questioning of the very
desire to know in itself (Lacan X 55). Instead, an essential maneuver for this project is to
install a space for what lacks in both the structure of the subject and within any
knowledge-producing discourse it may inhabit. This is an effort to account for the effects
of something that exceeds and escapes representation, but which conditions it all the
same. The precise task at hand, as I see it, is to define how lack structures — and is
structured — within autism.
Lacan’s name for what occupies this point of structural lack is objet a; he
conceives of it as a primordially missing object, whose loss is an outcome of the subject’s
constitution by the signifier. In the field of the Other, objet a comes to stand for the
subject as lack. 70 It is a leftover produced by the subject’s coming-to-be in language.
Similarly, it is an “un-imaged residue of the body” 71 that is “non-specular” 72 and exceeds
the mirror image. Paradoxically, objet a is “precisely an object that is external to any
possible definition of objectivity.” 73 It is only an object to the extent that it is lost, a
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means for naming something that is radically absent. Lacan refined the concept of objet a
across his writing, while consistently maintaining its structural importance as something
determinative of the subject. In the development of the individual, its earliest
manifestations are as “yieldable” objects that assist in the distinction of inner and outer
relative to the body (e.g., the breast, the feces, etc). 74 Yet in itself, objet a eschews such a
neat distinction of inner and outer; it is a “notion of an outside that stands prior to a
certain internalization” 75 because it “stands in” for the body of the subject in a temporal
relation pre-existing the subject’s constitutive lack. 76
In reference to Freud’s framework of the oral stage, Lacan describes how the
breast functions as objet a at the moment it is yielded by the child in the process of
weaning. Contrary to an experience of separation from a prior state of wholeness, Lacan
is clear when he states that in ceding the breast, the subject weans itself into being. This
distancing is the “lack that turns him into desire.” He is not weaned, nor is individuation
forced upon him. Recalling Lacan’s non-linear temporality there never was a subject in
possession of his wholeness prior to such an act of giving up, regardless of the logical
tendency to retroactively posit such a state of plenitude. The breast functions as objet a
by virtue of its inevitable absence, setting the stage for the mobilization of lack in support
of unconscious desire.
Relative to subjective structure, I focus on how objet a is developed in Seminars
X and XI, where it is presented as the object of anxiety and as the gaze respectively. In
the first case, topographical proximity to objet a is signaled by anxiety, 77 meaning an
encounter with the ostensible cause of desire will reveal the essentially groundless, alien
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nature of this desire. Lacan holds that anxiety is a breakdown of the “support that lack
provides.” 78 In this sense, objet a qua lack acts as a sort of buttress, holding open a space
for the subject to function as the subject of unconscious desire in the field of the Other.
Anxiety is the sole effect and it is the closest the subject comes to an experience of the
Real, breaching the limits of symbolic mediation. As noted, the desire of the Other is
encountered by the subject as a question: Che Vuoi? Now we can see how this question
must remain unanswered; 79 to wager a response threatens to stifle the subject at the level
of unconscious desire. In serving as objet a, the breast provokes anxiety not at its loss,
but insofar as its “imminence” 80 threatens to eclipse the space into which the subject
emerged as separate in the first place. An actual object may function as an objet a when it
is missing, but it can never be the object in its materiality. The distinction is crucial.
Anxiety is not the anticipatory fear of losing an object; it is a disruption issuing from the
compression of the space reserved for a lack. Objet a, insofar as it is lacking, preserves
this space.
In the visual realm, objet a is defined by Lacan as “the gaze.” The gaze is a
disruption or stain that indicates the inclusion of the subject at the level of desire,
allowing the neurotic fantasy to invest in the image. As objet a, the stain of the gaze
serves to stimulate desire, suggestive of something hidden behind it. 81 This formulation
appears in Seminar X in reference to a beauty mark, 82 but Lacan’s most well-known
theorization of the gaze comes with his commentary on the phenomena of anamorphosis
in Seminar XI, concerning a 16th century painting, The Ambassadors. Included in the
foreground of this painting is the slanted shape of a skull. To behold the anamorphic
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skull, the viewer must approach the painting from an angle that in turn distorts the rest of
the scene. The skull is not objet a because the object cannot be perceived as such.
Instead, it is the very liminal position suggested to exist at the pivot point of realignment
between skull and the broader scene, where both are maintained simultaneously. One can
see how objet a orients the subject towards desire as “that which always escapes from the
grasp of that form of vision that is satisfied with itself in imagining itself as
consciousness.” 83
Understanding objet a through metaphorical approximations is instructive to a
point and we will proceed with describing it in relation to all three of Lacan’s registers in.
But as an object of lack, its effects are felt as that which inheres to the fissures within all
modes of representation and perception, signaling the point of the subject’s inclusion
within these modes, at the level of unconscious functioning, in subversion of the apparent
self-sameness of the ego. Lacan refers to objet a as “purely topological” meaning that it is
neither fully Imaginary, nor Symbolic by nature. He likens it to a “wooden darning
egg” 84 that contours the subject’s psychical landscape. Taken for a Real object, emergent
as something yielded by the subject, objet a is not “out there” affecting the scene, so
much as it is the very division of the subject extended into any act of apprehending and
representing the world. It is not, physiologically speaking, that eyesight is impaired in
beholding the gaze. It is that the minimal, but necessary, separation of the subject from
the Real of itself, lends a distorting gravity to what is seen.
The topological orientation the subject takes towards this point of constitutive
lack determines its particular subjective structure. Traditional Lacanian theory – if there
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can be said to be such a thing – would contend that there are limited possible structural
variations available to the subject to this end. Neurotic, psychotic, and perverse structures
are distinguished respectively by the repression, foreclosure, or disavowal of this
unavoidable lack. Consider, by comparison, the standard responses one might have
towards a perceived danger: fight, flight, freeze (and flock). While the particular details
of either response are limitless, the underlying templates are not – and the initial trauma
exists all the same. Subjective structure takes shape by virtue of how the subject responds
to the irremediable condition of its non-coincidence with itself. But for Lacan, the game
is ultimately rigged and all possible responses are doomed to miss their mark. No
structural orientation to lack resolves the fundamental dilemma because objet a is
unobtainable by nature; there is no such thing as a “normal structure” that is not in some
way determined by lack, although Lacan seems to formulate neurotic structure as
typical. 85 Neurotic structure is defined by an attempt at reversing the essentially
apocryphal loss of objet a, supported by the fantasy that the Other has it. Relative to
autism, I draw an analogy between neurotic structure and the idea of being “neurotypical”
to de-normalize the predominant lens through which autism is pathologized.
Across his work, Paul Verhaeghe elaborates a clinical approach to
metapsychology grounded in Lacan’s structural variations of the divided subject. His role
as a psychoanalyst operative within academic psychology at the University of Ghent is
invaluable for the project at hand. While remaining firmly grounded in
Freudian/Lacanian theory, Verhaeghe’s writing engages with the DSM-paradigm of
Anglo-American (psychological) empiricism, effectively providing a translation of one
26

into the other, without dissolving the crucial, theoretical impasses separating them. We
will return to Verhaeghe’s work regularly as an embodiment of Lacanian theory in the
contemporary clinical setting.
In On Being Normal and Other Disorders (2004), Verhaeghe calls for a
metapsychology that investigates the structural relation of subject and Other, rather than
focusing on “categorizing personalities.” 86 He insists that “each subjective structure
possesses a certain way of being-in-language.” 87 Further, his clinical psychodiagnostics
leaves off from the question of “guilt,” 88 given what he considers to be the implicitly
juridical nature of any psychopathological investigation. Verhaeghe’s critique of western
psychology in part assesses the various ways it is preoccupied with locating
etiology/cause definitively to side one or the other of typical nature vs nurture rhetoric.
The “guilt” in question is a matter of pinpointing the proper “culprit whose two
extremities are the exoneration of the subject by way of an external causality, and the
blaming of the subject through an internal causality.” 89 In the first case, something is
enacted on the passive subject by its environment (exoneration through desubjectification), and in the second, something arises out of the subject itself (the subject
is retained, but blamed). But in neither case is the subject’s fundamental lack given its
constitutive due. Verhaeghe goes on to equate guilt directly with lack, 90 whereby “the
one who displays a sense of guilt is neurotic…the one who doesn’t is psychotic; the one
who denies guilt is perverse.” 91 Going further, neurotic structure places its lack in the
Other and is driven by its own culpability in ceding the object; perverse structure carries
on as though lack does not exist, characterized by the fetishistic disavowal of this
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knowledge; and psychotic structure is lacking lack and thus it evinces no structural
intuition//awareness of its plight.
Among contemporary Lacanian practitioners, autism is defined according to the
structure of psychosis. Assessing the extent to which this application aligns with the selfreporting of autistic subjects is taken up in Chapter 2. In the meantime, the foreclosure
characteristic of psychotic structure is essentially a “rejection” of the lack that inheres to
the Other, preventing the cross-wiring of desire found in neurotic structure. 92 Foreclosure
of lack hinders the aspect of language that works retroactively to anchor the discourse of
the subject. 93 Lacan calls this anchorage le point de capiton – the “quilting point” 94 – and
its rejection collapses the dialectical tension of the Imaginary and the Symbolic, leaving
the semantic coordinates of language unmoored for the psychotic subject. Given that the
relationship between signifiers and the signified “always appears fluid, always ready to
come undone,” 95 the function of the quilting point is to prevent the total unraveling of
intersubjective meaning. However, recalling that for Lacan, the signified only ever
functions as another signifier, 96 le point de capiton is itself subject to the rules of absence
governing linguistic structure, making for an essentially negative locus. Thus, the
question of foreclosure in psychotic structure is one of a rejection of a particularly
important, if fundamentally missing, link in the signifying chain, called the master
signifier, or S1.
The notion of an originary signifier is mythical by design. In Lacan’s “return to
Freud,” no aspect of the master’s theory was spared reinterpretation, least of all the myth
of the Primal Father first described in Totem and Taboo. Whereas for Freud, a mythical
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patricide served as the founding, sacrificial act of civilization, Lacan invokes the “Nameof-the-Father” to meet the structural condition of le point du capiton and secure the
position of S1. Given the precarious status of the signifier, predisposed as it is towards its
own absence, the Name-of-the-Father manifests as an empty linguistic structure, a
framework for mobilizing a primary process into a secondary elaboration. It is not the
presence of an actual father, so much as it marks the enactment of the “paternal
function.” This shift from biology to structure is emblematic of Lacan’s reinterpretation
of Freud, and to that extent, the “paternal function” is included within his reworking of
the Oedipus complex. Instead of murderous, jealous indignation at the father who severs
the mother-child dyad, Lacan supplants this account [of romantic love for one’s mother],
with the structural procedure of language acquisition.
In a colloquial reading of the Oedipus complex, the father limits the child’s access
to the mother, asking that it relinquish the mother in exchange for something offered in
return: a soothing replacement item, a small measure of independence, or new and
enticing privileges. A structural reading shifts this perspective significantly and allows
one to sidestep the limitations of the historically – and culturally – situated gender
essentialism present in such a pop-psychological account. Instead, ascension to the
signifier opens space for the desiring being to emerge as divided, owing to a different sort
of relinquishment. In this sense, the theme of sacrifice 97 is useful for understanding
Lacan’s Oedipal structure. The move from Freud to Lacan translates “castration anxiety”
into “symbolic castration,” with a sense of loss as the common factor. The castrating
“cut” in question for Lacan is a change in the Symbolic coordinates within which the
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child is positioned relative to the desire of the Other. With its recourse to the signifiers of
the Other, the subject gives up – and gives in – to Symbolic Law, allowing objet a to
initiate its stoking of desire across the metonymic exchange of signifiers. When the
Name-of-the-Father is operative, the subject emerges in the gap between [division-from]
S1 to S2. Objet a is the sacrificed bit of the subject that secures its position relative to the
Other, lodged in the liminal space between signifiers. It is what the subject cedes –
despite never having had in the first place – to exist as a speaking being. S1 functions as
objet a relative to the origin of the subject, emerging as lack in the field of the Other. The
paternal function procures space for the subject to displace its own division. It serves to
signify this division as the missing signifier, S1. As le point du capiton, the paternal
function stabilizes the differential structure of language equally as a protective measure
and as a restrictive containment. It is no less than the [Real] knotting of the Symbolic and
the Imaginary.
Verhaeghe offers a framework for understanding these concepts within an
intersubjective dynamic, defined by the subject’s movement from the first to the second
Other. 98 In brief, the child is born into something dyadic that opens laterally into a
triangular affair, upon the establishment of le nom-du-pere. The potency of this
theorization lies with its applicability beyond the presence of a traditional family
structure populated by “concrete” parents, in favor of a shift in the relationship between
the subject and the Other. 99 With the first Other, mirroring is founded when an attuned
caregiver addresses the infant’s disorganized bodily needs. The second Other corresponds
to a traversal of the first Other’s inevitable limitations in this capacity. Invariably the first
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Other responds to the stirring of the infant through the unconscious coordinates informing
its own desire, and so the child encounters something unknown of (and to) the first Other,
something lacking.100 The second Other emerges as if it possesses whatever it is the first
Other lacks, as if it is the answer to the first Other’s desire. For speaking beings, this is
the phallus, something Lacan denaturalizes 101 from the corpus of Freudian concepts
(penis envy, castration anxiety, Oedipal aggression) whose biological literality do
psychoanalysis few favors in the present. As a missing element, the Lacanian phallus is a
marker of difference; it affords a two-fold displacement of what the child cannot obtain
out of the dyadic relation to the first Other by shifting to the second Other. 102 Practically,
it helps to establish a correspondence between words and subjective experiences, making
the private language of subject and first Other “public” in the audience of the second
Other. By functioning as a signifier, it ensures desire is sustained through metonymic
deferral and displacement, simultaneously guarding against the real anxiety induced by
the desire of the Other and proximity to objet a.
The paternal function positions the first Other within a multi-dimensional schema,
roughly similar to how a “y” axis is needed to transform an “x” axis beyond the infinitely
narrow series of points that constitutes a line. The second Other corresponds to this “y”
axis; there can be no solitary and originary “x” axis in this account. With the opening of a
two-dimensional terrain the subject may withdraw along the third “z” axis to garner a
degree of separation. Roughly, the “x” axis is imaginary and the “y” axis is symbolic.
The “z” axis, then, is real to the extent that it is irresolvable to x or y, but is necessary all
the same. The establishment of the paternal function and a “third, mediatory point” opens
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“the dimension of difference between the child, the first Other and the second
Other…” 103 For Verhaeghe, at stake here are the very possibilities of agency and choice
relative to one’s desire, even if this choice is forever entangled with the fundamental
enigma of the Other’s desire. 104105 This is why the subject can only position its own
coordinates through recourse to objet a, regardless of whether l’objet is read as some
portion of the body the subject gives up, the object-cause of desire in the possession of
the Other, or something unspoken and excessive at play in language.
Verhaeghe points out that Lacan’s Other encompasses, at base, the body. 106
However, the bodily Other does not exist in a pre-historic, pre-lingual vacuum, nor in an
harmonious, immediate state. The body is first experienced through the shaping of the
caregiving Other. The basic embodiment of the subject is mediated through the Other,
who “names and tames” the infant’s somatic states, so to speak. Because the infant
encounters its most intimate bodily sensations through the tending, attunement, and
mirroring of the first Other, even they must be inscribed within a subject-Other dialectic.
With the first Other, the child is “invited to interpret its own arousal…in order to get an
answer to its own lack, the subject has to model itself according to the Other’s desire; it
must identify with it.” 107 In terms of the body, psychoanalytic theory gives primacy to a
certain status whereby the body exists as a disruptive catalyst. It is not those aspects of
bodily processes we grow to systematize, to codify, to recognize through conscious,
mindful awareness – the psychoanalytic body is Real insofar as it resists symbolization
and at a certain level bodily arousal is coded as lack. The Other is so necessary a
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condition that the individual does not even form an understanding of its own embodiment
without the structuring of this relation.
In neurotic structure, objet a is put into dialectical exchange with the Other. Put
otherwise, lack is volleyed between the subject and the Other. In perverse structure, the
subject is the “perfect answer to the phallic desire of the first Other” meaning that the
lack in the Other can, in effect, be ignored. 108 Foreclosure of the Nom-du-Pere
determines the relation of subject and Other by precluding the dialectic exchange of lack,
framing the encounter within a psychotic structure. The result is a “monolithic” Other. 109
Just as the subject springs from its own constitutive divide, the Other, too, must hold a
space for its generative lack. “Normal” neurotic structure is predicated on the guarantee
S1 provides when it is located, as a missing signifier, in the field of the Other. This
allows subjects to partake in the social conventions of language, even though this
structure is an essentially groundless system oriented around – and perforated by –
absence. 110 If psychosis is typically characterized by delusion(s), then Lacan forces us to
consider how “normal” neurotics engage in the zero-level delusion against which
delusions are judged to be delusory. In a homophonic play on Nom-du-Pere, Lacan
suggests instead les non-dupes-errent. And so, in a reversal, the psychotic who presents
as convinced by his delusion, is in fact the supreme skeptic who cannot “believe” in the
Other’s capacity to mitigate lack (i.e., to circulate objet a, to manage bodily arousal, or
match affective states to words). The psychotic can gain no purchase in the field of the
Other and must confront something inescapable of the body without the support lack
provides.
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It is clear why some Lacanians conceptualize autism through framework of
psychotic structure: the neurotic subject’s relation to the Other establishes a shared,
intersubjective, social landscape that is symptomatically difficult for autistic individuals
to navigate. 111 Between 25-50% of individuals diagnosed on the spectrum are considered
non-verbal. 112 As Verhaeghe points out, a structural account of language acquisition is
tied inexorably to subject development. 113 The circumstances at play in the establishment
of the nom-du-pere set the conditions for a certain kind of subject to emerge. They are
operative through a primary process that determines the way of being for that subject.
This is a matter of how – or if – the first Other of the body is inscribed-into and writtenover by the signifiers of the second Other through the triangulation of lack.114
To give Jim Sinclair’s assertion that “autism is a way of being” a thoroughly
Lacanian review, we have so far considered the various ways the divided subject is
structurally dependent on and inseparable from the Other, as well as the manifold, farreaching scope of the Lacanian Other in general. Verhaeghe sets as his goal the
establishment of a “metapsychology that gives the relationship between subject and other
a central place.” He outlines this dynamic in terms of “the subject’s relation to the
structural lack in the Symbolic (the Other) with respect to the Real of the drive.” 115 Going
forward and owing to the nature of the first-person content to be analyzed in Chapter 2,
we will ask the questions: what are we to look for in terms of how these unconscious
conditions manifest? How do they shape conscious and how are they to be decoded from
emic texts? First, however, we cannot proceed further without incorporating the Freudian
concept of drive into the theoretical edifice constructed thus far.
34

Metapsychology from Freud to Lacan with Richard Boothby
My implementation of psychoanalysis as a metapsychology is heavily indebted to
the work of Richard Boothby. In Freud as Philosopher, Boothby champions the
unresolved metapsychological scope of Freudian theory by reading it alongside the
philosophies of several formidable continental thinkers. This approach allows him to
demonstrate how Lacan’s structural concepts open up the untapped philosophical
potential of Freud’s basic discoveries. 116 In particular, the function of objet a is
transposed into a dynamic system defined by the mobility such as a missing element. As
Boothby starts by noting, Freud relies on the flow and investment of “psychical energy”
to encompass his array of concepts in a metapsychology. 117 This primordial and
libidinous energy, originating with the id, is formulated in Freud’s theory of the “drive,”
as what impels the subject of the unconscious, unconsciously, (into so-called “object
cathexis.”) While unconscious desire can be interpreted to tell us something about our
most basic fantasies and predilections, the drive faces us with an uninterpretable lacuna at
the core of our condition as subjects. It is the “heterogeneous pulsionality of the
organism, the very ground of its being.” 118 The search for objet a is ultimately the search
for an answer to the drive. Importantly, and despite its lamentable translation as “instinct”
in the Standard Edition translation of his works, Freud conceived of the drive as a
“concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic,” irreducible to biology and
culture alike, located at the border where one is incommensurable with the other. 119 This
places the drive uniquely at the point of departure of human from animal. While a
biological need can be satiated and an instinct can be followed, the drive is satisfied with
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its own continuation. It is the singular, alien presence within the subject that fuels both
love attachments and primal aggression alike. Its unrepresentability is an irremediable
condition of – and for – one’s existence qua subject.
The persistence of the drive transcends the logic of pleasure and pain, crosswiring one into the other. Although Freud defines pleasure as the minimization of drive
tension, his work in Beyond the Pleasure Principle recognizes the way in which the
subject is ultimately complicit in the steady accumulation of this tension. 120 While
understanding human nature to be grounded in an innate desire for pleasure allows one to
interpret all behavior as ultimately oriented around the obtainment/procurement of
pleasure, psychoanalysis suggests the satisfaction of the subject is secondary to the
insistence of the drive. 121 And although it is simple enough to consider that the human
organism is ultimately spurred by the proclivity for a state of lesser arousal, it is
undeniably more radical to consider that the subject incurs and enjoys a state of constant
disruption through its very existence, that survival is hardly the most basic desire of one’s
unconscious functioning.
Lacan highlights this problematic dualism and deploys the term jouissance to
refer to the peculiar sort of enjoyment felt (in an encounter with) at the impossibility of
drive resolution, especially to the extent that the drive is properly unsymbolizable.122
Jouissance is the leftover portion of enjoyment that cannot be expressed through the
signifier. 123 It is what requires an ultimately imperfect equivalence through metaphorical
(analogical) explanation. Put crudely, if “having one’s cake and eating it too” is
impossible, then jouissance is the terrible enjoyment one derives by compulsively trying
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to do so all the same. The subject strives towards jouissance as “what is furthest from
him” and instead encounters the “intimate fracture” at its core, suggestive of the
impossible, internal limit of representation that jouissance threatens to transgress. 124 As
such, the experience of jouissance is the breakdown of coherent experience itself. It is an
excessive enjoyment because it explodes the dyad of pressure and release, in defiance of
the logic of self-preservation and pleasurable satisfaction. Jouissance is the beyond of the
pleasure principle that the drive leaves in its wake as it disrupts the smooth functioning of
language and the stability of the perceptual field, (indicative of how a core element of the
subject is always included in any experience of so-called “external reality”). Jouissance
is a non-categorical, extra-consensual enjoyment the subject works to temper through an
exchange of lack with the Other.
A main function of Verhaeghe’s first and second Others is to shuttle jouissance
away from the subject, first through mirroring attunement, and subsequently through the
signifier. In this sense, jouissance is an aspect of bodily arousal that masquerades as
something total and encompassing. It teases its own obtainment from beyond the limit it
instantiates. In New Studies of Old Villains: A Radical Reconsideration of the Oedipus
Complex, Verhaeghe ties jouissance to the paternal function and the establishment of
Symbolic Law. He suggests that “reframing impossibility in terms of prohibition leaves
us with the illusion that we might surpass this prohibition and attain a supreme form of
enjoyment.” 125 Because the paternal function is prohibitive, it leaves an excessive
remainder the subject cannot shake. Such is the insistent, unresolvability of the drive.
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However, given that no such drive energy has been shown to exist as a
quantifiable, observable substance, Freud’s metapsychological aspirations progressively
stalled out against the burgeoning, empirically oriented fields of clinical psychology and
neuroscience. While many of his concepts circulate/are operative today, Freud’s broader
theoretical corpus has been sustained piecemeal, as metaphor and myth. 126 His drive
theory in particular exists by virtue of the proliferation of discrete “drives” more or less
conflated with biological instincts. Fortunately, the thoroughgoing argument Boothby
undertakes is to show how Freudian energetics is a fundamentally “structural concept”
determined by a purely differential element that is impossible to represent within the
system it governs: objet a. 127 Shifting away from a metapsychology theorized exclusively
in terms of psychical energy requires that the structural dimension of the subject be
determined by something that eludes it at every turn, lacking a satisfying inscription
within the representational modalities available to it. Just as the drive functions vis a vis
object cathexis, objet a keeps psychical energy moving; it “triangulates” the subject
relative to the drive, by posing as an always-out-of-reach something that might serve to
resolve the drive. 128 This is why Lacan refers to objet a as the object cause of desire: the
real impossibility of having one’s cake and eating it too is not just that once we eat it the
cake is gone, but that retroactively it never was the actual cake we lusted after in the first
place. This sort of perfection can only exist in anticipation, because the structural
function of objet a is displaced by any actual object obtained by the subject. It is only
when the piece of cake is kept at a distance that it can serve to motivate us so deeply.
Objet a, insofar as it is perpetually lacking, safeguards this distance.
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Throughout Freud as Philosopher, Boothby drives at the structural kinship of the
imaginary and the symbolic, culminating in the role played by objet a as the shared point
of lack that conjoins them. Given that psychoanalysis addresses the discourse of the
unconscious, my implementation of psychoanalytic theory towards first person,
subjective writing builds off Boothby’s approach to understanding unconscious structures
through conscious, phenomenological experience. His work provides an interpretive
schema for mediating between Lacan and autistic discourse, especially to the extent the
latter addresses issues of sensory-perception, embodiment, language, and subjective
experience. In essence, Boothby’s project involves detailing how the imaginary
dimension of the symbolic maintains a dialectic with the symbolic elements of the
imaginary – with objet a as the point of negative tension binding the image to the word.
The immediate conclusion to be drawn is that unconscious processes prevent any neat
empirical experience of the world. The more metapsychological point to be developed
concerns articulating how autism emerges as a “way of being” precisely at the point of
the subject’s encounter with something that should otherwise be missing/lacking.
Boothby’s writing paves the way for analyzing this encounter.
Earlier we described the symbolic as a “shifting matrix of signifiers” and the
imaginary as a “realm of stable appearances.” While this over-simplification serves its
introductory purposes, it gives the impression that one is conceivable as easily separate
from the other. Instead, Boothby shows how the seeming immediacy of an imaginary
coalescence is always-already evocative of symbolic framing. However, because these
registers are irresolvable to one another, their structural proximity is best accounted for
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by understanding how objet a is positioned at an intersection of lack. Objet a is real in
the properly Lacanian sense of the word, emerging in the liminal, unsignified spaces that
separate – and connect – signifiers, just as it lurks behind the image, inexhaustible
through perceptual means. To the extent that it is a “cedable object,” objet a can be said
to represent the way the subject must subtract itself from the external world, in a
sacrificial trade-off made in order to achieve any experience thereof.
Boothby’s reading of Freud and Lacan sees him survey the rich theoretical
terrains of early-mid 20th century phenomenology and gestalt psychology. The shared
point of departure here is that both modes of inquiry are concerned with the appearance
of ideas and perceptual objects out of their respective contexts – just as psychoanalysis
seeks the “unthought ground of thought” – with the important caveat that the subject is
the agent driving this emergence, rather than a passive spectator on external
happenings. 129 Boothby maintains the dialectical theme of “positionality” and
“dispositionality” to develop on the structural dynamic [underlying relationship] of the
imaginary and the symbolic. Initially, an object’s positionality is perceived against the
supposed backdrop of its dispositionality. Crucially though, the latter is always at play in
the former as an object moves from “positional adumbration” (distinguishing that an
object exists) to “positional articulation” (determining what that object means for the
subject, per the unconscious logic of the pleasure principle), requiring the apparent
immediacy (givenness?) of the object to be suspended in favor of some underlying
intentional orientation. 130 Dispositionality erases the positionality of an appearance in
order for the appearance’s positionality to present with any relevance whatsoever. Once
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again, there is no “objective” appearance of an object apart from a more fundamentally –
and unconscious – determinative field.
Boothby reviews the figure/ground distinction described by gestalt psychology as
an example of the way the subject participates in the creation of such observable entities,
sustained as distinct from their environments and separate from other objects. 131 Included
among his examples is reference to the classic gestalt image that can be viewed either as
the outlining contours of a vase, or as the face-to-face profiles of two individuals gazing
upon one another – but not both at the same time. 132 This “not both” is essential because
it represents something fundamental in the relationship of the subject to observable
phenomena, something akin to a trade-off implicit in all experience. In short, whenever
something emerges as an imaginary object, other objects, including their enveloping
contexts, are necessarily cast away pending a shift in attention and focus.133 The primacy
of the unconscious over consciousness determines the nature of conscious attention and
focus ascribed to a given scene, prior to one’s awareness that the decision has, in effect,
already been made. The same dynamic should be extended to those experiences we
consider as originating in the body, including even what is most internal to the body.
Recalling the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Boothby suggests moreover
that “the perceiving body absents itself in order to make things present.” 134 The
dissolution of one’s awareness of the body is a founding act of “every registration of
perceptual figure and ground.” 135 It is simply not the case that one can access an
unmediated experience of bodily arousal; even those sensations emanating out of our
internal viscera are subject to the positional-dispositional dialectic. What cannot become
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a positional object of consciousness is the ultimate dispositional field conditioning all
awareness, just as the drive is the inaccessible core of the subject, simultaneously most
internal and yet radically alien. What is crucial is the element of something more implicit
behind any perceptual object, something in excess of the perceived that remains
necessarily unperceivable, which can only be said to present itself as absent.
Boothby links these ideas to the structure of language, drawing an equivalence
between the conditions of appearance underlying one’s registration of a linguistic
signifier with that of a perceptual gestalt. 136 Most important here is the function of
dissipation that necessarily accompanies such an imaginary formation, drawing the
positionality of the signifier into dialectic tension with its dispositional field. Boothby
applies this dynamic equally to structure as much as to content and observes that
“linguistic unity is pervaded by otherness.” 137 Linguistic meaning and perceptual unity
emerge within a differential system in which the salient, seemingly positive
characteristics of a thing are attributed by virtue of how that thing (or word, image,
object, etc.) differs from its associated surroundings, rather than according to a set of
essential qualities it possesses unto itself. Further, because the underlying action of
signification is to signal away from itself, the signifier “is bound up with a constant
oscillation of appearance and disappearance, a continuous formation and breakdown.” 138
Boothby locates this dialectic as much at the macro-level of language embodied in the
matrix of signifiers, as at the micro-level, manifested within the phoneme.
In structural linguistic theory, the phoneme is the smallest audibly discernible
component of language. It is isolatable from other phonemes but exists without its own
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“logico-semantic content,” and is always-already lost in a larger context upon positional
registration. The phoneme exists at the intersection of positionality and
dispositionality. 139 It is a marker of “pure difference” that serves as the “hinge” between
sound and meaning, blurring the boundary between the acoustic/perceptual dimension of
language and the semantic one. 140 The phoneme works to establish the phonetic
variations within a word that distinguish it as such, in addition to aiding in the distinction
of one word from another. At the first level, the phoneme functions as a differential
marker grounded in the embodied production of sound – a feature Boothby notes to be
centered on the binary determination of inner and outer proximity to the body; at the
second level, the phoneme engages in the “open horizon of semantic content.” 141 Because
it reaches across two distinct structural layers of language, the phoneme earns the
paradoxical status of “both/and” and “neither/nor.” 142 With this, Boothby conjures a sort
of dynamic stasis wherein every apparent unity is engaged in a dialectic with its own
absence: at the micro-linguistic structure in the phoneme, up to the appearance and fading
of perceptual gestalts. An imperceptible and unknowable element is caught-by and
created-in any act of consciousness.
The basic indeterminacy of the phoneme begs that one consider the extent to
which the subject must be able to, in effect, determine it, through some preliminary
availability to a structure wherein identity is both defined – and perpetually undermined –
by difference. These are the metapsychological conditions for subjectivity evinced by the
symbolic dimension of the imaginary register, which comes to “overwrite” what is
paradoxically yet to-be-written. 143 They indicate the primacy of the symbolic over the
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imaginary, the dispositional over the positional – the Other over the imaginary ego –
meaning that the unknowable framing of a thing prefigures what can be known of it. 144
Such a structural predisposition should recall my earlier remarks on the fundamental
division of the subject instantiated by its constitutive lack.
While Boothby establishes the positional – dispositional dialectic as one step
among many within his larger project of orienting the imaginary and the symbolic to a
Freudian metapsychology, a valuable offshoot of this approach lies in the connotative
potential smuggled along within the word “disposition.” In addition to naming the
imperceptible, unconscious field within which an object’s positionality can emerge,
“dispositionality” should be taken equally in its more colloquial form, to refer to the basic
nature or temperament of a subject. It is an essential condition of its existence that frames
the entirety of its dealings with the world, to the point of constituting the world qua
reality.
All of this takes on additional import when Boothby refers to objet a as a
“dispositional object” that “must be located in the dispositional field” without ever
presenting as a readily perceptible phenomenon therein. 145 One could say that it sets the
scene without ever making an appearance on stage. 146 Recalling an earlier formulation,
objet a “triangulates” the subject towards the paradoxically “both/and and either/or”
aspects of the phoneme, enabling the dispositional “fore-grasp” necessary to overcome
the indeterminacy. 147 The phoneme qua objet a is the persistence of context lingering
around a discrete gestalt, and equally the uncanny recognition of isolated parts from their
surrounding wholes. As we have noted, objet a as the gaze is the “stain” to which “desire
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is truly tethered” in the scopic domain. 148 Within language, objet a absents itself along
the signifying chain while initiating the slippage from S1 S2, S3, and so on, similarly
ensnaring desire. In both cases, we can discern a de-centering of the subject whereby
objet a is the unconscious element of the subject whose polyvalent circulation lends the
imaginary sufficient phenomenological depth, and the symbolic a fluid openness to novel
semantic configurations and metonymical exchanges. Objet a pivots from the imaginary
to the symbolic in the way that the phoneme hinges sound and meaning, in effect
bridging the real structural gap that binds, just as it separates, the two registers.149
In highlighting the fundamentally paradoxical and indeterminant character of the
phoneme, Boothby opens up a pathway for connecting it, via objet a, to the unknowable
core of the subject, a space we have framed in terms of the Freudian death drive. The
phoneme is, in effect, a conduit for objet a, enabling the conjunction of positionality and
dispositionality, owing to the structurally missing element at their intersection. 150 Objet a
is the manifestation of what is unsymbolizable of the subject that emerges retroactively as
a leftover of the subject’s coming-to-be in the Other. With the phoneme representing the
microunit of the signifier, and with the signifier’s origin in the Other, we see once again
how the drive emerges out of a paradoxical space imbedded in the field of the Other,
forever undermining the imaginary integrity of one’s identity. When objet a coincides
with lack in the field of the Other, a neurotic/neurotypical structure is erected around the
dialectic of desire.
Being: The Final Approach
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To provide a Lacanian interpretation of the assertion that autism is a “way of
being,” we will approach the very source of the drive, referred to by Lacan as das Ding,
and situate it in relation to the broader array of concepts reviewed thus far. Up until now
objet a has been something of a stand-in for das Ding. If objet a is “a” lost object, das
Ding is “the” lost object. Recourse to objet a, defined as the impossible activity of trying
to obtain what can only function as lost, is the endless deferral of an encounter with the
Real of das Ding. 151 To grasp the most fundamental conditions of a subject’s being is to
position the subject in relation to das Ding. Consistent across Lacan’s separate clinical
structures, it is a structurally universal and necessary condition.
In his Project for a Scientific Psychology, Freud names the “thing” as that which
fills in the gap between one’s present perception and prior memory of an object. 152 This
substance creates a rudimentary stability of appearances for the developing child. In an
early example, Freud cites the bridging that occurs when an infant beholds the maternal
breast from a new angle, and yet can nonetheless merge this unfamiliar perspective with
one previously registered. The “thing” – das Ding in German – is the unknowable
wholeness of the breast posited as its/the material totality held in reserve behind the
patchwork of different viewpoints the infant might amass.
Boothby aligns the phoneme with the Thing, in terms of how the subject’s “foregrasp” transcends their mutual indeterminacy, granting tentative positionality out of
unconscious dispositionality. Freud goes on to outline the process of “cognizing” in
which the human being locates das Ding beyond the limit of its ability to identify with
the bodily movements and actions of a “fellow-creature” based on its own experience of
46

embodiment. 153 The “thing” is the portion of the nebenmensch absent from this
identification, creating a structure similar to that of one’s “fore-grasp” of the signifier. It
is interesting to note that these passages are pulled from a section of the Project
concerning “Remembering and Judging,” further asserting the primacy of unconscious
processes over conscious ones: any act of remembering is prejudged by the unconscious
dispositional framing in which it occurs. What is “uncognizable” is necessary for any act
of cognition, just as objet a frames any act of perception from the imperceptible fringes
of consciousness. 154 In the nebenmensch of the “fellow-creature,” Freud locates a
similarly unknowable, necessary condition.
In Seminar VII, Lacan takes up and the builds upon the intersubjective aspect of
das Ding, isolating it in what he calls the “alien” nature of the nebenmensch. 155 For
Lacan, das Ding stands beyond one’s relation to the actual other, and by extension, it is in
excess of the parental Other, and Language as a whole. It is the “beyond-of-thesignified,” 156 non-existent “at the level of Vorstellungen” 157 as an imaginary appearance.
Further, the “impassable…site of the Thing” is the “unfathomable spot” of the death
drive. 158159 Here we see again the alignment of subject – drive – Other, reminiscent of
earlier descriptions of how the Other provides a tentative answer to the subject’s
jouissance [qua bodily arousal qua real drive.]
As noted in Seminar X, Lacan draws a connection between anxiety and the
opacity of the desire of the Other, which confronts the subject as an unanswerable
question and threatens it with unbearable jouissance. By focusing on the negative
presence of das Ding within the nebenmensch, Lacan short-circuits anxiety with the
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Thing. Insofar as objet a signals anxiety, it functions as a stand-in for the most “profound
object, the ultimate object, the Thing.” 160 Key here, once again, is the function of the
“support that lack provides” relative to anxiety and, ipso facto, to das Ding, the desire of
the Other, and jouissance. In this sense, objet a, mobilized as lack in the field of the
Other, promotes a repetitive deferral of these unanswerable questions, preventative of an
encounter with the Real of das Ding. 161 Conversely, proximity to objet a, in addition to
collapsing the space that sustains desire as desire, is essentially a journey to the frayed
fringes of meaningful, signifiable experience. In approaching this limit, the subject finds
only jouissance in place of das Ding.
Naoki Higashida provides several elucidating examples of this type of encounter
in The Reason I Jump. In response to the titular proposition, he notes how, “People with
autism react physically to feelings of happiness and sadness. So when something happens
that affects me emotionally, my body seizes up as if struck by lightning.” 162 When Naoki
jumps, “It’s as if my feelings are going upward to the sky.” With this skyward discharge,
“I can feel my body parts really well…free to move the way I want.” Throughout the
book, Naoki expands upon these conditions with inverse examples as well. As he puts it,
“kids with autism, we never use enough words,” and “we can never make ourselves
understood.” 163 If a person with autism is “going through a hard time…the despair we’re
feeling has nowhere to go and fills up our entire bodies, making our senses more and
more confused.” 164 Of autistic people, he says, “We never really feel that our bodies are
our own. They’re always acting up and going outside our control.” 165 Naoki evokes a
direct correlation between the body and the word.
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Naoki’s descriptions of lightning strikes, confused senses, and out-of-control
bodies are forms of an enjoyment-beyond-signification associated with jouissance as we
have defined it above. They represent instances of how jouissance is “impossible” (i.e.,
Real), in the sense that it is mutually exclusive with neurotypical/stable consciousness.
That Naoki characterizes autism, most broadly, as the inter-relation of “missing words”
and intense emotional states, hints at the scope of the connection to be made between the
signifier, objet a and jouissance – and ultimately das Ding. 166 “Missing words” can be
reversed to entail the presence of what words typically cancel out. Jouissance has
“nowhere to go.”
To carry this analysis further we must turn to objet a in its manifestation as “the
voice.” 167 As Lacan defines it, objet a emerges when “óur voice appears to us with a
foreign sound.” 168 It is the “otherness of what is said.” 169 Just as the gaze “cannot be
grasped in the image,” the voice is irreducible to the semantic content of an utterance. In
The Voice and Nothing More, Mladen Dolar defines this aspect of the voice as a
“material element” that is “recalcitrant to meaning.” 170 Based on these claims, Dolar
asserts a “dichotomy of the voice and the signifier.” 171 As a dispositional object, the voice
frames the manifest content of a statement, in lieu of its own representation therein.
Naoki touches upon an intriguingly similar phenomenon when he writes about his
“weird voice…the voice I can’t control…” He says: “When my weird voice gets
triggered, it’s almost impossible to hold it back – and if I try, it actually hurts, almost as if
I’m strangling my own throat.” This voice “blurts out, not because I want it to; it’s more
like a reflex.” It spews “verbal junk that hasn’t got anything to do with anything.” 172 Here
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the “foreign sound” of the voice is accompanied by the involuntary mandate of
jouissance. Crucially, Naoki’s weird voice represents only those unfamiliar elements that
constitute the voice qua objet a. (In How Can I Jump If My Lips Don’t Move?, Tito
Mukhopadhyay describes similar experiences, in one case recalling how “many times, in
the midst of other sounds, I could hear my own voice, laughing or screaming.”) 173
These encounters extend along the inverse trajectory as well. As the listener,
Naoki writes about “drowning in a flood of words” when he loses his ability to
comprehend what is said to him. 174 For his part, Tito describes the “horror” of being
“surrounded by real voices.” 175 Auditory processing deficits are well-documented relative
to autism, often describing how the sound of a word is registered independent of its
meaning, rendering the phonetic dimension non-sensical, “recalcitrant to meaning.” 176
Lacan suggests the distance between the subject and das Ding is “precisely the
condition of speech.” 177 He makes this assertion in relation to the Ten Commandments,
drawing together the mythological establishment of Symbolic Law with the space
necessary for the subject to exist as a speaking being, suggesting there is a fundamental
prohibition at play in each. 178 Here we return to the Oedipal terrain surveyed earlier,
where it is important to recall how Lacan’s structural reworking shifts the focus away
from the taboo of actual incest towards the process of language acquisition, based on the
machinations of the paternal function and symbolic castration. Lacan goes on to identify
das Ding with the object of incest, located as they both are, impossibly, beyond this
limit. 179 In each case, the subject seeks a reprieve from the anxiety incurred in an
encounter with the traumatic real, through a mediating condition that grants simultaneous
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access-to and distance-from the Thing. Once again, language is key to establishing this
distance.
In response to the question, “Why don’t you make eye contact when you’re
talking?” Naoki offers: “What we’re actually look at is the other person’s voice. Voices
may not be visible things, but we’re trying to listen to the other person with all our sense
organs.” 180 This structural disjunction will be discussed at more length in Chapter 2. In
the present context, however, we could venture that an encounter with only this portion of
the voice renders bare objet a as a source of anxiety and jouissance. Instead of some
irreducible trace of the voice accompanying the signifier, Naoki (and Tito) experience the
opposite: the predominance of objet a qua voice, with only a hint of the signifier. With
the inability to speak, the objet a dimension of the voice – the “otherness of what is said”
– is retained, and the constitutive distance from das Ding via the signifier is collapsed.
In his essay, The No-Thing of God: Psychoanalysis of Religion after Lacan,
Richard Boothby explores the borderline metaphysical dimension of the Thing. Building
on the ideas advanced in Freud as Philosopher, in particular his theory for how the
signifier opens space for objet a and das Ding, Boothby compares the religious appeal to
an almighty God with a plea to the big Other of language.181 Operative in both is a need
to maintain a degree of separation from the jouissance of the neighbor-Thing. 182 An
encounter with the neighbor-Thing is, ipso-facto, a confrontation with das Ding within
the indeterminant, buffering zone of the signifier. Similarly, the subject is able to invest
in language only to the extent that it can successfully set out space for das Ding along the
signifying chain. Language, anchored by the paternal function, opens access-to and
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safeguards a distance-from, what is essentially an anxiety-causing lacuna where lack does
not exist. In Boothby’s analysis, Language bridges the gap to one’s neighbor in the same
move by which it first establishes the gap.
The Thing helps us appreciate the breadth of Lacan’s concept of the Other and the
extent to which the subject is inconceivable apart from it. 183 The scope of this concept is
well-suited for maintaining the clinical aspects of Lacanian theory alongside the
philosophical ones. So far, we have reviewed how the Other encompasses both the
parental Other and the linguistic big Other of the Symbolic. In the first case, the nascent
subject turns to the parental Other to address the tension of the drive, resulting in the
acculturation of what might erroneously be considered bio-material, thereby subjecting
the innermost element of the subject to Symbolic law and Imaginary investment. The
attunement and mirroring of the caregiving Other simultaneously structures and calibrates
the bodily arousal of the infant, while radically de-centering the perceived cause of such
arousal. In the second sense, the big Other is the guaranteeing authority of meaning
whose governance over the Symbolic order lends credibility to the (operationally) selfreferential web of signifiers available to the subject. Verhaeghe’s first and second Others
were deployed as a model for linking these concepts to the Oedipal structure. And now,
in the presence of das Ding, we can consider more fully how the Other qua Nebensmench
is the privileged site of access to something originating with the subject itself.
It is perhaps most accurate to consider Boothby’s approach to the Thing as metatheological, but even so, das Ding represents – sine qua non – the metapsychological
keystone of Lacan’s return to Freud. For Boothby, rather than represent a function of
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belief, the Thing is the very pre-condition for religious belief, catalyzing the “ineluctable
disposition to believe” 184 rendered in/by the unknowability of the subject to itself. By
encountering das Ding in the neighbor-Thing, the (neurotic) subject contributes to the
predominance of the Symbolic order as an intersubjective refuge from the jouissance of
the subject’s own drive. This is something Verhaeghe, following Lacan, refers to as the
“shared solution for the Real.” 185 Boothby further reminds us that objet a, Lacan’s
“cedable object,” is a crucial part of this trade-off when it is successfully put into play in
an economy of exchange with the Other. From the phoneme, to objet a, to das Ding, we
can see how language, animated through the signifiers issuing from the Other, mediates
the trauma of the subject’s relation to its very own topological “blind spot.” 186 As
Verhaeghe notes, Lacan’s continuous nuancing of the Other – the jouissance of the Other
in particular – comes to account for the body, which is the “most fundamental Other...the
most intimate stranger.” 187 And so, an important question going forward is what results
when the Other, in appreciation of the full scope the concept affords, does not provide the
privileged opening to das Ding qua neighbor-Thing? What if one dimension of the Other,
that of the neighbor-Thing, fails? What if the ever-so-crucial encounter with the first
Other is missed or is structured differently to the point of being unrecognizable through
the neurotic paradigm?
To determine a subject’s way of being is to locate it in relation to das Ding,
because it lies at the intersection of the drive and the lack in the Other. Neurotic structure
means the subject is properly “duped,” allowing for the fantasy of a “shared solution” to
something ultimately singular and irresolvable. Neurotic doubt – the ever-present
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question of “what does the Other want from me?” – is predicated on the twofold,
underlying belief that a) there is, in fact, an answer and b) that the Other possesses the
answer. 188 Conversely, psychotic structure entails a “monolithic” Other who leaves the
subject to confront jouissance without the support of a fundamental fiction wherein the
Other has a, because the triangulation from first to second Other does not occur. As a
result, psychotic structure is defined by certainty, not doubt. 189190 The subject’s baselevel drive tension does not circulate through the Other in a dialectic of exchange,
represented by objet a; the solution the psychotic subject erects does not stand in
comparison to an other’s, let alone the Other’s; its delusion is its own, of which it is
certain.
In relation to these coordinates, it is tempting to conceive of autism as an agnostic
or noncommittal “way of being” in language. Instead of doubt founded upon belief, or
certitude covering over the inability to believe, when the positioning of das Ding itself is
called into question, the stultification of belief may well result. With autism, the very
emergence of the Other must be reconsidered, without jettisoning its essential mediating
function, lest the autistic/divided subject be jettisoned in kind. If, as Boothby suggests,
the signifier can hold a place for the Thing in the indeterminant space of objet a, then the
absence of – or ambivalence towards – certain aspects of language would leave the
subject to emerge through a confrontation with das Ding according to some other
mediating structure – and, consequently, forever in a questioning stance towards
language – especially in comparison to neurotic structure. A structurally different relation
to the (first) Other will cascade profoundly, affecting one’s fundamental embodiment and
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language acquisition alike. If the body itself serves as this mediating structure, then the
hinging action of objet a should affect a distinctive dialectic of positionality and
dispositionality, unique to autistic structure, and evidenced in autistic subjectivity.
The pertinent questions going forward can be stated as follows: what is the status
of the Other for the autistic subject? And what does this status entail for objet a? Does
the autistic subject have “faith” in language to a degree that positions the blind spot of
das Ding within the neighbor-Thing of the Other, initiating a symbolic mediation of the
drive? If the autistic subject does not access das Ding through the neighbor-Thing of the
Other, what recourse might it attempt to signify that which is the “beyond-the-signified”
and stave an overflow of jouissance?

Interlude – Psychoanalysis and Autism
Whereas Chapter 1 questioned what it is “to be” a subject in the Lacanian sense,
this interlude detours through historic and contemporary psychoanalytic
conceptualizations of autism. This is an interim step before we apply a Lacanian
hermeneutics to first-person writing and scientific research. While psychoanalysis was a
major theoretical orientation used in the initial diagnostic articulation of autism, its
legacy as a therapeutic intervention is mixed, and its conceptual contributions find little
audience in the context of the data-oriented, evidence-based approaches prevalent today.
At its most anachronistic, a psychoanalytic approach to autism is inseparable from the
historical insistence on a psychogenic etiology, exemplified in the notion of “toxic
parenting,” which lays the blame for “autistic psychopathology” on parents.
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In the sprawling NeuroTribes, Steven Silberman investigates the history of
autism with a focus on the lasting consequences of the divergent research practices of
Hans Aspergers and Leo Kanner. 191 Silberman contrasts how Asperger, working as a
pediatrician in Austria, “saw threads of genius and disability inextricably intertwined in
his patients’ family histories – testifying to the complex genetic roots of their
condition,” 192 while Kanner, a child psychiatrist trained in the era of psychoanalysis’
dominance, “saw the shadow of the sinister figure that would become infamous in
popular culture as the ‘refrigerator mother.” 193 Although Bruno Bettelheim is widely
associated with this figure today, Silberman notes how Bettelheim “had been virtually
parroting Kanner” in his writing on this topic. 194 The psychoanalytic theory that guided
Bettelheim’s clinical work aimed towards assisting his patients to “restart the process of
ego development” that had been, ostensibly, stifled by cold, emotionally withdrawn
parents.
Silberman further highlights the implications of the etiological contrast [between
early conceptualizations of autism] by observing: “Where Asperger and his colleagues
recognized a specialized form of intelligence systematically acquiring data in a confusing
world, Kanner saw a desperate bid for parental affection.” 195 In this view, some of
Kanner’s most basic observations – autistic self-isolation and the obsessive desire for
sameness, for example – were understood as defensive reactions to a prior psychological
wound. 196 Silberman is cutting in his final assessment: “By blaming parents for
inadvertently causing their children’s autism, Kanner made his syndrome a source of
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shame and stigma for families worldwide while sending autism research off in the wrong
direction for decades.” 197
We see echoes of this general framework in the theory of Frances Tustin, albeit in
a more nuanced and developed form. Tustin’s clinical work with autistic patients spanned
several decades and was widely influential in the psychoanalytic community. 198 In her
view, autism is a “massive ‘not-knowing’ and ‘not-hearing’ provoked by traumatic
awareness of bodily separateness.” 199 While she granted “organic autism can be a
reaction to brain damage or sensory defect,” she held psychogenic autism to be a
“survival mechanism” akin to a post-traumatic stress disorder. 200 She posits a traumatic
wound stemming from an “abnormal state” of undifferentiated infantile fusion in which
“both mother and child had colluded,” possibly due to a combination of mutual “genetic
susceptibility” and “environmental pressures.” 201 Autism, then, is an “impenetrable
protection.” 202 Autistic children “are not fully born – they still feel part of the mother’s
body; to exist, to ‘be’, seems fraught with danger.” 203
Tustin suggests the “undue closeness” between child and mother “hampers the
development of ‘object relations,” and makes the reality of bodily separateness
“agonizingly intense.” 204 Autistic children react with an “erogenous auto-sensuousness,”
and seek objects and shapes that “swathe such children in a sensual protective shell.” 205
Tustin theorized the role of “autistic objects” that are “peculiar to each individual
child.” 206 Through her clinical work, she observed that “autistic objects seem to staunch
the ‘bleeding’ by blocking the wound. They also seem to plug the gap between the couple
so that awareness of bodily separateness is occluded.” 207
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Although Tustin worked mostly within a psychoanalytic model developed by
Melanie Klein, she is considered “post-Kleinian” 208 and is recognized for her innovations
on Kleinian theory. 209 Here we can begin to situate Lacan’s thinking in relation to
Tustin’s through a more direct comparison with Klein. Both are known for their unique
interpretations of Freud, and Lacan made repeated reference to Klein over the course of
his seminars. 210 However, in addition to Lacan’s incorporation of structural linguistics
there are clear points of departure in their interpretations of Freud.
For Klein, the organization of an integrated ego is the “first psychic task of the
infant.” 211 This ego is a dynamic formation constituted through the dual activity of
introjection and projection. 212 Yet as we reviewed in Chapter 1, the ego, for Lacan, is a
site of faulty self-knowledge grounded in a misrecognition – meconnaisance. Analysis
must instead address the subject, posited by Lacan to emerge as an effect of the signifier
and the structural flaws in language. The subject speaks from a retroactively determined,
unknowable position; it enunciates its unconscious desire along the signifying chain, not
in the manifest content of what is said. However, because Klein’s ego results largely from
unconscious processes, it occupies a similar position in her theory as the subject does for
Lacan, and there is some resonance with the subject based in a shared autoopaqueness/unknowability-to-themselves.213
Klein’s thinking includes elements of both Freud’s drive theory and objectrelations theory. 214 In her model, the ego forms in relation to the id, based on how the
drive (originating from the id) is deflected outwards – i.e., projected – onto external
objects whose status depends on satisfying the drive. The resulting “good” or “bad”
58

object is subsequently introjected, creating an internal object. 215 The ego is shaped by an
assemblage of internal objects, and there is no ego perception that is “psychologically
neutral” from the prior libidinous investment of the id through projection. 216 The building
blocks of the Kleinian ego/psyche are forged by a mode of relation predetermined by the
drive, similar to Boothby’s suggestion (see Chapter 1) that any positional object is
always-already framed in a dispositional field, (in)substantiated by the impossible object,
objet a.
A likeness can be found between Kleinian projection and introjection, and
Lacan’s explanation of imaginary and symbolic identification. 217 We will return to
Verhaeghe’s framework of the first and second Others to approach this similarity in a
manner that highlights an important distinction between Klein and Lacan. By deflecting
the drive to an external object, the child engages, roughly, in imaginary identification.
Given Klein’s observation that the projected object is a parental stand-in, we can
understand this in terms of how the first Other mitigates the drive through mirroring
attunement, ushering it away from the infant and displacing its origin outward. 218
Conversely, introjection indicates the incorporation, or taking in, of something
external. In Lacanian theory, symbolic identification takes hold as the subject identifies
with the symbolic coordinates laid out for it in the form of the ego-ideal, “ratified” by the
signifiers of the Other. 219 If an introjected object “binds” the drive, symbolic
identification functions according to an inverse course by circuiting the drive along the
signifying chain. 220 This secondary elaboration of the drive highlights the similarity
further: what was previously displaced outwards is taken back in a new form. For Lacan,
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the Real element of the drive carried in the signifer doubles with the lack in/desire of the
Other, making it is resistant to identification. However, it is important to note that
imaginary and symbolic identification both remain firmly on the terrain of the ego for
Lacan. They are, in effect, different modes of alienation between subject and ego.
Projection is the displacement of the drive onto the first Other; introjection establishes
one’s position relative to the paternal function of Symbolic Law (i.e., the second Other).
Clearly this comparison holds only to a point. There are key differences between
Lacan and Klein in how they conceive of the earliest relationship between mother and
child. 221 While both consider this relationship to be of central importance, their modes of
articulating and weighting its effects are reflective of their distinctive conceptual motifs.
Lacan insists on the primacy of the Symbolic over unconscious phantasies emerging from
the infantile body. 222 In his schema, the state of fused plentitude that marks the start of
mental life for Klein, is only posited retroactively as an effect of the signifier. 223 A purely
somatic, yet still psychically-relevant [mother-infant] relationship is unthinkable, and it
undermines the logic of nachträglichkeit in favor of a linear temporality. Lacan’s
inability to “image the earliest mother-infant” is noted as a key difference with Klein. 224
By way of a possible reconciliation, however, it has also been suggested that recent
research into a child’s prenatal encounter with the maternal voice indicates how the
Symbolic “starts to frame the world” even before birth. 225
In Seminar VII, Lacan writes that “Kleinian theory depends on its having situated
the mythic body of the mother at the central place of das Ding.” 226 By approaching this
relationship in terms of presence, Kleinian theory installs something where Lacan insists
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there should be something missing. 227 Similarly, Lacan was noted to have claimed that
Klein “imaginarizes” the symbolic order by insufficiently theorizing its radical negation
of all object-relations. 228 Using Boothby’s framework, we could say Klein’s model
operates predominantly through the positionality of objects at the expense of their
dispositionality. Here we can see how objet a – the “dispositional object” – is
unrecognizable in a Kleinian model. Although projection and introjection are partially
analogous to objet a in how they make “an exteriority interior,” Klein’s internal object is
not properly lost. 229 Finally, because objet a “designates the ultimate object, the Thing,”
the conflation/overlapping of the imaginary maternal body with das Ding occludes the
place of lack so fundamental for Lacan’s metapsychology. 230
How this distinction plays out in a psychoanalytic examination of autism as a way
of being depends, in part, on whether one considers the aim of analysis to be a matter of
repairing a wound and integrating the ego’s object-relations, or to safeguard a space for
lack, and by extension, desire. This is an important difference that frames the way we will
approach first-person writing and scientific research going forward. Focusing on lack
establishes a unique set of criteria for interpreting the source material by shifting
attention towards instances of dialectically opposed, seemingly irresolvable terms, and
recasting them as markers of the subject’s structural contours and the movement of objet
a. Here we pivot to a review of Lacanian theorists of autism, while keeping an eye
towards Tustin’s model, and its Kleinian roots.
The prevalence of language impairments that accompany autism, understood
within the frame of the autistic subject’s relation to the Other, are of central concern for
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analytic theorists who elaborate Lacan’s concepts into this realm. From the intersection
of language and the Other, questions of structure, topology, jouissance, and objet a, are
posed. Many contemporary theorizations can be traced to Rosine and Robert Lefort. We
will dedicate significant space in review of their work here.
In the early 1950s, Rosine Lefort practiced psychoanalytic treatment at la
Fondation Parent-de-Rosan, an asylum for children near Paris; Robert worked there as a
pediatrician. The daily session notes Rosine maintained for two children are collected in
Birth of the Other, where she provides a detailed account of how she applied Lacanian
theory to her treatment of pre- and non-verbal children. Her praxis and subsequent
analyses laid an important foundation for a Lacanian approach to the autistic subject.
Birth of the Other examines the cases of “Nadia” and “Marie-Francoise.” At the
time of their treatment at la Fondation, they were thirteen and a half months and two
years of age, respectively. Early separation from their parents and hospitalism were
concerns for both, and Lefort’s technique commenced similarly in each case. By striking
a passive, intersubjective presence in an attempt to situate herself in the position of the
Other, she sought to introduce lack through constructing “limits at the level of her
response to the subject’s demand.” 231 In “refusing to satisfy needs, she facilitates the
creation of the lack in the Other where the subject will come to locate her own lack.”
Lefort’s clinical observations make repeated note of how her patients related-to and
interacted-with the holes in her own bodily surface, especially the eyes and mouth, as
well as with apertures in the environment (doorways, windows, etc.). 232 She interpreted
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the former as instantiations of lack and her patients’ actions to be symptomatic
manifestations of their respective orientations to the imaginary and symbolic orders.
Lefort’s comparison of Nadia and Marie-Francoise examines both the emergence
of the Other and the status of the Other as a lacking entity. Over the course of their
treatment, Nadia’s progression through the mirror stage into a transferential relationship
with Lefort is contrasted with Marie-Francoise’s persistent ambivalence and diagnoses of
childhood schizophrenia and autism. 233 While Lefort occupied the “locus of the Other” 234
for Nadia, whose desire was structured by her “relation with the lack of the object,” 235 for
Marie-Francoise the Other was “nonexistent as such.” 236 Noting how Marie-Francoise
“did not assign any special significance to the Real of my body in relation to the other
objects,” 237 Lefort suggests her corporeal presence was experienced, instead, as part of an
“undifferentiated” 238 plane.
In addition to there being no “imaginary existence” of the other for MarieFrancoise, a “nonexistent Other” resulted in the absence of the Other’s lack. 239 In this
model, the Other’s lack is understood as “a hole of reception, the only place where the
subject may become, a place that is not in the Real.” 240 Lefort wagered that this was “an
essential aspect of the infans subject’s psychosis,” 241 meaning that “if the hole was not in
the Other, then it was (Marie-Francoise’s) body that was radically holed.” 242 But whereas
Tustin theorized autism to be a defensive gesture in response to the unbearable “wound”
left by the child’s separation from the mother, in Lefort’s analysis, a non-lacking Other
offers no “hole of reception,” resulting in the inverse, such that a traumatic absence is
substituted by the intolerable presence of the Real and the lack of absence.
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As Theodore Mitrani has observed, “For Lacan, the hole (lack) stimulates the
formation of the signifier, whereas for Tustin, the dread of the hole or wound prevents the
creation of signs and symbols and the development of a sense of inside and outside.” 243
The nuancing here is subtle, but one consequence pertains to the therapeutic potential of
Tustin’s “autistic object,” which she felt to “handicap mental development.” In a
Lacanian framework, as noted by Jean-Claude Maleval, an autistic object “possesses a
remarkable dynamic capacity,” which can assist the autistic subject to “open themselves
to the world.” 244 Along these lines, Lefort considered a revision to Klein’s notion of good
and bad objects, such that regardless of whether a “good object exists in itself, bearing
real witness to the love of the Other,” what is more fundamental is the “signifying
dialectic” that hinges on the Other’s lack. 245 We will consider the downstream
consequences of this theoretical divergence in Chapter 2.
Beyond the structural necessity of lack, Lefort speculated as to how the Other
factors in to the dialectical constitution of physical and psychical space. She observed
that the first instances of objet a (the voice and the breast) are “stuck to the body of the
Other.” 246 It follows, then, that with a child’s natural separation from the parent, “a
distance appears between the subject and the object of its quest.” The loss of the voice
and the breast “introduce the notion of distance” that facilitates the “signifying
inscription” of the subject onto the holed body of the Other. 247
With Nadia, the presence of a holed Other opened a dynamic, lacking dimension
of the object and facilitated the transference in the resulting signifying space. Through the
particulars of Nadia’s play, Lefort noted that a “veil” 248 was frequently operative and a
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“beyond of the image” was established, which “actualized at once the other and the
Other, the ‘a + A.” 249 By aligning the beyond of the specular other with the structural
fissures of the symbolic Other, the subject’s lack was knotted with the Other’s. For
Nadia, this enabled “the articulation of the Real with the signifer.” 250 Yet for MarieFrancoise the Other offered no “hole of reception” wherein the “mutation of real objects
into signifiers could be done.” 251 Instead, Lefort “found the Real – plenty of it.” 252 The
signifier was present, but “could not get inscribed in the Other,” and Marie-Francoise was
“cut off…from all loss.” 253 The “double absence of the Other and the other” led Lefort to
question “the very notion of structure” itself. 254
Psychotic structure, wherein the subject rejects, through foreclosure, the “hole” in
the Other, entails that the elaboration from first to second Other does not occur. Objet a
cannot then defer the drive via the signifier and jouissance issues from a “monolithic,”
purely imaginary Other. 255 The misstep from first to second Other is key for psychotic
structure and with Marie-Francoise, Lefort observed no “trace of the image of the other in
its relation with the Other.” 256 But beyond the structural ramifications of this nonrelation, the “double absence” forced Lefort to consider whether the imaginary other
could foreclose the structural lack of the symbolic Other at all – because neither appeared
as such. Although she approached Marie-Francoise through the framework of childhood
psychosis, the resulting “failure of structure” provoked a turn towards topology. 257
Lacan developed topological conceptualizations throughout his writings, and in
Seminar XX, he suggested an “equivalence” between structure and topology. 258
Following this course, Lefort noted how the “body’s surface is the locus of structure from
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the very beginning of life.” 259 Based on her observations of Nadia and Marie-Francoise,
she felt compelled to “redefine the corporeal relations between the small subject and the
Other in terms of surfaces and, correlatively, of holes.” 260 If the correlation between
surface and hole is determined by the subject’s relation to the Other, it must be added that
this correlation, in turn, determines how – and if – the lost object comes into play. Objet
a’s role in constituting a space for desire is predicated on the “distance” it marks between
the subject and the body of Other, as well as the dialectical folding of this external
distance internally to the subject.
To develop her differential analysis of Nadia and Marie-Francoise, Lefort makes
reference to two of Lacan’s topological models: the Mobius strip and the torus. The
former spans a continuous, two-dimensional surface, twisted in on itself such that the
inner and outer are the same. The Mobius is “nonorientable” to the Other in threedimensional space.261 Conversely, the torus is a “three-dimensional structure that divides
the space of the body into an exterior and an interior,” creating an “orientable surface
structure” shaped around a hole. 262 Lefort sought to give “a topological account of this
passage from a nonorientable surface to an orientable surface.” Importantly, both the
subject and the Other are subject to these morphological shifts.
The ultimate aim of such a topological passage is the “articulation of the Real
with the signifier,” and so for every step Nadia took along this sequence, Marie-Francoise
was the “counterproof.” 263 As Lefort explains: “She showed us what happens when the
questioning of bodies is not pursued with the help of a possible articulation between the
Real and the signifier in the field of the Other, but remains in the Real alone.” 264
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Throughout their sessions, Nadia’s interactions with Lefort’s body showed her concern
for the signifying objects of the Other, while Marie-Francoise “remained with the real
object,” because there was no symbolic dimension to the holes of the body of the
Other. 265 In the first case, this signaled Lefort’s body was shaped as a torus oriented
around a hole, capable of relinquishing its objects to Nadia, whose body, by virtue of the
extracted objects, was “filled.” 266 In this way, Nadia maintained the structure of a Mobius
strip, at least initially. As such, “the dialectic between Mobius and torus was able to
continue,” instantiated in the repeated “sticking and unsticking” of Nadia’s body to
Lefort’s, one surface to another. 267
When the activity of sticking and unsticking occurred in the presence of a mirror,
changes in how Nadia oriented herself to Lefort’s body were noted and interpreted as
“changes in her perception of the structure of bodies.” 268 As Lacan explained in the
Mirror Stage essay, a mirror supports the perception of a (specular) whole, in contrast to
the “fragmented” bodily experience of the child. 269 Lefort theorized that in this domain of
plenitude, Nadia could view herself in relation to the body of the Other from different
positions, variously conjoined and separated – “stuck” and “unstuck.” In this way, Nadia
established a “topological identification” with Lefort: “she made me a ‘surface’ in her
own image, before going to confront us in the mirror.” 270
For Nadia, the mirror was a “surface which separated two spaces, by doubling
real space in a virtual space,” where the Real of the body of the Other was “articulated”
with the signifying image of the subject-Other dyad. 271 In this doubled space, the surface
boundary of their Mobius dyad was “pitched” and “immersed,” instigating a “succession
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of transformations” that possessed the “mark of the signifier.” 272 The “distance” between
objet a and the holed body of the Other was likewise inscribed in the signifying image,
“conjugating” the signifier with the Real in the virtual space. 273 With the doubling of
space in the mirror, Nadia “took on a toric shape” and “discovered the notions of inside,
outside, and hole.” 274
In Lefort’s observation, none of this progression occurred for Marie-Francoise.
The absence of a holed Other meant that she was not able to extract signifying objects to
“stop the holes in her own body.” 275 Instead, “Marie-Francoise remained with the real
object, and this had the effect of closing off the division of the subject.” 276 The seeming
contradiction between being simultaneously “closed off” and “radically holed” highlights
a fundamental predicate of the Lacanian subject.277 Although Marie-Francoise was faced
with “a real hole that was to be really filled,” this refers to a dimension of the body that is
typically negated through the articulation of the Real with the signifier. Lefort is
describing the process of how signifiers “mark” the body. These holes, marked by
“rims,” are zones of extreme sensation, vulnerability (i.e. the mouth, the eyes, the anus),
and, in the absence of a holed Other who can proffer signifiers for metonymic exchange,
jouissance. 278 Based on their sessions, Lefort theorized that Marie-Francoise was left to
“stop” her corporeal perforation with “real” objects. Conversely, the division of the
subject is a signifying division, typically emerging through the signifier insofar as it is
articulated with the Real. As a divided subject, “real holes” are ameliorated in a dialectic
exchange of lack with the Other.
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Because the Real and the signifier “each remained in their own domain,” the
mirror did not facilitate the “doubling” of real space with virtual space. 279 Instead, Lefort
recounts an instance wherein Marie-Francoise was presented with a cosmetic mirror by a
nurse, and “all it reflected back to her was Real, which she tried to find by clawing at the
back of the mirror.” 280 Unlike Nadia, who became “oriented” to the Other through the
mirror, the real holes that characterized Marie-Francoise were “non-orientable.” Nor did
she engage in a topological progression from Mobius to torus [in relation to the Other.]
Marie-Francoise’s treatment was brought to a premature end when the Leforts
moved abroad. Yet in their final few sessions, Lefort noted the “emergence of a call to
the Other,” leading her to consider that “Marie-Francoise’s structure was not frozen.” The
insistence on a topological account, driven by Lefort’s observation that structure fails
when the signifier and the Real are unrelated, suggests that autism emerges with the most
elemental shaping of the young subject. This can be interpreted as pointing towards a
topological theorization of autism irreducible to psychotic structure. If we take psychosis
to entail the covering-over of the Other’s lack issuing from a failure of the Name-of-theFather, Lefort seems to suggest autism is a mode of relating to the subject’s own lack in
total isolation from Other. Marie-Francoise was left with a hole that she could not signify
via the Other, a “real hole,” because what cannot be signified is Real – and in Lefort’s
observation, there was “plenty of it.” 281 The immediate question to ask becomes: through
what medium does the autistic subject relate to lack?
Lefort wrote Birth of the Other almost thirty years after her work with Nadia and
Marie-Francoise. At the time of their treatment, Lefort was undergoing analysis herself,
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prior to any theoretical training, which she felt to be inextricably linked with the
treatment of her patients at la Fondation. 282 Without “knowing what to do,” she was
guided by “an unconscious knowledge,” allowing the analysand to occupy the “place of
teacher.” 283 Taking into account her nascence as an analyst, it seems reasonable to assign
a degree of heterodoxy to her approach with her patients, and possibly to the conclusions
she and Robert later drew as well. Throughout the treatment period, Lefort’s practice of
writing detailed session notes was an important ritual that enabled her to carry on through
challenging times:
The writing was a way for me to blot out the Real of bodies that had been of use
to them in the sessions but whose transformation into signifiers remained my
responsibility, so that these small analysands could carry on along their own
paths. 284
While Lefort’s writing practice supported her capacity to engage in sessions, the ability to
“blot out the Real of bodies” was also, in essence, the main aim and ultimate difference
between the treatments of Marie-Francoise and Nadia. When we consider this from the
perspective advanced in Chapter 1, the inability to “blot out the Real of bodies” is another
way to conceive of an encounter with das Ding, defined as the subject’s “blind spot.” By
locating das Ding in the unknowable dimension of the Other, one’s entrance into
language doubles as access-to and distance-from the Thing, a process described by Lefort
as the “conjugation” of the signifer and the Real. Further, in Chapter 1, it was in relation
to das Ding that we wagered a definition of one’s “way of being,” based in how the
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subject’s capacity to “believe” in the Other as a protective buffer from jouissance
determines its fundamental structure.
Through a set of tentative axioms, we can trace the basic parameters/conditions of
a Lacanian theory of autism more directly to the notion of autism as a way of being. First,
the topological implications of the autistic subject’s relation to the Other entail a surfeit
of the Real. Second, the signifier exists, but its relation to the Real is not facilitated by the
Other. Finally, because objet a cannot lack from, nor be relinquished to, an unholed
Other, its origin and role in structuring the autistic subject must be examined. Underlying
these axioms is the ongoing question of how to relate/distinguish autism and psychosis.
Those influenced by the Leforts have taken up these ideas in the context of their own
writing and clinical practice, often incorporating first-person sources in their analyses. I
will review examples from three such analysts before situating their thinking into a larger
discursive context.
Eric Laurent is a French analyst who was well-acquainted with the Leforts. He
recalls discussing the question of autism and psychosis with them often: “Should they be
separated through a particular mode of foreclosure that provoked the rejection of all
signifiers or through a particular mode of the return of jouissance to the body?” 285
Regarding the former, Danielle Bergeron has suggested that while the psychotic
“identifies a defect in the structure of language and devotes his life to trying to restore it,”
the autistic subject “does not enter into the complex and alienating relation to the desire
of the Other” because “he runs afoul of this alienation.” The fundamental point of
distinction lies in how the psychotic individual “takes a step into language and confronts
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the Other of language,” while the autistic subject “has evacuated the other from his
system” tout court.
In Jacques-Alain Miller’s reconsideration of Lacan’s model of psychosis,
differences in the return of jouissance are used to distinguish between sub-categories. 286
When jouissance manifests in the body as [destabilizing, involuntary] enjoyment in the
Real, schizophrenia is posited; when it issues from the desire of the Other, paranoia is
considered.287 Laurent’s idea, echoed and supported by Maleval, is that autism bears
witness to a return of jouissance along a “rim,” or “edge.” 288 Here we should be quick to
recall Lefort’s observation of how the site of a rim functioned for Marie-Francoise,
compared to Nadia, who could “fill” her holes with the signifying objects of the Other,
Marie-Francoise could only “delimit” them as Real along the outline of a rim. 289 But in
Laurent and Maleval’s account, the autistic rim is not situated along the [privileged
“erogenous zones” of the body that factor in the ceding of objet a,] because the Other
does not facilitate this exchange of lack for the autistic subject.290 Instead, a “synthetic
Other,” 291 seen by Laurent and Maleval in the “islets of competence” or areas of
obsessive interest that many autistic individuals possess, assists in the “localization of
jouissance” outside the body. In this way the space of the rim “acquires a distance in
relation to the body” and “constitutes a frontier in relation to the external world” that
substitutes for the nonexistent or unholed Other. 292 Laurent views treatment to be a
matter of “finding something capable of displacing the limit of the autistic rim” and
initiating metonymic exchange within the new coordinates that emerge. 293
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In the absence of the signifier’s articulation with the Real, Laurent notes how
there is no “pathway of the drive that could otherwise link the body of the subject to the
Other.” The autistic subject is “glued to the drive in a non-metric fashion” because the
phallic signifier – the “yardstick” of metric space – only emerges in the elaboration of
lack from the first to the second Other. 294 Instead, through his obsessive, repetitive acts,
the autistic subject “tries to empty himself of a presence in which absence has not been
symbolized.” 295 This child “wears himself out eliminating an excess of presence that
encumbers him.” 296 The “non-metric space” of the autistic subject is “not constituted in
terms of distance,” causing a conflation of “infinity and proximity,” 297 which Laurent
observes in the heightened reactivity of autistic individuals to certain sensory stimuli.
When the (neuro)typical pathway of the drive to the Other does not exist, the capacity of
the “synthetic Other” to establish and regulate a “distance” from (and within) the Real
requires that it mobilize objet a through some other means.
We have noted how Tustin’s concept of the autistic object changes in a Lacanian
framework from a static, hindering object, to one with a “dynamic capacity” to “capture”
the autistic subject’s jouissance. 298 This owes mainly to Lacan’s insistence on the object
as a lost object and the space for metonymic exchange this loss opens. However, instead
of objects “stuck” to the body of the Other that inscribe their distance from the subject as
loss within the subject, autistic objects are not determined by a prior relation to the holed
Other. Yet, as Laurent and Maleval maintain, when the autistic object is pulled into the
orbit of the synthetic Other – or area of interest – it may assist in “complexifying” the
autistic rim in support of the distance inscribed along this rim.
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In his clinical work, Laurent has observed “different modes of attachment to an
object that is supplementary, particularized and electively erotized,” which “constitutes
an integral part of (the autistic subject’s) rim.” 299 Through the “constant re-adhesion” of
the subject’s body to such an object of jouissance, it may function as an objet a. When
these objects are “extracted” or put into exchange – with the analyst, a peer, a family
member – an effect “can be produced in the real.” 300 To facilitate this exchange, Laurent
attempts to foster what he calls “an autism a deux,” which is “a matter of making oneself
the new partner of this subject, beyond all imaginary reciprocity and symbolic
interlocution.” This partnership sidesteps the imaginary ego as a false totem and
acknowledges the futility of the signifier to structure autistic jouissance. By way of
technique, this approach seeks to foster the obsessive interests – or “passions” – of the
autistic analysand that constitute the regulating boundary/frontier of the “rim,” rather than
incentivize or instrumentalize them to promote non-autistic behavior.
In recent years, Laurent and Maleval have presented “affinity therapy” –
colloquially known as “Disney therapy” in the case of Owen Suskind – as an example of
a treatment modality that engages the affective life of the autistic individual. By shifting
the therapeutic impetus from the teacher to the subject and focusing activity along the
autistic rim, this approach moves beyond conscious motivations and “opens a disturbing
psychic dimension where the subject is not entirely master of him or herself.” 301 This
suggests a liminal space of therapeutic potentiality within the otherwise comforting zone
of the autistic subject’s affinities, an activity Laurent has called “displacing the limit of
the autistic rim,” or, per Maleval, “complexifying” it. The underlying mechanism at work
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are the affinities’ “common ability to create a space that simultaneously creates a need to
be filled,” or, lack.
Maleval’s support for affinity therapy doubles as a critique of other approaches.
Across Listen to the Autists! and Affinity Therapy: The Return of a Psychodynamic
Approach to the Treatment of Autism, he traces a history of autism treatments grounded
in behavioral theory (ABA) and cognitive science (Denver Model, TEACCH, etc.).
Maleval suggests different methods “lean on fundamentally different conceptions of what
it means to be human.” He acknowledges successes and failures across the board and
grants that certain approaches yield quantifiable results, especially when “measured with
favorable instruments.” 302
Ultimately, though, Maleval questions whether knowledge acquired through
learning methods that strictly modify behavior can be internalized in a meaningful way.
He is skeptical towards practices that “deconstruct emotional life into cognitive
elements” because they miss the point that “emotion is not taught.” 303 ABA, in particular,
is not “a mode of knowledge about autism” and builds off “the implicit hypothesis that all
human beings share the same functioning.” 304 In the context of a behavioral theory
predicated on the efficacy of positive/negative reinforcement, this sameness appears to
originate in an understanding of human nature that fails to move beyond the pleasure
principle. 305 This implies an ignorance of autistic difference in its most fundamental
dimension, that of the drive. Instead, Maleval suggests that “if autistic subjects think and
function differently it is because they derive enjoyment in a very specific way.” 306 This
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observation highlights how jouissance is key to both meaningful treatment, as well as an
approach to the singularity of the subject that does not elide autistic difference.
Maleval’s critique tacitly suggests we consider a distinction between treating
autism and treating the autistic subject. The former posits the underlying existence of a
non-autistic subject suffering an autistic psychopathology, with the potential to attain
relief from autism through the proper interventions at their recommended levels. 307 The
latter embarks from an understanding of autism as a “different mode of subjective
functioning,” 308 that emerges with the fundamental structure of the subject. In this model,
relief occurs within the horizon of autistic being. We can add that relief from autism is
determined according to a set of etic criteria, while the coordinates of relief set within
autism can be emic in origin, voiced by autistic subjects themselves. For these reasons,
Maleval (and Laurent) urge against the manualization of treatment in favor of knowledge
inherent to the subject, and he sees an important ethical distinction in where different
approaches locate the “source of change:” with the teacher or with the subject. In his
view, although learning and behavioral methods promote autonomy, independence is
only achieved through “highly original methods” developed when the autistic individual
is free to build on their affinities.309 The difference here is between doing something on
one’s own (autonomy) and doing something of one’s own choosing (independence),
albeit with the caveat that the unconscious subverts the full coincidence of agency and
conscious thought.
Unsurprisingly, Maleval argues in favor of psychoanalysis as “the only approach
that isolates, behind the diversity of different types of behavior, what is constant in
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autism.” He considers it uniquely capable of “listening to the other person” and
“promoting respect for the singular and its non-absorption into the universal.” This sort of
listening attempts to engage with the heterogeneity 310 of autism at the level of the
individual, where n=1, in order to “accompany the subject in his original inventions.” 311
Maleval summarily disavows parent-blaming psychogenic etiology, stating “not a single
serious psychoanalyst would support such a thesis,” and sees a trend among
contemporary analysts towards the separation of autism from psychosis.
Yet along with this support for individualized treatment and subjective
knowledge, there are two areas of notable dissonance within the theoretical position we
have worked to articulate. The first raises questions of culpability; the second suggests a
limit to psychoanalysis’ ability to conceive of autism as a way of being.
Frequently in their writing, Maleval and Bergeron seem to ascribe an element of
intentionality to the autistic subject. As Maleval puts it: “At its root, autism is constituted
by the refusal to give up drive objects to the Other.” It is a “more or less conscious choice
made by the subject to protect themselves against anxiety” by “retaining the object of
vocal jouissance.” Similarly, at the expense of a “shared perceptible universe,” Bergeron
states the autistic subject “chooses to remain within the hallucinatory universe of his own
mental representation.” 312 He refuses to give up unmediated access to “the mental
object,” precluding its conversion into a signifier of the Other.
Both Maleval and Bergeron trace this subjective choice to an originary traumatic
encounter with the desire of the Other. To this end, Bergeron identifies the “audible”
dimension of the maternal voice with the “foreign Thing” that threatens the being of the
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autistic subject by mobilizing the drive. Following a “precocious” and “ravaging”
encounter with the audible, the autistic subject creates “a universe of objects where he
lives from instant to instant,” withdrawn from the desire of the Other. If we apply
Lefort’s template to this dynamic, objet a does not cancel the audible of the voice
because the Real, signaled in the opacity of the Other’s desire, is not articulated with the
signifier. In Chapter 1, we offered an interpretation of Naoki Higashida’s “weird voice”
and “missing words” in similar terms. At times Naoki’s own voice confronts him with
jouissance in the nonsensical “verbal junk” he blurts uncontrollably. 313 Here the
“dichotomy of the voice and the signifier” is analogous to the articulation of the Real
with the signifier. Except for Naoki, and perhaps the autistic subject more generally, this
dichotomy remains unconjugated by objet a, and dichotomy falls apart. As a result,
jouissance is not channeled away by the signifier so much as it is condensed within it.
For his part, Maleval interprets the autistic subject’s difficulty parsing implicit
meaning and subsequent predisposition towards the literal meaning of words to be
reflective of an aversion to “vocal jouissance.” 314 Citing Temple Grandin’s account of
her thought process in Thinking in Pictures, he theorizes that the autistic subject relies on
the sign over the signifier. 315 While the signifier “breaks the link with what it signifies,”
signs “do not efface the thing represented,” leaving no mechanism for metonymic
exchange.316 In a schema like Grandin’s the “referent of signs can be found in the world
of things.” As Grandin puts it: “The easiest words for an autistic child to learn are nouns,
because they directly relate to pictures.” 317 Through their “absolute signification” signs
are stripped of the indeterminacy of the Other’s desire, and, by extension, of lack. 318
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From this perspective, Maleval defines autism as “an intense form of castration anxiety,”
absent the “support that lack provides.” 319
The notions of “conscious choice” and “refusal” beg consideration in any
discourse on autism, and in my view, especially a psychoanalytic one that claims to
“accompany the subject in his original inventions” in appreciation of “what is constant in
autism.” It would seem the ethical stance that grants agency to the subject in its radical
singularity is also prone towards holding the subject accountable for its earliest encounter
with (and reaction to) the desire of the Other. If, as Bergeron suggests, this encounter was
“ravaging” and “traumatizing,” it is as though psychoanalysis implicates the autistic
subject for its instinctive “fight, flight, or freeze” response. 320 This position locates the
underlying mechanism of autism somewhere between a deliberate action and an
unconscious recoil. Bracketing off the idea that autism is a conscious choice, with
Bergeron’s motif of “refusal,” we find ourselves back in Tustin’s conceptual terrain.
Even though Maleval and Laurent radicalize the autistic object by asserting its
potential for dynamic exchange along the “rim,” they commence from Tustin’s basic
formulation that sees the autistic object as protective in nature. 321 What Maleval
describes as “retaining the object of vocal jouissance” is analogous to how Tustin’s
object functions to “staunch the ‘bleeding’ by blocking the wound” of traumatic bodily
separateness. 322 And so, while the “rim” may be constituted by the subject’s “islet of
competence,” formative of a “synthetic Other” that assists in the “localization of
jouissance,” the underlying premise remains that it is foremost a barrier, or shell, behind
which the autistic subject retreats. 323 Jim Sinclair would clearly take issue with this,
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based in their claim that: “Autism isn’t something a person has, or a “shell” that a person
is trapped inside.”
Given Tustin’s catastrophizing of autistic being as “fraught with danger,” a
Lacanian perspective that sees autism as profound castration anxiety, resulting from a
“ravaging” encounter with the Other’s desire, risks losing what distinguishes its
approach. 324 However, taking into account the full conceptual scope of the Lacanian
Other, an alternate analysis becomes possible. In Chapter 2, following Verhaeghe, we
noted the body as the “most fundamental Other.” 325 Beyond the big Other of language
and the parental first Other, the bodily Other is “the most intimate stranger.” 326 This
highlights the conceptual instability of the basic division between the subject and the
Other; they are unthinkable in isolation. Now, the autistic rim, formed at the edge of the
autistic “shell” and constitutive of a “synthetic Other,” is no longer a separate possession
so much as it is the topological plane of autistic being in its most porous immanence. The
challenge becomes a matter of thinking the autistic subject’s efforts at self-stabilization as
simultaneously a unique mode of relating to the world that retains all the richness
afforded to neurotypical individuals.
For psychoanalysis, all subjectivity is defensive. We find this anchored in one of
Freud’s observations in Beyond the Pleasure Principle where he states: “Protection
against stimuli is an almost more important function for the living organism than
reception of stimuli.” 327 The theoretical progression Freud undergoes by placing the drive
at the “frontier” between the body and the mind, as a disruptive stimuli originating from
within, means the subject’s defense against itself is an ex-nihilo condition of its being. 328
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Although this limits how psychoanalysis can conceive of the autistic subject, it is
simultaneously an egalitarian maneuver. By pathologizing all subjects, psychoanalysis
thereby refuses to situate any mode of being a subject, neurotypical or otherwise, in the
privileged position of a non-pathological norm.
In Lacanian theory, the Other is the subject’s ultimate mediator; it is both the
origin of stimuli and the protective buffer against too much stimuli. For the
neurotic/neurotypical subject, the Other facilitates the dialectical displacement of the
drive with the desire of the Other. Based on the clinical observations put forth by
Maleval, Bergeron, and Laurent, this displacement does not occur in the same fashion for
the autistic subject, who “runs afoul” of the desire of the Other. 329
Maleval et al. regularly cite first-person sources in their writing. This approach
has the effect of substantiating the lived experiences of autistic individuals with poignant
examples of threatening and intrusive encounters with the Other. Nobody Nowhere
(1992), in which Donna Williams describes her many methods for keeping other people
at bay, is a prime example referenced by both Bergeron and Maleval. However, we have
also seen how this approach leads to a characterization of the autistic subject oriented
around a fundamental refusal towards the Other. The immediate question that arises is a
simple, “why?” Why is this encounter so fundamentally altering for the autistic subject?
Does autism entail that the invasive foreign element of the drive cannot be mapped to an
actual Other, leaving it to confront the subject solely through the corporeal guise of the
Other as “the most intimate stranger” of the body?
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In her final analysis of Marie-Francoise and Nadia, Lefort poses an intriguing
question as to whether her analysands, Nadia in particular, possessed a certain topological
“anticipation” of the Other. 330 Based on Nadia’s activity in sessions, Lefort was certain
the Other, for her, was “holed.” 331 Beyond this, she speculated as to whether the Other
was “toric from the start” as well. The implication pertains to the ease with which Nadia
could make Lefort “in her image” as a support in the “virtual space” of the mirror. In my
view, Lefort is questioning whether something innate to the subject determines its
capacity to relate to the Other at a topological level. For Marie-Francoise, forever the
“counterproof,” the absence of this anticipation might explain why she could not find the
symbolic hole in Lefort’s body, leaving it to reappear in the “real of her own body.” 332
We have set as our goal the development of a psychoanalytic metapsychology
compatible with Sinclair’s pronouncement that “Autism is a way of being.” In reviewing
clinical literature, we have co-located autism with the most basic emergence of the
subject. Now, in order to see beyond a horizon of the autistic subject defined by a
traumatic encounter with the desire of the Other, we must consider how to reorient the
drive to an Other whose lack does not manifest as such. If we suggest autism to be a
mode of relating to one’s own lack, in isolation from the signifying matrix of the Other,
then it is not a matter of “resisting” the alienation of language, as Maleval puts it, so far
as it is alienation from this alienation. Perhaps autistic being is a mode of defense wherein
the Other and the neighbor-Thing are not aligned. We will continue to wrestle with these
questions in Chapter 2 by engaging with first-person writing and scientific research.
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Chapter 2: Introduction
Chapter 2 ventures a series of speculative encounters between emic, first-person
writing and quantitative, etic research, facilitated by the psychoanalytic framework
outlined in Chapter 1 and the Interlude. Although these encounters are neither standalone
pieces nor fully integrated, their central purpose remains consistent: to consider autism as
a way of being through Lacanian theory. To this end, certain themes and concepts make
repeated appearances, applied as analytic tools for a critical engagement with the source
material. The remainder of this introduction reviews Chapter 1 and the Interlude before
picking up from the end of Chapter 1 to describe, broadly, how these themes and
concepts will be incorporated going forward.
In Chapter 1, we defined “the subject” in contrast to the ego or “self.” Instead of
an agent possessing transparent self-knowledge, the subject operates unconsciously to
frame the bounds of conscious thought. In this way it is a radically lacking entity. We
considered how Lacan’s application of structural linguistics to psychoanalysis opened
new dimensions to Freud’s theoretical edifice, memorialized in his formula “the
unconscious is structured like a language.” The subject of the unconscious is thus the
subject of the signifier; it only exists in relation to an/the Other. Moreover, a subject’s
way of being is a way of being in language.
Utilizing Paul Verhaeghe’s psychodiagnostic formalization of Freudo-Lacanian
theory, we traced the subject’s structural formation in relation to the first and second
Others. Whereas the first Other mitigates drive tension through dyadic, mirroring
attunement, the second Other elaborates this dyad along the cross-axis of the signifying
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chain. A “triangular structuration” is thereby opened allowing the subject to mobilize
something unresolved and unsymbolizable in the dyadic relation to the first Other, a
remnant of the subject’s drive that emerges as a lacking element in the field of the
Other. 333 Lacan names this objet a.
In order to grasp how objet a exerts an influence on perceptual awareness, we
utilized Richard Boothby’s phenomenological motif of positionality and dispositionality.
This approach describes a dialectic relation between positional objects that are readily
given to consciousness as discrete and separate from their surroundings, and the
imperceptible dispositional field in which such objects emerge. Following Lacan’s
analysis of objet a as “the gaze” in the visual realm, Boothby names it as a “dispositional
object” that is “active in the invisible framing that produces all positional awareness.” 334
In the auditory domain, Boothby applies this framework to the phoneme, taken “solely as
a marker of difference,” whose positionality is “immediately swallowed up by its role in
establishing a field of dispositionality.” 335 The phoneme, like objet a, is a “unique
intersection of positionality and dispositionality.” 336
One goal here is to demonstrate how an examination of positionality and
dispositionality offers an analytic method for extrapolating about unconscious structures
based on conscious subjectivity. Essentially, for something to present itself to
consciousness, something else must go unseen, unheard, or unregistered, meaning that
what lacks from consciousness is as fundamental as what appears. The most basic
parsing-out and breaking-up of conscious experience relies on this dialectic, which is
regulated by objet a as it “focuses” the dispositional field. 337 I apply this methodology
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heartily in my analyses of first-person texts. The writing of autistic individuals often
describes uniquely distinctive visual and auditory experiences that implicate objet a as a
dispositional object, and subsequently as a fundamental marker of their subjective
structure.
A more profound aim is to show how objet a relates to the metapsychological
dimension of signifying structure. As a dispositional object “strangely suspended
between the subject and other,” objet a interweaves the subject’s lack with the desire of
the Other in the indeterminate space of the signifier. 338 Here we return to the central place
of language in determining the being of the subject. In Verhaeghe’s view, Lacan’s
separate clinical structures (neurosis, psychosis, perversion) each “imply a different way
of being-in-language” 339 based on how they evince a particular “relation to the structural
lack in the Symbolic (the Other) with respect to the Real of the drive.” 340 Because objet a
can be mapped to both the drive and the Other, this led us to double-down on the question
of how objet a manifests in the subjective experience of autistic subjects as evidence of a
uniquely autistic structure.
We left off from Chapter 1 in the shadow that is das Ding, presented by Richard
Boothby in its most metapsychological dimension as “the site of a fundamental blind
spot, the subject’s primitive acknowledgement of a zone of something unknown.” 341
Located beyond the limit of the subject’s capacity to identify with the other, The Thing
provokes the “ineluctable disposition to believe” by confronting the subject with
something “abyssal” at its core. 342 Boothby’s essay, The No-Thing of God:
Psychoanalysis of Religion After Lacan, sketches a psychoanalytic theory of religion that
86

collapses the antagonism between faith and rationality based in how Lacan locates “the
motive sources of belief rooted in the elemental architecture of subjectivity.” Because the
belief in question pertains to the subject’s capacity for symbolic mediation of anxiety and
jouissance through the big Other -- by way of fantasy, foreclosure, or disavowal -- the
centrality of language impairments and social communication deficits in defining autism
tethers us firmly to the ontological dimension of the autistic subject. The subject’s dualrelation to language and other people directly invokes the question of that subject’s way
of being.
To this end, the scope of the conceptual terrain occupied by the Other is crucial.
In addition to the big Other of the Symbolic domain, we must consider it simultaneously
as the caretaking first Other and the body. As Verhaeghe puts it: “On the one hand we
have the Other as the body from which the jouissance arises; on the other there is the
Other as the (m)Other who provides access to this jouissance via signifiers.” 343 In the
first case there is the body as the “most intimate stranger,” a manifestation of the internal
Other “that enjoys, if possible together with us, if need be without us.” 344 Yet it is equally
the caregiving Other whose signifiers “mark” the body, setting external coordinates for
one’s inner sense of corporeality. 345 The division of the subject is established by the
division between subject and Other. Verhaeghe goes on to note that even as Lacan’s
usage of “the Other” changed over the course of his writing, it is possible to maintain the
earlier meanings alongside later ones. A Lacanian engagement with the autistic subject
must leverage this semantic polyvalence to its full extent.
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Review, cont.
In the Interlude, we largely deferred the question of “being” to consider how
historical and contemporary psychoanalytic theories conceive of autism. One goal was to
identify what is unique in a Lacanian approach to autism compared to other
psychoanalytic orientations. Another was to assess the compatibility of this approach
with the specifics of Jim Sinclair’s assertion that autism is inseparable from the
underlying existence of an autistic person. As he put it: “There’s no normal child hidden
behind the autism.” After problematizing the historical relationship between
psychoanalysis and a psychogenic etiology of autism rooted in “toxic parenting,” we
reviewed Frances Tustin’s work as an example of a theory that pathologizes autistic
existence. We traced Tustin’s theoretical underpinnings to the work of Melanie Klein
before comparing and contrasting Klein with Lacan.
Although there are clear parallels between the two, a main point of departure
pertains to the status of the infant’s earliest relationship with the maternal body. The
negation of the signifier and the primacy of the Symbolic, for Lacan, refocuses this
relationship away from a dynamic of presence to one of absence. It is a subtle, but
crucial, difference. Tustin, for example, conceives of autism as a maladaptive response to
the child’s bodily separation from the mother. A prior “undue closeness” in which “both
mother and child had colluded” leaves the child ill-prepared for this otherwise normative
separation, leading it to erect a protective barrier around itself. Tustin sees the “autistic
shell,” manifest in the ritualized behaviors and obsessive interests of the autistic child, as
a tactic for protecting against threatening stimuli. Similarly, she theorized the role of
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autistic objects and shapes that protect the child by “blocking the wound,” but “handicap
mental development.” 346
We then pivoted to the clinical work of Rosine and Robert Lefort as an example
of proto-Lacanian autism theorists. In Rosine’s detailed case studies of Nadia and MarieFrancoise, the extent to which she was installed in the role of the Other for each child
contrasted their respective courses of treatment. Moreover, the status of her body as
lacking, or “holed,” was a necessary condition for initiating a dialectic exchange of
signifying objects and establishing a transferential relationship wherein Nadia could
signify her lack, but Marie-Francoise could not. For Lefort, autism emerges in the double
absence of an Imaginary other and a “holed,” Symbolic Other, resulting in an abundance
of the Real. Finally, her turn towards topological models expanded the structural thematic
we relied on previously.
A fundamental question for Lacanian theorists of the autistic subject is how to
separate autism from the framework of psychosis, based on language’s limited capacity
to mitigate jouissance in each case. 347 Eric Laurent, Jean-Claude Maleval, and Danielle
Bergeron are Lacanian analysts active today who build from the work of the Leforts in
order to articulate this separation. While for Tustin, autism is a defensive response to the
traumatic loss of the maternal body, in a Lacanian model, autism emerges in an encounter
with the desire of the mOther. It is not a matter of the mOther’s absence, but of her lack,
manifest in the cut of the signifier. Yet whereas the psychotic subject attempts to restore
the structural flaw in the Symbolic that bears the desire of the Other, the autist turns away
from this lack more profoundly. 348
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Although these analysts see the autistic object as a “precious invention” with the
“dynamic capacity” to function as objet a, Maleval and Bergeron consider the autistic
subject to be prone towards retaining this object of the drive. They use rhetoric that
suggests the autistic subject is active in this “refusal” to cede the “vocal object” (Maleval)
or “mental representation – the mental object” (Bergeron) to the Other. Doing so supports
the supposed homeostasis of autistic withdrawal. Further, Laurent theorizes that for the
autistic subject jouissance is borne along a “rim” or “edge” that constitutes the site of a
“synthetic Other” capable of localizing jouissance outside the body. Although this model
operates within the paradigm of the autistic shell, Laurent sees the rim as a site of
therapeutic potential, where the analyst can join in an “autism 𝑎𝑎̀ deux” to facilitate the
exchange of autistic objets a on the terms set out by the subject. Similarly, Maleval

argues in favor of psychoanalytic therapies that “listen to the autist” and engage with the
subject’s “islets of competence” or affinities that constitute the synthetic Other.
Consistent across psychoanalytic conceptualizations of autism is the idea of
defense. Because psychoanalysis defines all subjective structures as imperfect solutions
to the “structural lack in the Symbolic (the Other) with respect to the Real of the drive,”
autism is conceivably just one mode of defense amongst other viable recourses. 349 Yet in
order for Lacanian theory to engage with autism as a way of being according to the terms
set out by Sinclair, the autistic object and the “edge” it supports must be understood as
constitutive-of and inseparable-from the autistic subject at the most fundamental level.
Rather than represent a barrier behind which the autistic subject retreats, they must be
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understood to establish a mediating zone between the subject and the world – and within
the subject itself.
In my view, greater distance should be established between a Lacanian
conceptualization of the autistic subject and that theorized by Tustin. Contrary to Maleval
and Bergeron, who suggest the autist retains the object in defense against the desire of the
Other, invoking Tustin’s object as that which “plugs the gap,” I speculate as to how – and
whether -- this subject encounters the Other’s lack most basically. This entails leaning
towards an understanding of the Lacanian Other in its bodily dimension, suggestive of a
uniquely non-intersubjective autistic objet a, that is “strangely suspended” between the
subject and the “most intimate stranger.” 350
The Interlude concludes with my speculation that autistic being is characterized
by the non-alignment of the Other with the Thing. This is based on Lefort’s question as to
whether Nadia possessed an “anticipation” of the Symbolic structure of the Other while
Marie-Francoise did not. Such an anticipation would explain Nadia’s capacity to ally
with the Other to process jouissance. As Lefort described, Nadia “made me a ‘surface’ in
her own image, before going to confront us in the mirror.” 351 The anticipation of a
Symbolic Other opened “space for a more leisurely return to a surface structure” that was
“orientable.” This was necessary for “articulating” the Real and the signifier in the virtual
space of the mirror.
A final step to take here is to consider the process by which das Ding is colocated with the desire of the Other. As Boothby puts it: “It is essentially a question of
“like me or unlike me” that leads to the positing of the Thing in the case of a failure to
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establish identity.” 352 The desire of the Other presents a limit to this identification,
creating a “zone of something unknown,” that opens a space for the Thing. However, for
the neurotypical subject, this failure ostensibly occurs after some measure of success.
Autism asks that we consider the ontological ramifications of subject formation in the
absence of any such success.
In Chapter 2 we return to Freud’s conceptualization of the Thing from the Project
for a Scientific Psychology. Recent scientific autism research has observed fundamental
differences in how autistic subjects move and perceive other subjects early in life, leading
me to hypothesize the “like me” dimension of the fellow-creature is not operative for
autistic individuals in a way that opens the virtual space of the mirror necessary for the
negation of the Real by the signifier. It is my wager that very little conceptual translation
is required to justify extrapolating about das Ding from these sources. From there we will
analyze the writing of Tito Mukhopadhyay for manifestations of the autistic objet a, with
special attention to the dispositionality of this object. My ultimate conclusion is that
Lacanian theory, while not without limitations, nonetheless presents a potent critical tool
for appreciating Sinclair’s claim that autism is a way of being.
Das Ding and Autism Research
For all of the importance we have placed on das Ding as a necessary and
constitutively absent condition of the subject’s being, the examples Freud used to
describe it in the Project are rather simple. They involve the everyday activities of
looking, moving, and remembering. When the “fellow human-being” recalls the
“subject’s first satisfying object (and also his first hostile object) as well as his sole
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assisting force,” Freud theorized that certain “perceptual complexes arising from this
fellow-creature” will be immediately recognizable against the backdrop of the subject’s
own embodied experiences. 353 Specifically, he describes visual perceptions of other
people that “will coincide in the subject with his own memory of quite similar visual
impressions of his own body – a memory with which will be associated memories of
movements experienced by himself.” Although the Thing is assigned to the “portion” of
the nebensmensch that does not “coincide” with the subject’s memories, corporeal or
visual, the whole subjective edifice/structure erected adjacent to it depends equally on
memories that “can be traced back to information about the subject’s own body.” 354
With this in mind, there are two bodies of scientific research that offer uniquely
pertinent findings, suggestive of something distinctive in how autistic subjects look,
move, and relate to memories of those movements. First, studies that use eye tracking
technology examine how infants and toddlers perceive fellow human beings compared to
other visual stimuli. 355 Some findings suggest autism is detectable as early as 2-6 months
of age based on longitudinally discernible differences in eye fixation when compared
with typically-developing (TD) subjects.356 Second, the “movement perspective” covers
an interdisciplinary array of research initiatives oriented around scientifically observable
and quantifiable metrics of sensorimotor functioning. 357 This approach to autism
considers how “different ways of perceiving and moving” underlie the secondary (and
tertiary) symptomology typically bundled in a classification of autism as a
neurodevelopmental disorder affecting social communication. 358
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The point here is to raise the metapsychological stakes of the body at a point in
the history of the subject when the terrain of the body itself is not easily demarcated from
the Other. Sensorimotor research and eye tracking studies do not posit a cause of autism,
so much as they suggest how its earliest manifestations intervene to shape all subsequent
development. For our purposes, at issue in both cases is the capacity for identification and
dyadic mirroring at the level of Verhaeghe’s dually-defined first Other, whereby the
subject exists within a “double dialectic” of the subject—body (or drive), and the
subject—Other.359 Before the desire of/lack in the Other is encountered and before the
signifier opens a space for the Thing, a relation defined by dyadic mirroring provides a
tentative, binary determination of tension/release, inner/outer, “like me or unlike me.”
We will review the methodologies and findings of these research bodies with a focus on
the implications for how das Ding emerges. The basic proposition is that “different ways
of perceiving and moving” must be considered as affecting the determination of “like me
or unlike me.”
Eye Tracking and the Limit of the Imaginary
Eye tracking studies consider many aspects of how test subjects perceive their
environment. Often utilizing a technique that observes light reflected off the cornea,
conclusions are drawn based on what subjects look at, for how long, and at the expense of
which other items in the visual realm. 360 These findings are typically contextualized in a
developmental perspective. One article notes that “from the first hours and weeks of life,
preferential attention to familiar voices, faces, face-like stimuli, and biological motion
guide typical infants.” 361 The underlying question with eye tracking research is whether
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an autistic developmental trajectory is observable in the some of the earliest interactions
between a child and its environment in general, and with other people more specifically.
Falck-Ytter et al. (2013) review an array of studies in a meta-analysis to
“critically assess the use of eye tracking in research focused on autism early in life.” 362
Although they note a range of findings and differences in specific research designs, their
summary discussions support certain broad conclusions. The most striking of these
pertain to how autistic children demonstrate: “reduced looking time at people and faces”
and “an absence of preference for biological motion,” compared to typically-developing
peers. 363 Other research designs that monitor eye movements across images placed sideby-side, called “preferential looking studies,” suggest autistic subjects tend to be drawn
towards dynamic geometric images and patterns and “non-social contingencies” more so
than towards social scenes or representations of the human form. 364, 365 In studies where
faces are the sole images presented, autistic participants tend to focus more on the mouth
and less on the eyes than typically-developing children. Related findings indicate “a
tendency to orient towards spatial locations with much audiovisual synchrony (AVS),
such as synchrony produced by clapping hands,” or in the case of facial looking patterns,
the mouth. 366
Even a cautious/conservative interpretation of these findings opens a direct line to
Freud’s theorization in the Project. To establish the “like me” dimension of the human
Other, the subject’s “visual perceptions” must be supported by a bare minimum of
looking. A tendency for “reduced looking time” opens a more basic question of “how
much looking is sufficient?” While we will leave this question open, it takes no great leap
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to suggest the mechanism at work in Freud’s thinking is affected by this tendency in
autistic subjects.
Eye tracking research appears to substantiate some of Rosine Lefort’s clinical
observations. Lefort noted how Marie-Francoise “did not assign any special significance
to the Real of my body in relation to the other objects.” 367 She was “always ready to turn
towards an object other than me, as if all the objects, including myself, were
undifferentiated.” 368 Decades later, Falck-Ytter et al. noted “limited orienting to
biological motion” in their young autistic subjects.369 Phenomenologically speaking, a
perceptual landscape where other human beings do not emerge as privileged entities
supports the broad claim that the autistic subject’s relation to the Other is, at some level,
not reducible to that of the neurotypical subject. But for as much as these observations
support the conclusion that the autistic subject isn’t “captured” by the specular other, this
leaves us isolated in the imaginary register. Lefort was quick to observe the “double
absence of the Other and the other” for Marie-Francoise, who “could not find the hole
symbolically in my body.” 370 Further, Boothby points out that Freud’s theorizing in the
Project specifies the Thing be co-located with “what is unknown in the human Other,” as
opposed to within other perceptual objects. Eye tracking research addresses only part of
equation, remaining within the dyadic relation to the first Other.
An interesting historical footnote illustrates this distinction further. Simon BaronCohen, the well-known autism researcher specializing in Theory of Mind (ToM) studies
and originator of the “extreme male brain” hypothesis, made a brief reference to Lacan’s
Mirror Stage essay in his PhD thesis at the University of London (1985). 371 In his
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research, Baron-Cohen demonstrated that autistic children have the ability for “mirror
self-recognition” and concludes that ToM deficits originate elsewhere. He then goes on to
refute what he believes to be Lacan’s theorization that such self-recognition “causes the
onset of social awareness,” as a “necessary and sufficient condition.” 372 While BaronCohen considers that “Lacan did not intend a literal interpretation of his use of the term
‘mirror,’” and notes the “philosophical framework within which he writes is not directly
translatable into the experimental psychological one,” this fleeting encounter reinforces
an important distinction between the ego and the subject.
In Baron-Cohen’s dismissal of Lacan, the focus on self-recognition reveals the
implicit determination of “the self” as the fundamental unit of personhood/subjectivity.
From a psychoanalytic perspective, a Theory of Mind paradigm posits egos interacting
with other egos as the underlying model for social being/existence, based in one’s ability
to ascribe intentionality to the neighbor. 373 Autistic individuals exhibit “mind blindness”
when they fail to report accurately on ego intentionality. Conversely, Lacan theorizes
how the desiring subject encounters the desire of the Other at the point of its own lack,
giving rise to objet a as the elusive representative of this lack within the socio-symbolic
field of the Other. Whereas attributing ‘something more’ to the Other is a shared feature
(intentionality and desire, respectively), the former case assumes this ‘something’ is
knowable with a working Theory of Mind, while the latter bases itself on the constitutive
unknowability of this excessive component.
The point of the Mirror Stage essay is to articulate how the ego arises out of a
fundamental misrecognition, forever subverting the truth of self-recognition. 374 As Lacan
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puts it, the ego is “irreducible” to and will only ever “asymptotically approach the
subject’s becoming.” 375 If anything, Lacan’s formulation of the mirror stage is defined by
the failure of the image to encompass the entirety of the subject’s being. How the subject
attempts to repair this failure portends its structure. To define autism via egoic or
cognitive criteria is to occlude the autistic subject and the unconscious
constitution/condition of its way of being.
In a psychoanalytic view, “social awareness,” as it is used to define autism, is a
function of a shared, structural failure amongst neurotypical subjects, emerging at the
limit of one’s mirror self-recognition. This requires we understand the importance of
recognition in its negative dimension, rather than as a positive characteristic. In other
words, beyond establishing a correspondence between oneself and one’s mirror image,
the question becomes: is the image imbued with something more, with an unknowable –
and thereby lacking – excessive dimension? It is the libidinous investment of the drive
that instantiates this dimension. Moreover, is this something more granted its symbolic
dimension, ratified by a lacking Other? As Boothby might put it: the gestalt positionality
of the image is relevant only as far as it registers within an imperceptible dispositional
field. And so, just as the reduced looking time observed by eye tracking research only
engages with the visual perceptions in Freud’s schema, the question here should be less
“can the autistic subject recognize its mirror image?” and instead, “what is the status of
the Other relative to this image?” Or, does the Other open a dispositional dimension to
the positionality of the image?
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Key to Freud’s theorization in the Project is that “visual perceptions” of the
other’s movements (“for instance, the movements of its hands”) will be related back to
the subject’s “memories of movements experienced by himself.” Das Ding inheres to the
unseen core of the other that “gives the impression of being a constant structure and
remains as a coherent ‘thing.” 376 Beholding a two-dimensional, static image does not
evoke the dispositional because it does not require that the subject demonstrate a "foregrasp” of the unseen inner space that is posited moment to moment. Boothby contrasts
“positional adumbration” with “positional articulation” to make this distinction, noting
how with the latter “changes in the (adumbrated) figure are collated in relation to a
virtual unity, analogous to the locus of the Freudian Thing.” 377
Lefort’s topographical analysis of how Nadia approached the mirror allows us to
bring “the virtual” into alignment with the Thing, movement, and the autistic subject. As
she noted, Nadia was able to establish a “topological identification” with her own image,
such that they formed a mobius dyad in the mirror. 378 As this dyad was “pitched” in the
image, contorting and deforming the perception of their surface boundaries, the Real of
their bodies was inscribed into the “virtual space” of the mirror. Unlike Marie-Francoise,
Nadia had extracted “signifying objects” from the holed body of the Other, interpreted by
Lefort as objets a.379 As these anchoring points were cast into the virtual space of the
mirror, they engaged the Real of Nadia’s body, establishing the signifying coordinates of
lack through which she could temper jouissance.
Crucially, it was through the embodied dynamism of this scene, the movement of
bodies with a common topography, linked by objet a, that “something more” was granted
99

to the image in the mirror. When Lefort questioned whether, for Nadia, her body was
“toric from the start” based on some innate structural “anticipation,” she equally implied
the question of whether Marie-Francoise was precluded from forming a mobius dyad, and
the dynamic “like me” dimension of the human Other necessary for the limit of
identification it implies.380 Here we turn to sensorimotor research to understand how
movement differences support the idea of autism as a way of being.
Movement Differences and the Thing about Autism
The “movement perspective” makes explicit its intentions to rethink the “socially
defined focus” of other autism theories and incorporate the perspectives of individuals
with autism. 381 One particular cluster of this research observes measurable differences in
“micro-movements.” 382 As the authors define them, “micro-movements are the nonstationary stochastic patterns of minute fluctuations inherent in natural actions.” 383 For
the typically-developing (TD) individual, micro-movements “increase in predictability
over time, based on ‘re-entrant sensory feedback.’” Micro-movements are not readily
perceptible “as they take place at timescales and frequencies that fall largely beneath our
conscious awareness.” 384 Put differently, micro-movements describe variations in the
body’s trial-and-error process for acquiring mastery over its actions, by learning from and
readjusting to the outcomes of previous, unsuccessful attempts.
A hypothetical example might proceed as follows: if one were to record all the
subtle movements an individual demonstrates when reaching for a glass of water,
including all the minute variations in the route the body traverses, time after time,
towards a consistent endpoint, the variability of the autistic individuals’ movements
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would far surpass that of the non-autistic individual. For TD individuals, what starts as
disorganized and chaotic becomes refined and predictable. Importantly, this process
usually occurs automatically along with physical maturation. 385
Micro-movement research methodologies engage in scientific observation and the
application of statistical analysis in interpreting results. The primary research design cited
by Torres et al. uses a motion capture system to monitor a basic pointing task, involving
both “goal-directed” (pointing upon request to a particular shape) and “goal-less” (the
subsequent return to baseline posture). 386 Findings show how the typically-developing
individual’s movements smooth out over time, becoming more predictable, accompanied
by a flattening of chaotic, superfluous movements. The researchers note how “intentional
motions have been documented in neonates as early as 10 days old,” and how “innate
reflexes may initially play a role in the identification of systematic patterns during
spontaneous exploratory behaviors by providing reliable referencing anchors.” The TD
subject’s development is based on the accumulation of these muscle-memory
(kinesthetic) “priors,” suggestive that the body has the potential to register and record
micro-movements within a stochastic field of likely/possible outcomes, so that future
instances build upon previous attempts. 387
By comparison, autistic individuals show a persistence of chaotic, unpredictable
micro-movements. As such, the autistic body is “memoryless.” 388 At the level of
cognitive functioning, the failure to build up a probabilistic inventory of stable causeand-effect motor expectations leads to “noise,” defined as “any kind of sensed
phenomenon or change that cannot be interpreted as a signal.” 389 In other words, the
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autistic subject’s body movements and sensations are not easily factored into
consciousness as meaningful events, let alone as “volitional” actions.390 A memoryless
and noisy body must “rely on the concrete ‘here and now’ of perceived body position and
environment.” 391 Whereas TD sensorimotor functioning leads to a continuous embodied
narrative, the autistic subject is tasked with constructing her own means for establishing
new spatial reference points, moment to moment.
Some movement perspective researchers consider certain aspects of their findings
“to be a unifying characteristic —or endo-phenotype— for the entire autism spectrum
irrespective of the heterogeneity of overall clinical presentation.” 392 In this view, surfacelevel behavioral symptoms of autism can be oriented within a sensorimotor framework
grounded by the lack of kinesthetic priors. The reliance on the “here and now” is
interpreted to account for the stereotypical lack of social flexibility and breaks in routine
associated with autistic individuals, based on the recurrent need to find one’s bearings. A
higher noise-to-signal ratio of micro-movements prevents smooth bi-modal sensoryintegration and processing, “because there is no internalized sensory-motor frame of
reference,” given the preponderance of non-sensical sensory input. 393 A preference for
sameness and repetitive motions are construed as “attempts to limit uncertainty (noise)”
and as “part of a search for current verification of body position in space,”
respectively. 394 Anticipating, perceiving, and interpreting the “actions and emotional
facial micro-expressions of others during real time social interactions,” are compromised
by the individual’s own lack of a “congruent map between physical and visual
perception.” 395
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Along these lines, Gizzonio et al. note how autistic subjects demonstrate
impairments in the ability to perform pantomime gestures. This includes both when the
subject is tasked with imitating a visually perceived action, as well as when the action is
described through verbal directives. These researchers suggest such differences emerge
with the inability to “encode the spatiotemporal dynamics of the observed gestures.” 396
They speculate further that gestures described by verbal command when “there is no
external model to imitate,” require the described action to be “extracted’ from an internal
model,” leading to the hypothesis that “children with autism build their own peculiar
dyspraxic internal motor models.” Pantomime deficits, then, are “mostly due to the
presence of an internal stereotyped model of action” that is not derived through
successful mimesis. 397
In a study that applied a “rocking chair paradigm” to examine a “low-level of
motoric behavior that does not depend on intentional, goal-directed action,” Marsh et al.
contrast how typically developing children “exhibit spontaneous social rocking with their
caregivers,” while autistic children do not share the same “tendency to rock in a
symmetrical state.” 398 They go on to speculate as to how “deficiencies in perceiving and
responding to the rhythms of the world may have serious consequences for the ability to
become adequately embedded in a social context.” Treatment interventions grounded in
this research approach build from the rationale that “by focusing the child’s attention on
the adult’s movements, and facilitating simple motoric movement synchrony, individuals
can be pulled into the orbit of another, becoming a social unity of perceiving and
acting.” 399
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There are parallels between certain aspects of sensorimotor research and Freud’s
theorization of the Thing that raise questions about the formation of the autistic subject.
For instance, how might a subject with a “memoryless” and “noisy” body relate visual
perceptions of the other’s movements back to “memories of movements experienced by
himself” – when those movements were not registered as such in the first place? This
process is further complicated by the research that shows autistic subjects often do not
experience their physical actions to be “volitional” in the way neurotypical individuals
do. Pantomime and interpersonal rocking studies suggest fundamental differences in how
autistic individuals relate to the movements of others, both intentionally (pantomime) and
involuntarily (interpersonal rocking).
In the Project, Freud describes a process wherein certain perceptions “can be
traced back to information about the subject’s own body.” Through this constant relatingback of present experiences to past memories, das Ding is positioned in the virtual space
that gives an object or person “the impression of being a constant structure,” despite
changes in the subject’s perspective or transformations in the object itself. Brincker and
Torres (2013) raise an intersecting question in their movement difference research: “How
can we, with a body in constant motion, get to a coherent and stable perception of
anything?” 400 In response, they describe how the accumulation of kinesthetic priors
support the “predictive anticipation not only of body position and motion in time, but also
the contents of what is perceived.” 401 However, the autistic body does not accrue such an
inventory and must “rely on the concrete ‘here and now’ of perceived body position and
environment.” Consistency across space and time is not guaranteed for this subject’s own
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corporeality, and so Freud’s “perceptual complexes” that are judged against this
background must be likewise unstable. Given the centrality of the subject’s perceptual
relation to the other in Freud’s theorization of das Ding, one must question the extent to
which, for the autistic subject, the fellow human being maintains “the impression of
being a constant structure.”
Sensorimotor research suggests profound implications for how autistic individuals
relate-to and experience-of the “like me” dimension of the fellow human. By extension,
the “non-comparable” or “unlike me” aspect, constitutive of the Symbolic Other, is
equally suspect. While eye tracking studies show quantitative differences in how autistic
subjects perceive the other (“reduced looking time” and “limited orientation to biological
movement” being prime examples), movement disorder research suggests qualitative
differences in how what is perceived is registered by consciousness and understood
within the context of the autistic subject’s own embodied experiences. This leads to the
conclusion that the dialectical co-emergence of the familiar and the foreign, crucial for
the alignment of the Thing with the other, occurs along a different topology.
The Object of the Autistic Other
When we extrapolate these findings into a Lacanian schema, we find new
opportunities to engage with the work of Lefort, Maleval, and Bergeron reviewed in the
Interlude. In that context, we considered whether neurotypical subjects possess an innate
“anticipation” of a topologically toric Other that assists in the opening of a virtual space,
necessary for the articulation of the Real with the signifier (Lefort). We also questioned
the premise that an encounter with the desire of the Other is somehow uniquely
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traumatizing for – and perhaps constitutive of – the autistic subject (Maleval and
Bergeron). To conclude this portion, we will reconsider these questions in conjunction
with sensorimotor research findings and the related implications for das Ding raised
above.
In her observations of Marie-Francoise, Lefort “found the Real – plenty of it.” 402
Because Marie-Francoise could not locate the Symbolic “hole of reception” on Lefort’s
body, the Other did not lack, nor were signifying objects extracted and pressed into
dialectic exchange. Because symbolization opens a space for lack, where lack cannot be
established, the Real resides. This resonates with the suggestion by Torres et al. that the
autistic body is “noisy.” 403 Here we can see how uninterpretable signal “noise,” generated
by bodily movements that cannot be sequenced into fluid actions and do not register
meaningfully for consciousness, create similar conditions for the Real to emerge. As
Brincker and Torres point out, the autistic body’s failure to accumulate “kinesthetic
priors” means “every variation and contextual influence intensifies the noise already
inherent in the movement.” 404 In other words, the autistic body accumulates the Real
through its very existence qua body.
We previously noted how “limited orientation to biological motion” supports
Lefort’s claim that Marie-Francoise did not differentiate her body from other objects. As
such, Lefort’s body remained a mobius strip, a “non-holed structure.” 405 If we have
adequately demonstrated how sensorimotor research supports the idea of a radical
difference between autistic and neurotypical subjects in terms of their corporeal relation
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to the Other, as well as the connection between these findings and the emergence of das
Ding, we can circle back to the matter of Nadia’s “anticipation” of a toric Other.
As Lefort put it, a torus shape supports “the notions of inside, outside, and
hole.” 406 Whereas the continuous surface of the mobius is “nonorientable,” a toric Other
possesses Symbolic holes that promote the extraction and exchange of signifying objects.
Notably in Seminar VII, Lacan described das Ding as “an intimate exteriority,” that is “at
the center only in the sense that it is excluded,” so we should add that the virtual “inside”
space of the torus is, precisely, that of das Ding. 407 If the autistic subject’s movement
differences point towards the conclusion that the like me/unlike me dialectic is not
operative, and the lack of “predictive anticipation” hinders the emergence of das Ding in
the Other, then it is logical to conjoin this assessment with Lefort’s, and confirm her
suspicion that Nadia approached the Other with an innate anticipation of a torus shape,
poised with Symbolic holes, calibrated by shared spatiotemporal coordinates. Inversely,
Marie-Francoise did not.
The movement perspective asks that we reconsider certain aspects of Bergeron,
Laurent, and Maleval’s thinking as well. Together these analysts share the underlying
paradigm of autism as characterized by the defensive retention of objet a in a protective,
stabilizing maneuver against anxiety and jouissance. Maleval and Bergeron, in particular,
see a refusal to cede the “vocal object” and “mental object” to the Other. In my view, we
should modify this conceptualization to take into account the way movement differences
complicate the mechanism by which this ceding (neuro)typically occurs, that is, in a
dialectic exchange with a lacking or “holed” Other.
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We have noted, given the nature of the movement differences observed, that the
autistic body is a purveyor of jouissance through its accumulation of the Real. Relatedly,
Laurent suggests there is no “pathway of the drive that could otherwise link the body of
the subject to the Other,” and that the autistic subject is “glued to the drive,” causing an
“excess of presence.” The non-relation to the Other – or more specifically, the nonalignment of das Ding, the “very source of the drive,” with the nebensmensch – leaves
the autistic subject to mitigate lack on its own. We should be quick to link Laurent’s
missing “pathway” with the movement perspective in general, exemplified in the findings
of pantomime and interpersonal rocking research. From here we can see how the absence
of shared spatiotemporal coordinates equally prevents the establishment of a “social unity
of perceiving and acting,” as well as a corporeal “pathway” to the Other. If we grant this
missing linkage its full range of downstream effects, we can open space for an alternate
interpretation whereby the autistic subject does not retain the object through a defensive
refusal or choice, but instead that in the absence of a viable partner for embodied
interlocution – without being “in the orbit of another” – the object has nowhere to go.
More precisely, the object cannot emerge as missing, because the Other has nowhere to
put it.
Maleval and Bergeron trace the impetus for this retention to the autistic subject’s
initial encounter with the desire of the Other. In (neuro)typical subject formation, this
encounter initiates the alienating, sacrificial tradeoff inherent to language acquisition.
Maleval maintains autistic subjects “resist the alienation of their being in language by
retaining the object of vocal jouissance.” 408 The alternative, he suggests, is “an intense
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form of castration anxiety” that manifests in the behavioral phenomena typically
associated with autism. Similarly, in Bergeron’s view, a “precocious encounter” with the
Other’s desire is “ravaging,” “unbearable and traumatizing.” The autistic subject has “run
afoul” of the alienation that accompanies the Other’s desire and refuses to cede naming
rights to its mental representations.
In the Interlude we posed the basic question as to “why” the desire of the Other is
so traumatizing for these subjects. Maleval points towards the need to empty the signifier
of jouissance that arises from the indeterminant element of the Other’s desire residing in
the cut between S1 and S2. Bergeron goes further and suggests that “an exteriority within
the maternal voice, a ‘foreign Thing’ within the uterine environment” sets autistic
formation in motion, leaving this subject to reject “the time and space conditioned by the
desire of the Other.” 409 Bergeron sees this space as constitutive of “a perceptible field”
that the autistic subject refuses to enter. By invoking the zero point of das Ding as the
“foreign Thing,” Bergeron acknowledges the ontological dimension of autism. Although
she leaves open the question of why autistic individuals are so susceptible to this
“exteriority,” elsewhere she describes how the Voice “mobilizes the subject’s drive.”
Considered in the absence of a “pathway” of the drive to the Other, one conclusion to
draw here is that autistic individuals are left to deal with the mobilized drive without the
mediating and structuring support of the Other.
The movement perspective describes a radical spatiotemporal disjunction between
autistic individuals and neurotypical individuals. In my view, this disjunction supports
shifting the emphasis away from the autistic subject’s refusal to cede the object, towards
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a conceptualization that acknowledges how fundamental movement differences preclude
this exchange from the outset of subject formation. We can maintain that the desire of the
Other confronts the subject with something radically unknowable, a kernel of the Real
lurking beyond what is recognizable in other people. However, we must add that for the
autistic subject this kernel is less salient, diluted perhaps, because the corporeal
coordinates used in a determination of “like me and unlike me” are irreducible to those of
neurotypical subjects. In an embodied system described as “noisy,” the Real of the
Other’s desire simply adds to the noise. Further, the negation inherent to signifying
structure, brought about by the slippage of the signifier, is lacking the most basic
moorings by which neurotypical subjects orient to this fundamental uncertainty. It is not
that autistic individuals do not “want to enter the time or the space conditioned by the
desire of the Other,” but rather that they cannot enter this space because they are
calibrated to a different intersubjective rhythm altogether.
The Shape of the Other and the Shape of the Object
If das Ding is not located with the nebensmensch, it may seem that we have
reinforced the etymological root of the term autism: autos. Lacking a pathway to the
Other, these subjects are locked into themselves, too occupied by the chaos of their world
to attempt an affective engagement with others. This would be a misstep in direct conflict
with Sinclair’s writing in Don’t Mourn for Us. In that setting, Sinclair’s sharpest criticism
is aimed at parents who lament the inability to connect with their autistic child and
assume this precludes any chance for a meaningful relationship. As Sinclair points out,
this perception is grounded in the parent’s “own experiences and intuitions about
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relationships” rather than the child’s innate incapacity. Instead, what they lack is a
“shared system” of “signals and meanings.” Sinclair recommends these parents “back up
to levels more basic than you’ve probably thought about before.” With this in mind, we
will examine the basic components of a “shared system” and consider how a Lacanian
framework might define Sinclair’s “levels more basic.”
We have noted that objet a is key to understanding how lacking subjects
constitute their world. Given how the object links the body, the signifier, and the Other, I
propose it is equally crucial for grasping its role in a “shared system” as well. For
interpersonal conduct to register in a meaningful sequence, discrete acts must be
perceived positionally within a dispositional field. In Boothby’s account, objet a is the
“dispositional object” that frames the dispositional field. 410 Because of the way it
operates outside awareness to constitute awareness, the object quite literally “disposes”
the subject towards certain ways of perceiving, acting, and desiring. Boothby makes two
related observations that are especially pertinent here. First, he describes the “perceiving
body” as a dispositional field when it “absents itself to make things present.” Second, he
observes the body as “the original matrix of signification, the ground upon which the
synchrony of the most elemental signifying system will be oriented.”
Taken together, we can see how the neurotypical body is structured – or
predisposed – towards an intersubjective, “shared system.” The exchange of signifiers
with the Other is a supremely embodied activity that sustains the space for lack directly
on the body. A shared system is shared across a mutually held embodied lack. With objet
a “strangely suspended between the subject and the other,” a “shared understanding of
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signals and meanings” exists within a dispositional field structured to readily include the
nebensmensch, to whom neurotypically lacking subjects trace their lost object. 411
However, as we have worked to show, the autistic subject does not encounter the
Other in such a way as to open the dialectical exchange of objet a. A “noisy” body does
not recede from awareness to establish a dispositional field, so much as it clouds the
positional emergence of what might be perceived or cognized. A memoryless body that
must constantly establish new spatiotemporal coordinates provides an ever-shifting
“ground” that disrupts the “synchrony” of a signifying system. Yet as we move away
from a psychoanalytic model of autism oriented around the willful refusal to cede the
object, in order to propose an alternate schema based in movement differences, we must
examine it in this context more closely.
This is a unique challenge given how the movement perspective favors observable
phenomena and psychoanalysis aims towards the imperceptible conditions of possibility
within which observable phenomena emerge. However, there are at least two areas where
such a leap seems feasible. Previously we noted how Brincker and Torres (2013) describe
the importance of “motor priors” for triangulating between dynamic changes in one’s
body and similarly dynamic objects in the perceptual realm. As they put it: “When
predictable and reliable, these [motor priors] serve as malleable anchors to adaptively
help separate internal from external influences and enable the system to discriminate
intended from spontaneous variations.” 412
I propose we consider the role of these “malleable anchors” as structurally
analogous to that of objet a. Both function to affix the subject to something, while
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retaining a dynamic fluidity relative to the systems they support. Objet a tethers the
subject to the desire of the Other at a point of lack, qua lack. It is a floating anchor whose
binding strength is operative in the absence of any fixed positional manifestation. Motor
priors constitute the body’s frame of reference for registering dynamic changes in
position, even as the environmental context in which these movements occur is itself
subject to change. They are “malleable” to the extent that they demonstrate no discrete
positionality in the present. Instead, motor priors establish a dispositional field within
which positional movements are articulated. By anchoring perceptual phenomena, they
evoke the stability and “constant structure” of das Ding. Motor priors and objet a
function to orient the subject to the horizon of knowability within their perceptual field.
In both cases, something not given to consciousness constitutes the conditions for
conscious awareness.
To further assist with this conceptual scaffolding from objet a to kinesthetic motor
priors, we must revisit Boothby’s analysis of the phoneme from Freud as Philosopher. In
linguistic theory, the phoneme is the smallest discernible unit of sound contained in a
word, that supports distinguishing between otherwise phonetically similar terms. As
Boothby explains, the phoneme “functions solely as a marker of difference” whose
positionality is “immediately swallowed up by its role in establishing a field of
dispositionality.” 413 It is a “hinge between sound and meaning,” that “functions to link a
system of oppositions modeled on a logic of embodiment with a domain of meaning that
transcends all reference to the body.” 414 As such, the phoneme is a “unique intersection
of positionality and dispositionality,” that assists in the subject’s semantic “fore-grasp” of
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an utterance even before the utterance can be said to have been heard. 415 Paradoxically,
this logic entails that one can only hear what one is predisposed to understand. Boothby
theorizes that the phoneme sustains a structural opening for lack in the auditory realm.
Objet a marks a similar “locus of indeterminacy,” that “is linked to bodily structures, but
is also crucially distinct from all embodiment.” 416 Like the phoneme, objet a disposes the
subject towards a certain way of desiring based in how it holds a space for what is
unknowable.
By this logic, in the context of “predictable and reliable” motor priors, I suggest
neurotypical subjects possess a “fore-grasp” of certain movements that precede their
registration as such. Brincker and Torres describe a “predictive anticipation” that helps
track the dual vectors of one’s “own body position and motion in time, but also the
contents of what is perceived.” 417 To account for the inherent variability of such
movements, they theorize that neurotypical bodies accumulate a “probabilistic
expectation about the variability itself,” meaning what can be registered about a
movement is dependent upon an embodied “fore-grasp” of the stochastic field within
which it occurs. 418 Just as objet a frames the perceptual field, motor priors enumerate the
range of possibility wherein movements can be defined as such. As “malleable anchors,”
they assist in the binary determination of intended/spontaneous and internal/external.
They convert noise into “actively sampled and sharpened informative ‘signals.” 419 On
one level, they “hinge” between changes in the body and changes in the environment. On
another, they hinge between sensed phenomena and the meaningfulness of this
phenomena.
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If motor priors and objet a function similarly as “malleable anchors,” the absence
of motor priors for the autistic subject substantiates the suspicion that objet a is not active
between this subject and the Other. Regardless of whether this originates from a refusal
to cede the object or the absence of a viable partner for exchange, such a structural
comparison relies on an alignment of what is constitutively indeterminant in the subject’s
spatiotemporal embodiment, with the opening of a similar space in the signifier,
exemplified in Boothby’s analysis of the phoneme as an anchoring “hinge.”
Returning to Sinclair’s essay, we must go further to link objet a with the “shared
understanding of signals and meanings” that constitutes the system in question, and
ultimately back to the subject’s way of being as it relates to das Ding. To this end, we can
turn to another strand of the movement perspective that examines how sensorimotor
differences affect an individual’s ability to participate in social interactions, as well as the
more fundamental question of what constitutes a social interaction as such. We will
conclude by using the idea of “enjoyment” to tie together objet a, Sinclair’s “shared
system,” movement differences, and das Ding.

<><><><><><><><><>

In Embodiment and sense-making in autism (2013), Hanne De Jaegher argues for
an “enactive account” of autism that understands social functioning to be inseparable
from embodiment and movement. Enactive cognitive science “uses the notion of sensemaking to define cognition as the meaningful way in which an agent connects with her
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world.” 420 Sense-making is a “thoroughly embodied activity,” emerging through a
purposeful, yet mutually informative exchange between the embodied subject and its
environment. De Jaegher cites a “deep continuity between the processes of living and
those of cognition.” In this way, she evokes a sort of corporeal social constructivism,
wherein the individual “casts a web of significance on its world” from a “non-neutral
perspective,” in support of the “constitutive and interactive autonomy of living
systems.” 421
Because sense-making is interactive, encounters between certain subjects may
yield participatory sense-making. De Jaegher suggests that when “patterns of
interpersonal coordination” are present across different modalities (e.g. the timing and
rhythm of bodily movements and the cadence of verbal exchanges), neurotypical subjects
“literally participate in each other’s sense-making.” 422 De Jaegher cites research that
describes how “interactors’ perception-action loops are coupled and interlaced with each
other.” As interactors, neurotypical subjects are “highly plastic” and susceptible to the
“double influence” of the dialectical exchange inherent to a social interaction. By
contrast, “difficulties with coordinating and interacting in autism will lead to hampered
participatory sense-making.” 423 This distinction encapsulates Sinclair’s notion that the
lack of a “shared system” is at the root of social disjunction between autistic and
neurotypical individuals.
An interesting aspect of De Jeagher’s analysis pertains to how, for neurotypical
subjects, the interaction process itself becomes a third term in this formula. As she puts it,
“interactions self-organize and self-maintain through processes of coordination, including
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its breakdowns and repairs.” She uses the example of encountering someone in a narrow
hallway: “sometimes…in order to avoid bumping into each other, you both step in front
of each other a few times, each moving to the same side at the same time – when all you
both wanted was to continue on your way.” The interaction process as such, becomes
“autonomous” and “modulates the sense-making that takes place.” De Jaegher’s analysis
of this phenomena even takes on a vaguely psychoanalytic feel. The interaction process
“sometimes continues in a way that none of its participants intends,” making it
“impossible to say who is the ‘author’ of the intentions.” This implies that the “shared
system” of neurotypical individuals functions, in part, at the expense of their autonomy as
agents and invokes the influence of something exterior to all participants, an “extraindividual dimension.” 424
A psychoanalytic interpretation of participatory sense-making requires that we
understand social interactions as occurring between desiring beings. In this way, the
interaction as such is constituted by what is radically absent for the interactors
themselves. To speak of the interaction process in this way is to invoke objet a as the
dispositional object that, as Boothby puts it, is “strangely suspended between the subject
and the other, belonging to both and neither.” 425 Both the participatory interaction and
objet a “modulate” sense-making from a third position, exterior to the semantic,
corporeal, or perceptual content of the interaction itself. In the participatory sense-making
of neurotypical subjects, we find a schema reminiscent of the sacrificial ceding of the
object to the Symbolic Other. Present in both cases is an unconscious activity that serves
to moderate the subject’s encounters with actual others. Movement differences entail that
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autistic subjects cannot give themselves over to the “self-organizing” autonomy of social
interactions, not because they refuse to cede the object, but because they do not
synchronize with neurotypical subjects in the necessary way.
De Jaegher contrasts the enactive approach with three prevalent theories of
autistic cognition: Theory of Mind, Weak Central Coherence, and Executive
Functioning. 426 In her view, these theories are limited by their “piecemeal functionalism”
and overall reductionism. They fail to take into account how embodiment and movement
are intimately linked with and constitutive of social functioning. Instead, by
foregrounding the “role of the body in subjectivity and cognition,” De Jaegher argues that
an enactive approach can be integrative of “autistic embodiment and autistic
psychology.” From this premise, she undertakes a project that promotes the universality
of sense-making across all subjects, while also considering what is unique in autistic
sense-making. De Jaegher attempts to de-stigmatize “autistic” behaviors by speculating
as to how they makes sense given differences in autistic sense-making. As she puts it:
If autistic embodiment is intrinsically linked with autistic sense-making, we can
hypothesize that many autistic people will find joy or significance in behaviors
and embodied styles of sense-making that are considered “autistic.” 427
In the Interlude, we noted Jean-Claude Maleval’s idea that “if autistic subjects
think and function differently it is because they derive enjoyment in a very specific
way.” 428 The thematic resonance with De Jaegher’s thinking, although grounded in a
different definition of the subject, is clear. However, by linking sense-making with
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enjoyment, and enjoyment with das Ding, we can proceed with a more direct analysis of
how sense-making evokes das Ding – and ultimately, the subject’s way of being.
In a psychoanalytic model, the subject enjoys by satisfying the drive. Importantly,
this does not occur through achieving a definitive end, but in the action of continually
reaching for it. For neurotypical subjects, the lacking Other offers a signifying matrix to
facilitate this mode of enjoyment: the signifier never reaches the signified, one word
begets another, and so on. When Lacan suggests that “distance” from das Ding is
“precisely the condition of speech,” he grants that the signifier, regulated by Symbolic
Law, establishes a limit to jouissance as an excessive form of enjoyment. 429 The signifier,
afforded its properly dispositional function of negation, distances the subject from the
Real. Because the Real is antithetical to meaning and sense-making, distance from das
Ding (as the site of the drive and the source of jouissance), is a condition for meaning and
sense-making. Too much enjoyment threatens the subject qua thinking-being.
In De Jaegher’s enactive account, “cognizers” (note the similar phrasing to
Freud’s in the Project) engage in a mutually informing, push-pull dialectic with their
environment, in the constantly unfolding enaction of their being: “The significant world
of the cognizer is therefore not pre-given but largely enacted, shaped as part of its
autonomous activity.” 430 Sense-making relies on “a cognizer’s adaptive regulation of its
states and interactions with the world, with respect to the implications for the
continuation of its own autonomous identity.” Enactive cognitive science asks: “why do
cognizers care about their world” and “why does anything mean something to someone?”
De Jaegher considers that one’s capacity to enjoy is intertwined with sense-making as a
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“relational and affect-laden process.” Affect-laden suggests a libidinal investment, which
necessitates a limit to said investment in the form of the signifier. 431 The “cognizer’s
adaptive regulation,” in support of sense-making and autonomy, implies a method for
negating the Real.
Yet we should be quick to recall how the autonomy of the cognizer is radically
undercut by the logic of participatory sense-making. Herein lies the most promising
inroad for a psychoanalytic interpretation of De Jaegher’s approach. By ceding full
autonomy to the “extra-individual dimension” of the interaction as such, based in a
corporeal predisposition towards intersubjective synchrony, neurotypical subjects
participate in the establishment of the dispositional field necessary for the signifier’s
negation of the Real. To boot, De Jaegher states that “sense-making is a narrowing down
of the complexity of the world.” 432 In support of sense-making, the notion of “narrowing
down” invokes negation as a form of removal or withdrawal from something excessive.
From the Lacanian perspective, neurotypical subjects narrow down the world in
unconscious participation with one another, according to the Symbolic Law of the
signifier that establishes a distance from das Ding. In this way, neurotypical sensemaking is a “shared solution to the Real” embodied in the structural predisposition to
displace the drive into the fremde portion of the neighbor-Thing. 433 As Lefort speculated
and the movement perspective seemingly confirms, this is supported by an “anticipation”
of a toric Other possessing symbolic “holes of reception,” primed for the dialectic
exchange of signifying objects, giving rise to objet a as the dialectical hinge of perceptual
awareness.434 All of this comes together to reveal the neurotypical subject’s way of
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being, determined by its “relation to the structural lack in the Symbolic (the Other) with
respect to the Real of the drive.” 435
Conversely, the “non-metric space” of the autistic subject, for whom the status of
the Other has been radically called into question, is not regulated in the same way. 436 Yet
the absence of a shared system animated by the intersubjective exchange of objet a does
not imply the absence of any system whatsoever. Sinclair has challenged us to “back up
to levels more basic” to find common ground between neurotypical and autistic subjects.
The question of how autistic “narrowing down” is revealed through enjoyment is key to
moving forward. In the absence of the necessary conditions for participatory sensemaking in the neurotypical sense, De Jaegher points towards the autistic subject’s areas
of restricted interest and patterns of repetitive behavior as indications of autistic sensemaking. 437 Here we can draw together first-person accounts, scientific research, and
certain aspects of the Lacanian theory of autism we reviewed in the Interlude.
In consideration of the way many autistic individuals are drawn towards certain
sensory phenomena, De Jaegher considers that the purely “aesthetic element” of
perception might hold inherent value for autistic sense-making. 438 For example, she cites
the enjoyment of patterns, including: “patterns in space, in ideas, in numbers, in size, in
time.” This is supported in eye tracking studies that use a preferential looking
methodology and indicate a partiality for dynamic geometric images and patterns over
social scenes or depictions of the human form. 439 More importantly, there are myriad
similar examples across first-person accounts.
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In Up in the Clouds and Down in the Valley: My Richness and Yours, Amanda
Baggs considers that the neurotypical world is “more filtered” than her own, possibly at
the expense of “the much more direct relationships, connections, and patterns formed
between one thing and another.” 440 She explains how patterns, as opposed to the
categories established by language, are the “basis for how I understand things.” As she
describes patterns: “I mean things fitting together in certain ways, outside of me. I mean
perceiving connections without force-fitting a set of thoughts on top of them. This is how
I handle not only sensory impressions but language itself.” Although De Jaegher makes
no reference to Baggs’ writing, they appear to be kindred spirits in support of the value
inherent to autistic being, with embodiment a common theme. Baggs continues:
Everything I perceive – from the movements of my body to the smells in the air –
goes into my mind and sifts itself into similar kinds of patterns…I consider these
patterns and connections to be more my language than the words that appear on
the screen when I let my fingers use the keyboard. And far more my language
than the words that have popped out of my mouth throughout my life. They are
how the world makes sense to me. Anything else is just the artifact of a shoddy
translation. 441
Baggs’ description of how patterns structure her subjectivity begs the question of
whether the signifier is the only entity capable of negating the Real. Elsewhere in her
essay, Baggs explains how she must “scale the cliffs of language” to use words. She
laments how “language was built mostly by non-autistic people” and the limitations this
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places on her ability to express “the most important things about the way I perceive and
interact with the world.”
In The Reason I Jump, Naoki Higashida describes a similar alienation from the
signifying structure of neurotypical language, as well as an embodied enjoyment of
linguistic material. 442 In response to the question “Why do you ask the same questions
over and over?” Naoki offers that “it lets us play with words.” The repetition of certain
questions is “great fun…it’s playing with sound and rhythm.” 443 Recalling that the drive
is satisfied in the repetition of its failure to obtain a lost object, the affective engagement
Naoki describes serves as a prime example of autistic enjoyment, reminiscent of
Laurent’s notion that this subject is “glued to the drive.” 444
Naoki’s writing provides other examples of embodied, aesthetic enjoyment as
well. He notes how “when a color is vivid or a shape is eye-catching, then our hearts kind
of drown in it.” 445 The rotational symmetry of “spinning things fills us with a sort of
everlasting bliss.” 446 Answering the question “Why do you line up your toy cars and
blocks?” he states: “What I care about…is the order things come in, and different ways of
lining them up. It’s actually the lines and the surfaces of things like jigsaw puzzles that
we love, and things like that. When we’re playing in this way, our brains feel refreshed
and clear.” 447 In autistic sense-making, the activities that constitute a “narrowing down”
of complexity take the form of repetitious movements and patterns. Tito Mukhopadhyay,
whose writing will be discussed more so in the next section, echoes Naoki’s sentiments:
“Designs always calmed my eyes, perhaps because of their repetitive nature or perhaps
because they never questioned my eyes, ‘Tell me what I am.” 448
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In the Lacanian conceptualization of autism advanced by Eric Laurent and JeanClaude Maleval, the technique of “autism 𝑎𝑎̀ deux” seeks out the psychological and

physical manifestations of autistic enjoyment in acceptance of this subject’s unique way
of being. These might include certain topics of intellectual interest or patterns of

stereotypied movement. In the absence of Symbolic lack embodied in the Other, Laurent
and Maleval consider the autistic individual’s “islets of competence” (or areas of
restricted interest, passions, affinities, etc.) as formative of a “synthetic Other,” that
assists in the “localization of jouissance” outside the body. The synthetic Other
establishes a “rim” or “edge” that “constitutes a frontier in relation to the external world,
a channel towards it and a dynamising [sic] sensor of jouissance,” 449 It assists in autistic
sense-making by establishing a semantic field. When an object from this semantic field is
brought into play by the autistic subject, Laurent and Maleval see an opportunity to
“complexify” the membrane of the autistic rim and establish channels for the dialectical
exchange of lack. This entails elevating the object to an autistic objet a. Contrary to
Tustin’s theorization of the “autistic object” as a hinderance to mental development,
Laurent and Maleval see in it the “dynamic capacity” to “capture” the autistic subject’s
jouissance. 450 In combination with the synthetic Other, the autistic objet a can be
mobilized to open a properly dispositional field wherein autistic sense-making can occur.
Although De Jaegher seems to favor subject-oriented research that suggests
“people with autism derive pleasure from their specialized activities or thinking styles,”
she considers an alternate hypothesis whereby the autistic subject’s restricted interests
and patterns of behavior are sources of suffering. 451 Ultimately, she seeks a middle124

ground and concludes that regardless of any such definitive assessment, these
characteristics should be approached as “relevant, salient, or significant for the person
with autism” – be they socially disruptive, personally painful, or uniquely sensemaking. 452
In search of the “levels more basic” as a common ground for linking autistic being
with being a subject more generally, enjoyment presents itself as at once singular to each
subject, yet structurally universal, grounded in the ontological dimension of the drive.
However, when we observe how enjoyment emerges out of different structural
conditions, as in a comparison of autistic and neurotypical subjects, we see its
universality in sharper relief. If we can enjoy up to the point of a limit there is sensemaking, and where there is sense-making there is a solution to the Real. Yet first-person
accounts, autism research, and clinical observations suggest an autistic affective
engagement with the world walks the line between overwhelming jouissance and
circumscribed enjoyment.
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Review, Reset, and Discussion
Our ultimate aim has been to consider Jim Sinclair’s statement that “autism is a
way of being” from the perspective of Lacanian theory. So far in Chapter 2, we have
applied the psychoanalytic conceptualization of “being,” developed in Chapter 1, to eye
tracking and sensorimotor autism research. The definition of “being” we advanced is
grounded in the details of the subject’s relation to the Freudian Thing. Because the
underlying mechanism at work in Freud’s sketch of das Ding in the Project for a
Scientific Psychology relies on the basic activities of looking, moving, and remembering,
the significant differences autistic individuals demonstrate in these activities lends
substantial support to the notion of autism as a unique way of being.
In the Interlude we considered autism from the perspective of psychoanalysis
more generally, including alongside several Lacanian analysts. We noted the problematic
history of a psychogenic etiology, as well as the conceptualization developed by Frances
Tustin, whereby autistic being is inherently traumatic. While contemporary Lacanian
theorists offer a method for approaching the autistic subject that honors her singularity
and recognizes autism as a “different mode of subjective functioning,” we raised
concerns about an element of culpability ascribed to autistic individuals and noted its
dissonance with Sinclair’s notion of autistic being. 453 Although psychoanalysis views all
subjectivity as fundamentally defensive, Jean-Claude Maleval and Danielle Bergeron
deploy the rhetoric of “choice” and “refusal” to account a particular defensive gesture
underlying autistic subject formation, the intentional withholding of objet a.
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Based on the implications of the movement perspective, taken in the context of
Freud’s locating of das Ding in the “non-comparable portion” of the Other, we suggested
an alternate interpretation. In this approach, autistic subjects do not “refuse” or “choose
not” to cede the object of the drive to the Other, so much as the Other does not emerge
within the spatiotemporal (nor semantic) coordinates necessary for such a dialectic
exchange. Further, we picked up from a question posed by Rosine and Robert Lefort in
their extended case studies of “Nadia” and “Marie-Francoise,” to consider whether
neurotypical individuals maintain an innate “anticipation” of the Other in such a way as
to steer that subject towards a non-autistic structural formation. The absence of such an
anticipation, grounded in movement differences, was offered to counter the notion of
refusal. Simply, with the very emergence of the autistic subject, the signifying matrix for
facilitating an exchange of objet a is not active in a way recognizable according to
neurotypical criteria.
By reading the movement perspective through a Lacanian framework, we
grounded autism as a way of being based in how the universal activities of looking,
moving, and remembering affect the establishment of the “like me/unlike me” division of
the Other for autistic subjects. Freud specifically names these activities as necessary
components for positioning the Thing in the “unlike me” dimension of the Other, after
similarities in externally perceived movements are related back to one’s embodied
memories of similar actions. Sensorimotor research shows how the autistic body is
“noisy” and “memoryless,” meaning certain movements are not smoothly registered in
consciousness and the lack of accrued “kinesthetic motor priors” do not assist in an
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embodiment that unfolds in a linear sense across space and time. By understanding
sensorimotor differences as essential to the autistic subject’s experience of the world (see:
Robledo et al. 2012), the movement perspective links the physical with the social in a
way that resonates with Freud’s idea that “it is on his fellow-creatures that a human being
first learns to cognize.”
We have attempted to walk a line between articulating a structural/psychoanalytic
account of autistic being, while keeping an eye towards the necessary conditions for the
emergence of the subject more universally. From a Lacanian perspective, these include:
lack, the signifier, and the Other. Sinclair’s essay challenges us to conceive of autism as
inseparable from the being of autistic subjects, but by focusing on the profound
differences that demonstrate this inseparability, we have risked undermining the status of
autistic individuals as subjects. If das Ding is not aligned with the Symbolic Other, what
mediating substance establishes distance from and access to jouissance? If, as Amanda
Baggs suggests, neurotypical language does not adequately speak for her experience of
the world, how might autistic desire be embodied in the absence of the signifier? If the
Other does not emerge as a viable partner for the exchange of signifying objects,
regardless of whether we can absolve the autistic subject from a charge of refusing to
cede the object, how and where does objet a arise?
The Lacanian answer for these questions lies with the Real: a lack of mediating
substance to establish distance from the drive leaves the subject to confront the Real;
proximity to objet a, one possible result of the non-existent lacking Other, is likewise an
encounter with the Real signaled by anxiety. Yet as we have noted, the Real emerges at
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an impasse of signification; it is resistant to thought, whether we define it as the exchange
of signifiers with the Other in articulation of one’s desire, or in terms of sense-making
and the “narrowing down of the complexity of the world.”
In an attempt to move towards an affirmative definition of autistic being and
locate the common ground of Sinclair’s “levels more basic,” we followed the enactive
approach and considered how differences in autistic sense-making suggest a unique mode
of autistic enjoyment. We connected enjoyment to das Ding and subsequently to the
subject’s way of being. It is from this position that we will move into the final segments
of this project. First, we will take up a psychoanalytically modified question of autistic
sense-making in the context of Tito Mukhopadhyay’s writing.
The Object of Autistic Sense-Making
Across the writing of Amanda Baggs, Naoki Higashida, and Tito Mukhopadhyay,
there is a recurring theme that hints at the unique structure underlying autistic sensemaking. In my view, this can be described, roughly, as a “dialectical disjunction”
between certain elements of cognition and sensory-perception that neurotypical
individuals experience in a gestalt whole, or with the otherwise smooth transition
between modalities. Examples include differences in shifting from remembering to
experiencing, from one sensory modality to another, and from perceptual experiencing to
semantic construction. I propose to categorize these phenomena as perceptual, temporal,
and semantic modes of hinging, based in the role objet a typically assumes in hinging
between dialectically opposed registers, enabling the positional awareness of discrete
elements within a dispositional field.
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Given the differences we have identified in the autistic subject’s relation to the
Other, as well as the implications for how movement differences might affect an autistic
person’s way of establishing a dispositional field, we can extrapolate further to suggest
objet a is not active as a dispositional object according to the same parameters as for a
neurotypical subject. In other words, the impact of the autistic subject’s drive on the
perceptual realm is not structured by the signifier of the Other. We touched upon this
disjunction in Chapter 1 when we reviewed Naoki’s encounter with the voice qua objet a.
As the determiner/regulator of what is cast out of awareness to allow any awareness
whatsoever, objet a typically operates according to Symbolic Law, by remaining
constitutively imperceptible in the establishment of a limit awareness. The dialectic
disjunction described by autistic subjects suggest the intrusion of the drive on those
aspects of perceptual awareness usually accounted for by the Other. Here we can recall
Danielle Bergeron’s suggestion that the autistic subject “does not want to enter into the
time or the space conditioned by the desire of the Other,” with the caveat that avolition is
not the driving impetus here.
In The Reason I Jump, Naoki Higashida explains how “inside my head there
really isn’t such a big difference between what I was told just now, and what I heard a
long, long time ago.” 454 In response to the question Why are you too sensitive or
insensitive to pain? Naoki eschews a biological explanation of hyper- and hyposensitivity, saying “I don’t think this is all to do with nerves and nerve endings. It’s more
a matter of ‘inner pain’ expressing itself via the body. When memories suddenly come to
people, we experience a flashback – but in the case of people with autism, memories are
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not stored in a clear order.” He goes on to say, “it’s not necessarily physical pain that’s
making us cry at all – quite possibly, it’s memory.” 455 Tito Mukhopadhyay endorses a
similar phenomenon, although the disjunction is in part temporal and perceptual: “My
boundary between imagining and experiencing something was a very delicate one.” 456
Naoki describes an aspect of his perception similarly to De Jaegher’s suggestion
that “people with autism can be properly described as having a different conception of
wholeness, one that has to do with order, patterns, exceptions, and perceptual
richness.” 457 Answering the question When you look at something, what do you see first?
Naoki explains: “When you see an object, it seems that you see it as an entire thing first,
and only afterward do its details follow on. But for people with autism, the details jump
straight out at us first of all, and then only gradually, detail by detail, does the whole
image sort of float up into focus.” 458
In De Jaegher’s enactive account, differences in which aspects of an object
become salient are ascribed to the particulars of how autistic sense-making “narrows
down” the perceptual field. Underlying this activity are sensorimotor differences, which
determine the criteria for establishing the relative significance of certain activities and
objects over others. In De Jaegher’s schema, value judgements like this are made in
support of the autonomy of the embodied system, but the psychoanalytic reframing we
offered earlier, based on enjoyment, places the drive at the heart of this equation. Naoki’s
description of an object’s constituent parts preceding the whole gives the impression that
the links of the signifying chain, distilled from linguistic components down to the
smallest discernible/separable elements of thought, are not “conditioned by the desire of
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the Other.” We might venture further that in the absence of the alignment of das Ding
with the nebensmensch, the perceptual stability and wholeness neurotypical individuals
derive from the displacement of the drive into the field of the Other is at the root of
Naoki’s subjective account.
Other examples of dialectical disjunction highlight a similar lack of affective
engagement in the field of the Other, as indications that objet a does not regulate the
hinging of opposing registers. Amanda Baggs describes how her “first memories of
speech involve not only no understanding of the meaning of words but no understanding
that words could even have meaning.” She continues by noting: “On the occasions where
I do understand the words, I can’t juggle the tone at the same time.” In a blog entry titled
“What I mean by ‘beneath’ words,” she remarks on experiencing different aspects of
words, depending on which “layer” of consciousness she is inhabiting.459 Words may
manifest as anything from auditory phenomena with no discernible meaning, as
“symbols” with the implication of a meaning that is ungraspable to her, to words in the
conventional sense.
In How Can I Talk if My Lips Don’t Move? Tito Mukhopadhyay describes
challenges with bi-modal sensory processing. 460 Additionally, he notes, “There are
components in the environment that I can miss due to the overindulgence of one sense or
an overindulgence towards one component to which my perception chooses to attend.” 461
He will either “over-see” or “under-see the components of the environment.” 462 The
involuntary occlusion of different elements from Tito’s sensory field. The similarities
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with Naoki’s account are clear, and he opens further common ground with both Naoki
and Baggs when he describes hearing someone’s voice more than their words. 463
Beyond his overindulgent senses, Tito relates a “difficulty of overassociation”
between terms as well. 464 In one example, keeping in mind his limited verbal abilities,
Tito is tasked with demonstrating his receptive language comprehension by writing out
something that was said to him. Due to the impact of synesthesia on his senses, what he
wrote described the poetic associations he drew from the vivid coloration of the speaker’s
voice. As a child, Tito would form “wrong associations between words and objects,” such
that whatever held his visual attention was named according to the words being spoken
around him at the time. 465 From the perspective of the signifier, in Tito’s case the
movement from one to another occurs in the “non-metric fashion” of the autistic subject,
so-named by Eric Laurent as an outcome of the absent phallic signifier that elaborates
lack from the first to the second Other. 466 If we take “metric” in a different sense, as the
“metering” out of a rhythmic pattern in a piece of music, then for Tito, the dual signifying
functions of metonymy and metaphor, or displacement and condensation, would seem to
march to the beat of a different drum.
Tito’s Autistic Objects and the Space of the Question
These examples show instances of dialectical disjunction occurring within the
seemingly natural vicissitudes of subjectivity: from remembering – experiencing –
imagining; to sensing (hearing/seeing/feeling) – understanding – associating; and
perceiving parts – wholes – details. As we have worked to illustrate, following Boothby’s
phenomenological analysis in Chapter 1, cross-modal hinging between semantic and
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perceptual fields is analogous to the basic orientation of consciousness to the
unconscious. In his account, the “perception of any object always occurs within what
might be called a “dispositional field,” the bulk of which “remains unconscious.” 467
Something must give way, constitutively speaking, for anything to emerge. 468 And so, in
cases of dialectical disjunction, the status of the hinge between the positional/conscious
and the dispositional/unconscious – i.e., that which regulates the basic activity of
subjective experience – must be considered directly.
We have routinely applied Boothby’s notion of objet a as a dispositional object.
In Freud as Philosopher, he considers how the object “functions as a particular
enhancement, we might even say a ‘focusing,’ of the dispositional field.” 469 While it
“cannot occupy the positional focus of attention,” objet a “remains active in the invisible
framing that produces all positional awareness.” 470 Objet a is “less an object than the
function by which objects will be established.” 471 In its most metapsychological role,
“objet a functions to ‘dispose’ the subject in the direction of the ungraspable horizon of
the Thing.” 472 Inversely, it can be said that das Ding is the condition of possibility for the
dispositional, meaning the sensorimotor evidence we reviewed to suggest that autistic
subjects do not position the Thing in the nebensmensch in a “neurotypical way,” has
implications for the basic establishment of a dispositional field and “all positional
awareness.” 473
Further, in the case of “sense-making,” described by De Jaegher as a “narrowing
down of the complexity of the world” in support of stable, positional awareness of what
remains, das Ding likewise establishes a horizon of possibility. In Boothby’s view, “The
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Thing marks the space of an open question. As Freud said of it, the establishment of such
a space of the question is what allows the human being to learn to cognize.” 474 By
reading this together with De Jaegher’s enactive account, sense-making is not only a
“whittling down” of reality from a greater “whole;” it is the introduction of lack into the
Real, which only retroactively posits the plenitude of the world.
Earlier we supplemented De Jaegher’s account to include objet a, hinted at in her
analysis of participatory sense-making as the autonomy of the intersubjective “interaction
as such,” because of how it subverts the conscious intentionality of the participants
involved. Due to movement differences, autistic individuals do not engage in sensemaking in the same way. Moreover, as we see in the examples of dialectical disjunction
described by Baggs, Higashida, and Mukhopadhyay, the relation between a positional
object and the dispositional field in which it exists does not appear to be regulated by
objet a in the neurotypical sense either. To consider autistic being and autistic sensemaking in the affirmative sense means, ironically, to consider how autistic subjects
introduce lack/absence into their world. If it is not in dialectical concert with the
Symbolic Other, then how?
From here we will focus on a succession of phenomena Tito Mukhopadhyay
describes in How Can I Talk if My Lips Don’t Move? These include specific objects of
interest and sensory assemblages that engage the body and assist in Tito’s sense-making.
I propose we interpret them as autistic objets a and consider how they mark “the space of
the question” that supports sense-making. In the thinking of Maleval and Laurent, the
autistic object is manifest in whatever physical, sensorial, or subject-matter object the
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subject is drawn towards out of its inherent “affinities” or “passions.” Importantly, these
need not only represent the hyperlexic intellectual investments of savants. As Maleval
theorizes, the autistic object initially supports the autistic “edge” or “rim” that
“constitutes a frontier in relation to the external world” and assists in the “localization of
jouissance.” In its “developed forms,” as in, when autistic individuals are supported to
foster their predilections, not earn them through performing adaptive “prosocial
behavior,” the autistic object “possesses a remarkable dynamic capacity” to “complexify”
the rim, opening an intersubjective dispositional field, and subsequently the “space of the
question.”
In Tito’s writing, he describes how certain objects and sensorial assemblages
assist him to “secure” his “scattered senses,” and allow his thoughts to “flow.” 475 He
writes about mirrors, his shadow, staircases, flapping his hands and rotating his body.
Common to these phenomena is their ability to open up a narrative dimension in his
cognition, creating “stories.” In an early example, he recounts obsessing over a particular
mirror in his family’s home, because “standing in front of a mirror helps secure my
scattered senses.” 476 The scattering and shattering of senses “can stop all through
processes, making it impossible to continue doing an activity that involves reasoning or
using the voluntary muscles of the body.” 477 Eventually, he would “finally reach the
mirror in the hope of seeing a story and in the hope of some silence.” 478 In the absence of
“those stories, recognizing and recalling a person or a situation is very difficult.” 479
Tito’s stories open an associative web, or signifying matrix, that helps orient him
to the world. The structural displacement inherent to the narrative flow of a story evokes
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the opening of lack necessary for “sense-making.” In the field of the mirror, Tito
observes: “More than the reflections, I was interested in the essence of the reflected
objects and the possible stories about them.” 480 Interpreted through Boothby’s
framework, stories are constitutive of a dispositional field that, in the case of the mirror,
frames the positionality of a reflected object and allows his thoughts to “flow” more
generally. By securing his “shattered senses” and facilitating cognition, the mirror qua
autistic objet a can be said to “capture jouissance” and “localize it” outside of him.
Tito goes on to write about how his shadow was his “greatest companion.” 481
There is a shift in these passages that is quite revealing of the way an autistic objet a
relates to the Synthetic Other. Tito’s shadow was “an extension of my body,” and the
“feeling of losing my shadow was like losing a part of my body.” 482 Approached in this
way, as his de-facto body double, Tito’s shadow was alienating and rivalrous. Although it
engaged his body, its shape and dimensions were contingent on the variations of light in a
given space, contorting Tito’s body-double into new, unfelt and untraceable forms. But
“even if I could not control its size, I could at least control its actions.” Occasionally, Tito
felt the need to “teach it some discipline” by jumping endlessly. 483
Tito’s shadow never told him any stories. Instead, it “followed [him] around,
blocking stories as it always did with its greater story of nothingness.” 484 The progression
of Tito’s autistic objets a shows how he remedied his obsessive rivalry with his shadow
by opening a dynamic, indeterminate space within it. In one example, Tito’s hands “made
a connection” with his shadow and “would flap excitedly at the sight of [it].” 485 His
flapping hands would become “transparent as they moved faster and faster, ready to
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become so transparent as if to challenge their shadows, ‘How would you shape me
now?’” Tito “needed to continue flapping and maintain their transparency with [his]
speed.” 486 In this dispositional space, stretched across a dynamic, transparent field,
“stories passed in and out,” negating the narrative blockage of his shadow. 487
In another example, Tito describes learning how to use chalk to trace the outline
of his shadow on the floor. “As I did so, I started seeing shadows in a new light. I could
now trap their shapes within the boundaries of my chalk tracing. Those traced shapes
remained there on the floor long after I had moved my hands away from those spots, like
pieces of my own history.” 488 He goes on to reflect that he could “seek out new stories in
those shapes on the floor.” 489 In the example of his flapping hands, Tito opened an
indeterminate space within his shadow that allowed stories to pass in and out. With the
chalk tracing, Tito cancelled his shadow by inscribing it, and then exchanged the empty
husk for new stories.
In a final example, Tito remarks on how “staircases filled me with wonder
because I saw my shadow splitting up into different vertical and horizontal planes as I
climbed up and down them.” 490 He then internalized the wonder of staircases, which he
would “mentally climb” with his “shadow in front of [him], broken by alternate vertical
and horizontal planes.” 491 Similar to the negation of his chalk tracings, staircases did
similar violence to the inertia of his shadow that blocked his stories. Perhaps we can
appropriately observe that the word is indeed the murder of the Thing. 492
As an “extension” of his body that blocked stories, Tito’s shadow emerges as the
rivalrous double that is the specular imago. Yet in the absence of a dispositional field
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guaranteed by the stable coordinates of neurotypical embodiment, Tito’s imago was not
“ratified” by the big Other of the Symbolic, and the element of the drive engaged by the
imago was initially granted no signifying matrix for its deferral.493 This was at the
expense of sense-making, leaving only “stories of nothingness.” We might speculate
further that in this permutation, Tito’s shadow was a literal embodiment of the gaze. It
was resistant to narrative displacement; it occluded stories as a stain signifying
“nothingness.”
By pulling his shadow into the orbit of other, newly-fostered activities and
interests (i.e., hand-flapping and climbing staircases), Tito negated its nothingness.
Although the Symbolic dimension he established was not embodied by the linguistic
signifier, the dynamic “transparency” of his flapping hands, the “splitting up” of the
staircase, and the “trapping” of the chalk tracings all disrupted his shadow’s inertia by
introducing lack. Is this not still the basic trajectory of the mirror phase, only played out
in a uniquely autistic way? The signifying objects Tito deployed were plenty capable of
cancelling the Real, even if they did not originate with the Other. from his Synthetic
Other
To conclude, we will double back to consider Tito’s mirror as an objet a par
excellence. In conjunction with Eric Laurent, Jean-Claude Maleval, and Richard
Boothby, we have theorized the autistic objet a as uniquely selected by each subject and
capable of assisting in sense-making by “capturing” jouissance. In this way, it may offer
the autistic subject a “solution to the Real” that is irreducible to the neurotypical
elaboration of lack along the linguistic signifying chain. By taking objet a as the
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“dispositional object” that orients the subject to the “ungraspable horizon of the Thing,”
we considered how it functions through opening an indeterminate “space of the
question,” or lack. 494
In Tito’s case, we interpreted his description of the conditions necessary for his
thoughts and stories to “flow” as revealing the intervention of objet a, manifest in the
structural displacement inherent to a narrative. Tito opens How Can I Talk by explaining
his relationship to a mirror in his family’s home from early childhood. He and the mirror
had a mutual desire to tell one another stories. As he peered into the mirror, the world
behind him “became transparent.” 495 The mirror could “absorb” the perceptual elements
of the room. Tito explains how “stories waited for me behind the mirror. So I was needed
on its other side. There was no great trouble to go through the mirror to the other side. All
I needed to do was to stare intensely at any shadow on the corner of the wall as it was
reflected in my eyes.” 496 By engaging with the “nothingness” of a shadow as it was
mediated by the mirror, Tito was able to traverse a boundary to access the stories he
craved.
In an interview with Ralph James Savarese, Tito is asked about mirrors in the
context of how he balances between different aspects of his cognition. The entire
exchange proceeds as follows:
R.S. I'm wondering how you reconcile your imaginative visions with your
scientific knowledge, your reason with your "fantastic abilities"? At the end
of How Can I Talk…, you proclaim, "Now, as I stand in front of a mirror, trying
to find some inspiration for my next story, I can clearly separate the physical laws
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of reflection with the planes of incidence and reflection from my enchanting
sensory experiences, leading my mind to differentiate between my alive and
interactive world and the reality about what the mirror is, a mere object with a
plane surface" (213). The customary narrative of maturity, both for the individual
and for the nation, is from primitive animism to rational disenchantment. What's
so interesting to me is that your education, while allowing you to distinguish
between fancy and fact, has in no way quelled your deeply animistic sense.

T.M. It's like this. This is full and that is full. Take the full away from the full and
what you are left with is full again. And this "full" I am talking about is Zero. 0 0 = 0. It is this Zero that is the center of all numbers, balancing the positive and
negative on either side. So it is easy to imagine the Big Bang and Creation from
Zero. The other side of Zero is not perceivable or conceivable to us. What is
understood by us is the plane surface of the mirror and the laws on this side.

Who knows what laws rule the other side if the plane surface of the mirror is
understood as Zero? 497
Tito’s response is delightfully oblique. The most direct interpretation places the
“plane surface of the mirror” at the intersection between his “imaginative visions” and
“deeply animistic sense” on one side, with his “scientific knowledge” and “rational
disenchantment” on the other. Because both sides are “full,” we can consider Tito to be
balancing the epistemological scales between intuition/rationalism and empiricism.
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Although we might question the validity of the antagonism Savarese establishes between
such modes of knowing, suffice to say that Tito identifies the mirror, broadly speaking, as
a “hinge” between them.
We have already named Tito’s mirror as an autistic objet a based on how it
captures his jouissance and secures his senses to facilitate the flow of his thoughts. Here
we can consider how it opens the “space of the question” and orients him to a “zone of
something unknown” as well. 498 Tito places the mirror surface at the Zero point between
the known and the unknowable, “balancing the positive and the negative.” All that can be
known is the mirror’s “plane surface.” If we take the mirror as the dialectical hinge
between consciousness and the unconscious, factored here as “the other side of Zero,”
which is “not perceivable or conceivable to us,” then the Zero point of the mirror surface
is precisely the locus of lack that is objet a. Tito suggests thought is bound by an
epistemological horizon manifest in this reflective plane. If this is the case, then all that is
known consciously owes its knowability to the unconscious knowledge on the other side
of the mirror, and Tito’s mirror truly orients him to the “ungraspable horizon of the
Thing” at the core of his being.
We set out to consider autism as a way of being. As Jim Sinclair explains it, this
entails an acceptance of the innateness of autism to the autistic individual; of its
constitutive inseparability from the all aspects of an individual’s being; and the totality of
its effects on how that individual experiences the world. Sinclair lays bare what is at
stake: to mourn for an individual because she is autistic is to mourn that she exists.
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In part, this exercise was driven by a concern that as the prevalence of diagnoses
increases and more individuals are interpellated as being “on the spectrum,” the
underlying uncertainty about what autism is will be hastily covered over in favor of
approaches that seek to ameliorate suffering (and, cynically, to reduce costs and increase
assimilation) without considering the extent to which this suffering results more from the
pervasive ignorance of autistic being, as opposed to the pathology of autism itself. To this
end, there is an element of substantiation inherent to this project, foremost in terms of the
viability of Lacanian theory to conceive of autism as a way of being, but also more
broadly as a matter of the critical and investigative potential of psychoanalysis itself. On
the latter point we will have to defer, but as a method for approaching autism as a way of
being, taking into account both first-person/emic accounts and scientific/etic research
findings, Lacan offers a fertile system, at once highly developed and yet still open to
unique applications.
The overlying architecture of this project is as follows: Chapter 1 established what
it means to be from a psychoanalytic perspective, as well as what might be understood as
one’s particular way of being. The Interlude put our task into the context of the
psychoanalytic discourse of autism, and Chapter 2 engaged with first-person accounts
and scientific research.
To start, we took a structural approach, following Lacan’s general reliance on
distinct clinical structures. In the first case, we considered how the subject of the
unconscious exists in relation to das Ding, defined alternately as the source of the drive,
the “prehistoric Other,” and the “site of a fundamental blind spot.” 499 In the case of
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neurotic structure, which I consider to be analogous to neurotypical being, the subject
locates das Ding in the unknowable core of the Other and thereby establishes the
“ineluctable disposition to believe” in the Symbolic as a “shared solution to the Real.”
One’s particular way of being is thus a question of the structural configuration underlying
of the subject’s relation to the “lack in the Symbolic (the Other) with respect to the Real
of the drive.” 500 Further, we put forth objet a as a reference point of lack, useful for
tracing conscious phenomena back to the unconscious structures from which they
emerge, based on how objet a holds Imaginary and Symbolic elements in dialectic
tension with one another.
The Interlude detoured through a historical and contemporary examination of
different psychoanalytic theories to grasp how they conceptualize autism. We highlighted
the problematic history of a psychoanalysis and autism, exemplified in a psychogenic
etiology and the associated the notion of “toxic parenting.” We briefly compared and
contrasted Lacan with basic aspects of Melanie Klein’s theory. This was a necessary step
to understand Frances Tustin’s theory of autism, as well as to distinguish what is unique
in a Lacanian approach. We reviewed the case studies of “Nadia” and “Marie-Francoise,”
described by Rosine and Robert Lefort as examples of Lacanian praxis; based on their
observations, we opened a topological front towards our overarching aims. From there we
reviewed three contemporary Lacanian theorists alongside Tustin and suggested the
Lacanian innovation of objet a and the overall primacy of lack as important components
for a psychoanalytic approach to autistic being to maintain resonance with Sinclair’s
criteria.
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A salient example of this takes the form of the “autistic object.” Theorized by
Tustin to account for the restricted interests and sensory profiles of autistic individuals, in
her account the autistic object supports autistic withdrawal and the “massive ‘notknowing’ and ‘not-hearing’” she views as resulting from the fundamental trauma at the
root of autism. 501 Instead, by interpreting the autistic object as an objet a, Lacanians such
as Jean-Claude Maleval and Eric Laurent consider how it possesses the potential for
opening a dialectic of exchange, especially when this occurs in the dispositional field
established by the “Synthetic Other,” embodied in the autistic subject’s affinities, or
passions.
We concluded the Interlude by considering the limitations to a psychoanalytic
approach, Lacanian and in general. Psychoanalysis sees all subjectivity as fundamentally
defensive, which on one hand levels the playing field between autistic and neurotypical
being. However, we also noted that Maleval and Danielle Bergeron attribute an element
of intentionality to the autistic subject’s particular mode of defense, theorized as the
willful retention of objet a due to a “ravaging encounter” with the desire of the Other.
This “refusal” prevents the circulation of objet a in the Symbolic field of the Other. We
returned to the Lefort’s to open an alternative interpretation whereby autistic subjects do
not relate to the Other in such a way that promotes the exchange of the object, grounded
in a topological feature of the Other’s emergence.
In Chapter 2 we applied the conceptual machinery erected in Chapter 1 and the
theoretical contextualization conducted in the Interlude to approach autism as a way of
being most directly. This included an interpretation of sensorimotor research findings,
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gathered under the umbrella of the “movement perspective,” as they pertain to Freud’s
initial sketch of the Thing from Project for a Scientific Psychology. The movement
perspective considers how autistic individuals move and perceive their environment,
based on quantitative research and first-person accounts.
Specific movement differences include the lack of accrued “kinesthetic motor
priors” that assist in determining the body’s location in space, requiring the constant
redetermination of the “here and now” on the part of autistic individuals. In other words,
muscle memory is not built up in such a way as to promote the smooth performance of
otherwise mundane physical tasks, let alone those subject to variables in the environment
or the dynamic unpredictability of another person in a social setting, leading to the
characterization of the autistic body as “memoryless.” Studies observe “reduced looking
time” at people and a preference for dynamic geometric images in autistic children.
Others note the inability to engage in pantomime activities and the spontaneous
synchronization of interpersonal rocking. The autistic body is considered “noisy” based
in how certain sensory feedback cannot interpreted as a signal and remains as
undecipherable “noise.” Self-reports supplement these findings and note challenges with
volitional action, regulating multi-modal sensory perceptions, and entire multifaceted
apparatus of social-communication. 502 Taken together, sensorimotor differences affect all
aspects of embodiment for autistic individuals.
Freud relies on the activities of moving, looking, and remembering as essential to
the subject’s isolation of an unknowable dimension of the “fellow-creature.” It is in this
“non-comparable portion” that the subject co-locates the unknowable core of its own
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being in order to emerge qua subject. The movement differences expressed by and
observed in autistic individuals support the idea that this isolation occurs according to a
different set of coordinates. I take this as compelling evidence that autism entails a
distinct way of being a subject that is irreducible to neurotypical structure formation.
From this position, we continued by reconsidering certain questions raised in the
Interlude. Instead of taking autism as the “refusal” to cede the object of the drive to the
Other, following a “ravaging” encounter with the desire of the Other, we offered that
movement differences preclude the establishment of a topologically “toric” Other and the
“symbolic holes” of reception where the object can be held in the dialectical tension of
“mine-not mine.” To wager a somewhat hasty analogy, we might liken the autistic
subject to a pilot who cannot see the airfield through dense fog and strong winds. This
pilot does not refuse to land, so much as she cannot safely and securely do so in the
absence of any necessary coordinates to determine her destination.
In search of objet a, we returned to Sinclair’s writing to consider how autistic and
neurotypical subjects lack a “shared system” capable of mediating their contact in the
way the object functions between subjects of a similar structural configuration. The
enactive approach to autism described by Hanne De Jaegher was reviewed in this context,
due to a conceptual resonance between the mechanism at play in participatory sensemaking as she describes it and Sinclair’s shared system. I included Boothby’s
interpretation of objet a as a “dispositional object” to further mediate between Sinclair
and De Jaegher. As a dispositional object, objet a is a condition of possibility of
conscious thought. When it is active between neurotypical subjects, it collectively
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disposes them towards locating das Ding in the Other, erecting a “shared system” and
promoting participatory sense-making. Inversely, I suggested that the autistic objet a
must be active in autistic sense-making, defined as the “narrowing down of the
complexity of the world.”
We continued to trace objet a through the writing of Naoki Higashida, Amanda
Baggs, and Tito Mukhopadhay. Under the ad hoc heading of “dialectical disjunction” I
cited examples from their writing that suggest objet a is not active in a neurotypical way
as the “hinge” between Imaginary and Symbolic elements. Examples included the unique
manifestation of parts over wholes, the sensory perception of an object or a word barred
from its semantic context, and the conflation of past memories with present experiences
stoked by an out-of-control drive towards hyper-association of discrete elements.
To offer an affirmative account of autistic sense-making, we concluded by pulling
examples from Mukhopadhyay’s How Can I Talk if my Lips Don’t Move? that show how
he engaged in sense-making in concert with different objects and sensory assemblages in
his environment. The main effect at issue is the lessening of jouissance and the negation
of the Real, owing to how both are antithetical to conscious awareness and sense-making.
Key among Tito’s objects was the mirror. By orienting him within a full range of what is
perceivable/conceivable and imperceptible/inconceivable – or conscious and unconscious
– the mirror’s “plane surface,” named by Tito as the “Zero point,” was posited as objet a.
So What? And What Now?
If, by any margin, I have succeeded in applying Lacanian theory in examination
and support of Sinclair’s notion of autistic being, then it is fair to ask: so what? and what
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now? In response I will offer a few brief remarks, before suggesting areas and topics for
further study.
To start, there is the potential for significant theoretical dissonance within the
position that places a psychoanalytic theory of the subject alongside a statistical analysis
of empirical differences in body movements. As such, I have attempted to take every
opportunity to formulate a psychoanalytic interpretation of these research methodologies,
before utilizing their findings in a Freudo-Lacanian context. Instead, the quantitative
observations it makes are immediately subject to interpretation within a conceptual field.
It is at this juncture that we applied a psychoanalytic metapsychology, exemplified in the
co-mingling analysis of Sinclair’s “shared system” with De Jaegher’s “participatory
sense-making.” In a psychoanalytic interpretation of movement differences, the foremost
question must pertain to how the Other engages the body and inscribes it into thought.
The movement perspective does not presume to identify a cause of autism.
However, as a result, we can equally consider that movement differences precede what
we understand as autism, and simultaneously that they are manifest in already-autistic
subjects. A similar chicken-and-the-egg deadlock emerges in the context of Lacan’s
writing on the Thing in Seminar VII, where he suggests the distance between the subject
and das Ding is “precisely the condition of speech.” 503 Can the inverse be true, such that
the absence of speech – and if not the full absence, then at least the limitations of the sort
of speech dependent on the Piercean sign described by Maleval – entails a proximity to
the Thing? 504 Maleval suggests as much by claiming autistic speech “does not represent
the drive.” 505 Laurent invokes a similar notion of proximity when he offers the autistic
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subject is “glued to the drive.” 506 Here emerges the problem of autistic being and the
Real. To characterize the former by the abundance of the latter, as we have done many
times, is to collapse the space for thought. In the absence of the signifier’s articulation
with the Real, the negation of speech does not occur; but if this can only entail a
proliferation of the Real, we risk desubjectifying the autistic subject. In my view, this
reinforces the importance of examining how autistic objects assist in uniquely autistic
sense-making, by opening lack in ways that only vaguely resemble the usual mechanisms
for neurotypical subjects.
As we noted in the introduction to Chapter 1, the lack of a definitive cause of
autism persists in spite of many attempts to offer one. Some of these, such as the
debunked theory that autism is caused by exposure to the heavy metals in vaccinations,
even promise a means for preventing further occurrences by avoiding the guilty agent
(mercury, MMR vaccines, etc.). In the most egregious cases, not only is there false hope
for prevention, but worse yet, the suggestion of a cure. I maintain that accepting autism as
a way of being is mutually exclusive with any approach that seeks to treat autism as such.
“Defeat Autism Now!” – since morphed into the Autism Research Institute – is a good
(or bad) example of this position. 507 A medical approach to autism, regardless of whether
it promises a cure or merely a lessening of one’s autistic symptoms, attempts to intervene
in the core dimension of personhood we have worked to articulate throughout this piece.
However, this is not to suggest there is nothing further to consider here. On one
hand, the work of Catherine Malabou, who applies Hegelian and Freudian theory to
contemporary neuroscience research, comes to mind. In The New Wounded: From
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Neurosis to Brain Damage (2012), Malabou examines how certain brain traumas,
including the mental decomposition of dementia, intervene in the essential coordinates
we use to define an individual agent. Rather than proffer a purely biological grounding
for the subject, Malabou’s position is highly-nuanced. She develops a dialectic analysis
of how the activity of neural plasticity “appears as an accurate balance between the
ability to change and the resistance to change.” 508 In other words, while neural plasticity
allows for the integration of new experiences into the narrative unfolding of the self,
sufficient injury “consists in the transformation of the patient’s previous personality and
in the emergence of a new individual proceeding from the explosion of the former
identity.” 509 Malabou points out the importance of affect and emotional life in gauging
the permanence of an identity over time. 510
This takes on a new significance in the context of Switched On: A Memoir of
Brain Change and Emotional Awakening (2016). In Switched On, John Elder Robison, a
well-known autistic writer and advocate, describes his experiences with the experimental
treatment, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Although Robison has a long record
of asserting the inherent value of autistic being, in accepting the TMS trial offer, “I
wanted to ‘make myself better’ in some ill-defined but powerfully felt way.” 511 His
telling how TMS profoundly altered his affective engagement with the world – and with
other people more specifically – dovetails with Malabou’s writing. Although the effects
of TMS wore off over time (often to the added peril of Robison), the susceptibility of
one’s emotional state to material intervention and the implications for reconfiguring the
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which aspects of the perceptual field gain significance over others, bears further research,
theorization, and consideration than will occur here.
The most concrete “so what” I can offer builds from Maleval’s support for
affinity therapy and Laurent’s (still quite ill-defined) notion of autism a deux. In both
cases, the areas of restricted interest and preferred objects of autistic individuals are
considered rather sacred. Given the important role we have assigned to autistic objets a in
supporting autistic sense-making, any approach or intervention that leverages access to
such an object risks doing violence to the subject. Similarly, to incentivize neurotypical
or “pro-social” behavior by withholding the object runs a similar risks. Instead, accepting
autism as a way of being asks that we remain open to the radical unrecognizability of its
various manifestations. Without sweeping aside the material realities of being autistic or
raising an autistic child, being autistic, as loudly and proudly as it were, means no less
than interrogating the “shared system” neurotypical individuals take for granted for
“levels more basic” and universal.
In the introduction to Chapter 1, I made reference to Sophie Roberts’
documentary the Wall. Roberts is sharply critical of psychoanalytic approaches to autism
as they continue to exist in France. In the particular scene under consideration, an analyst
likens the jaws of a toy crocodile to the desire of the mOther; by propping the jaws of the
crocodile with a small wooden peg, the analyst attempts to demonstrate the intervention
of psychoanalysis relative to autism: because the desire of the Other threatens unbearable
jouissance, the analyst must assist the subject to secure a space for its own desire via the
phallic signifier, cast there as the wooden peg, lest it be devoured by the mOther’s desire.
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In New Studies of Old Villains, Paul Verhaeghe offers a reworking of the Oedipus
Complex and references Lacan’s “crocodile mother” in contrast to Freud’s “primal
father.” 512 Verhaeghe notes that general shift in Lacan’s thinking away from the mother
as a source of jouissance, towards a model wherein the subject’s turn to the Symbolic
supports a defense against “the real of the jouissance as it arises from one’s own
organism.” He criticizes Freud and Lacan for hastily extracting a “generalized theory” 513
from their clinical practice. Verhaeghe’s point, essentially, is that while the mother – or
the gender-neutral caregiving first Other – is “mixed up” in the subject’s drive owing to
how it emerges extimately, psychoanalysis must attempt to support the subject to remain
open to other ways of dealing with the drive, rather than propping up older, “mythical”
methods and the fantasies of maternal jouissance or paternal punishment that sustain
them.
There is a progressive impetus in amongst contemporary Lacanians that remains
open to a critical engagement with different discourses. I hope for the continued crosspollination of ideas. For autistic subjects, who must seek relief from jouissance without
the assistance of the Symbolic Other, following their lead in support of uniquely
embodying activities and sensory-driven sense-making inventions is to accept their way
of being at “levels more basic.”
Further Study
Based on what I see as the under-tapped potential of Lacanian theory to assist in a
conceptualization of autism, there are several themes, concepts, and topics ripe for further
study. I will list them with little elaboration here:
153

•

Autistic Structure: Although I have presented Lacan’s clinical structures
as mutually exclusive, different readers focus on how Lacan moved away
from this arrangement later in his career. This raises questions of whether
to invest more theoretical effort into a head-on engagement with autistic
structure and how it is distinct from psychotic structure.

•

The Sinthome: Lacan’s concept of le sinthome presents as a framework
for further consideration of how autistic subjects establish idiosyncratic
solutions to the problems of sense-making that arise from a “noisy” and
“memoryless” body. Le sinthome is a sort of private solution. As
Verhaeghe describes it, “the aim of the creation of a sinthome is to be able
to function without a guaranteeing Other.” 514

•

Lalangue: Lacan defines lalangue as the material, or “acoustic level” of
language that engages jouissance but does not contribute a semantic
quality. 515 Lalangue remains interwoven with mature speech in the
unconscious. Recalling Naoki’s enjoyment at “playing with sound and
rhythm,” lalangue presents as another framework for understanding
autistic self-reporting.
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•

Neurodiversity: This movement sees autism as occurring within the
natural range of human variation. 516 While it normalizes and sees value
inherent to autistic individuals, it does so based on biological differences.
A direct Lacanian engagement with the underlying assumptions of
neurodiversity might open new ways of approaching difference.

•

Facilitated Communication (FC): As I have argued, autistic being may
present within a semantic field that is not immediately recognizable – or
verifiable – to neurotypical observers. One example is the controversial
practice of facilitated communication, that gained popularity in the 1980s
and 90s, but has since undergone sharp critiques from evidence-based
approaches. In the context of movement differences, a Lacanian analysis
of FC can include the mediating function of the Other to speculate as to
the mechanism at play in an approach that raises questions of authorship,
while simultaneously offering a means for stabilizing the word.
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